A STUDY OF THE ADEQUACY OF ABRAHAM MASLOW'S CONCEPT OF THE SELF TO HIS THEORY OF SELF-ACTUALIZATION

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ABSTRACT

The task of the dissertation was to determine whether Abraham Maslow developed a concept of the self to undergird his theory of self-actualization. Because of a conviction of the writer that the central theme of any theorist or artist grows out of an individual life and is consciously and unconsciously colored by that history, the study began with a close examination of biographical materials. It became clear that Maslow's theory of need fulfillment leading to self-actualization stood in dramatic contrast to his own personal deprivation during the first twenty years of his life and in some ways in contrast to the experience of his whole life. The study of the biographical roots of self-actualization theory included a separate review of the minds which influenced Maslow: Sumner, Freud, Watson, Adler, Goldstein, Benedict, Wertheimer, Fromm, Horney, and the specific ways in which this influence became manifest in Maslow's writing. This was followed by a thorough review of the theory of self-actualization: presuppositions, methodology, philosophy of human nature, deficiency and growth motivation, the hierarchy of needs and values, peak and plateau experience, being-cognition, self-actualization and self-transcendence, and, centrally, Maslow's concept of the self. Areas where Maslow's work was seen as inadequate, inconsistent or unsubstantiated were: inadequate attention paid to unconscious

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aspects of various levels of the need hierarchy, particularly with regard to the need for acceptance, and how this inadequacy weakens if not invalidates the hierarchy; subjectivity involved in Maslow's selection of subjects, illustrated by his judgment that Ruth Benedict represented a pattern of life he would call "self-actualized"; the methodology involved in Maslow's derivation of the Being-values; the lack of a philosophical framework out of which Maslow discusses Being, religion, transcendence. The areas where Maslow's thinking is most appreciated include: his focus on health; his distinction between deficiency and growth motivation; his passion for "the farther reaches of human nature."

For the purpose of comparison and contrast and because of the focus they give aspects of the self less attended to by Maslow, the concepts of the self of George Herbert Mead and Carl Jung were studied in a more limited way. These theorists correct and contribute to Maslow in the areas of the depth psychological (Jung) and the social (Mead). Each concept of the self was evaluated according to these criteria: First, is sufficient attention paid to: the physiological or biological self; the psychological self or self-image; the social self; the spiritual self; Second, is what the theorist says about the four aspects of the self intellectually and experientially credible and is it emotionally satisfying? The final chapter attempts to draw together, by way of a process of assemblage, a morphology of a more adequate concept of the self.

The self must be seen as tentative, relative, in process -- best imaged as a tendency toward integration, individuation,

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actualization. More attention must be paid (than any of the theorists under study paid) to the physiological and sociological givens which deeply affect, both consciously and unconsciously, the self that emerges as principle of integration in an individual's life.

In every aspect the self must be seen as bi-polar. Drawing on and expanding upon the dualities included in the self-concepts of the theorists in question, the following polarities are posited: the self is created by and creative of its process of formation; the self is relational and yet solitary; spontaneous and reflective; the self is conscious and unconscious; it experiences itself with both love and hate; the self is living and dying; finally, the self is both feminine and masculine. The final chapter can be read as a map for future explorations of the self, providing some sense of the shape that that pilgrimage might take.

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In order to facilitate the reading of this dissertation, Maslow's books will be cited by short titles in parentheses in the text as follows:

Full title:	Short title:
Principles of Abnormal Psychology: The Dynamics of Psychic Illness (with Bela Mittelmann), 1941 (revised 1951)*	Abnormal
Motivation and Personality, 1954 (revised 1970)*	Motivation
New Knowledge in Human Values (editor), 1959	Knowledge
Toward a Psychology of Being, 1962 (revised 1968)*	Toward
Religions, Values, and Peak-experiences, 1964	Religions
Eupsychian Management: A Journal, 1967	Eupsychian
The Psychology of Science: A Reconnaissance, 1966	Science
The Healthy Personality: Readings (editor with Hung-Min Chaing), 1969	Healthy
The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, 1971	Farther
Abraham H. Maslow: A Memorial Volume, 1972	Memorial

* Unless otherwise specified, reference is to the revised edition.

Maslow's articles will also be referred to by shortened titles, accompanied to numbers corresponding to the chronologically arranged bibliography at the end of this study.

INTRODUCTION

Abraham Maslow has been called a genius, a giant, "The greatest psychologist since Freud."[1] He has also been written off as a lightweight, as superficial, tenderminded, "an attractive nuisance."[2] How significant a figure is he? Father or catalyst, he was undoubtedly one of the key figures in the establishment of what he called "third force psychology," what we more commonly call "humanistic psychology."[3] (Maslow believed that the adjective "humanistic" in front of "psychology" ought to be redundant ["Conversation," no. 129, p. 57].) Both directly and indirectly, Maslow was instrumental in the establishment of the human potential movement, from Esalen at Big Sur to growth groups all across the country. With Anthony Sutich, he was responsible for the foundation of the Journal of Humanistic Psychology, the American Association for Humanistic Psychology, and the Journal of Transpersonal Psychology.[4] Maslow wrote six books, co-authored one, edited one collection of essays, co-edited a second, and published some 135 titles.

Maslow's extensive efforts to initiate humanistically oriented organizations and activities and his prolific writing are related to his belief that psychology was on the verge of a true revolution, comparable to that of Galileo, Darwin, Einstein, Freud and Marx: a revolution in thinking and perceiving, in imagining the human person and society, a revolution in

ethics and values (Toward, p. iii). His credo is an urgent appeal to psychologists:

> I believe that the world will either be saved by the psychologists or it won't be saved at all. I think psychologists are the most important people living today. I think the fate of the human species rests more upon their shoulders than upon any group of people now living. I believe that all the important problems of war and peace, exploitation and brotherhood, hatred and love, sickness and health, misunderstanding and understanding, of the happiness and unhappiness of mankind will yield only to a better understanding of human nature. I believe that medicine and physics and law and government, education, economics, engineering, business, industry, are only tools -- powerful tools, powerful means -- but not ends.
>
> I think that the ultimate end to which they should be bent is human fulfillment, human betterment, growth and happiness ("Philosophy," no. 64, p. 225).

And what might suitably be added as a sub-credo is that Maslow considered himself to be a great synthesizer (the great synthesizer?) of the psychological thought that could effect such a revolution. He claimed to be both Freudian and behaviorist, coining the words "epi-Freudian" and "epi-behavioristic" to describe his variety of affiliation with the first and the second force schools of thought (Farther, p. 4). As for "third force," Maslow's primary school of affiliation, his listing of its membership is too inclusive to allow the school to be distinctive -- an illustration of the thesis of his biographer, Colin Wilson, that Maslow "was the sort of person who preferred to think in terms of agreements rather than antagonisms."[5] Maslow lists as "third force": Adlerians, Rankians, Jungians, neo-Freudians, post-Freudians, Gestalt psychologists. Individual writers in his collection include: Allport, Angyal, Asch, N. Brown. Buhler, Erikson, Fromm, Goldstein, Horney, Lewin,

H. Lynd, Marcuse, Marmor, Moreno, Moustakas, G. Murphy, H. A. Murray, Schachtel, Sutich, Szasz, Wertheimer, Wheelis (Toward, p. ix; Religions, p. 69). Further, Maslow believed that third force psychology was a preparation for fourth, which he called "transpersonal, transhuman, centered in the cosmos rather than in human needs and interests (Toward, p. iv)."

Indeed, Abraham Maslow's goals were cosmic in proportion. He wanted to construct a comprehensive and systematic psychology and philosophy of the human person and society that would be academic and practical, a system which would touch every aspect of life: ethics, politics, economics, religion, science (Memorial, p. 60). He died before that systematic work took shape. Of course, the question is bound to be raised: Was not Maslow dreaming "the impossible dream"? Could a work of such scope and complexity be realized by any single individual?

Yet Maslow did, prior to his untimely death, take great satisfaction that his theories of motivation were moving beyond the realm of psychological study per se and were being tested in a variety of environments: in hospitals, in educational institutions, in industry. One obvious illustration is Nonlinear Systems, the electronics plant in California where Maslow studied and influenced management. Under Maslow's consultation, Nonlinear Systems switched from assembly line production to work in teams of three to nine. Time clocks and scheduled coffee breaks were abolished. Salesmen were put on an allowance rather than an expense account. In general, workers, salesmen, and management were made co-responsible for the industry. While

production initially dipped when the new procedures were instituted, within three months it was back to assembly line level, and during the next three years sales increased by 100%. Productivity per worker went up 30%; employee turnover dropped by 25% of the national average; customer complaints dropped more than 70%.[6] Other companies which have been cited as significantly improved through Maslovian type humanistic management include Texas Instruments, Avis rental cars, Dow Chemical.[7]

Research on Maslow's theories with regard to management and human needs have supported the conclusion that there is positive correlation between level of management and level of need fulfillment: lower or bottom management experiences greater need deficiency than levels immediately above.[8]

In the area of criminal rehabilitation, Frank Goble refers to Bill Sands' "Seventh Step" program for prisoners as an illustration of Maslow's thinking effectively at work. Sands, an ex-prisoner himself, helps inmates realize the truth that criminal behavior cannot satisfy their need to relate to others.[9] Finally, R. T. Goldberg's study on the rehabilitation of psychotic patients concludes that there is a positive relationship between the satisfaction of esteem and belongingness needs and the rehabilitation progress of patients.[10]

There is ample evidence that Maslow speaks positively to a broad scope of readers. Five years ago Colin Wilson reported these figures: Eupsychian Management sold 25,000 copies in hard cover in three years; in its original hard cover edition, Motivation and Personality sold 30,000; Toward a Psychology of Being

sold 150,000 in paperback.[11] Maslow's message that psychology is not a study of mental sickness but a search for and the study of psychological health has been well received. Psychology Today called Motivation and Personality "a triumphant summary of Maslow's lifelong struggle to prove that wonderful people can and do exist -- even though in very short supply and even though having feet of clay."[12]

Maslow's plea that adjustment to society not be considered a norm or seen as the antithesis of sickness, though surely not Maslow's alone (Horney, Benedict, Jung made similar claims, and undoubtedly the list could be expanded), was equally well received. He replaced the earlier emphasis in psychology on control, inhibition, discipline, with a focus on spontaneity, impulse-awareness, gratification of basic needs (Motivation, p. 279). He insisted that the study of the psychology of the human person be inclusive of all of human experience, and highlighted what he considered to be neglected areas of human life: art, wonder, enjoyment, zest, connoisseurship, experience, play (Motivation, p. 234). What Maslow's inquiry resulted in was the positioning of Being and Being-values (including religion) as central to the study of psychology. While this can be appreciated as one of Maslow's gifts to his discipline, it is also one of the weaknesses of his "system." Maslow was inconsistent in his discussion of Being. As will be seen, he reappropriated some of the thinking of the ancients with regard to truth, goodness, and beauty as characteristics of Being, but he did not follow their grounding of Being in the reality of God. Maslow's

Being-values are ultimately groundless. At one moment he speaks of these values as characteristics of nature -- of Being itself -- at another he describes them as possessions of individuals in whose lives the values live. Values of Being which transcend any individual life become possessions of individuals.

While the attractiveness of Maslow's thinking is abundantly evidenced by the subsequent research on and implementation of his thinking in a variety of social settings, and by the extensive sale of his books, neither the clarity or adequacy of his concepts nor the consistency of his thought is as easily established. The attempt of this dissertation is to try to determine if the sparks of hope that take flame in the imagination of Maslow's readers and followers are sparks of truth as well. The task, then, has primarily been to understand Maslow. His writings have been studied developmentally and contextually, in terms of the evolution of his thought, and in light of his personal experience. Because of a deep conviction of the writer that the central themes of any theorist or artist, and particularly personality theorists (and perhaps philosophers and theologians) grow out of individual lives and are dramatically colored by those histories, the study began with a close examination of biographical materials. (There was an attempt to arrange a meeting with Maslow's widow, Bertha Maslow, but for personal reasons she chose not to engage in a conversation about her husband.) The study of the life experience and personality of Abraham Maslow was enhanced through access to Maslow's entire personal library (his own publications excluded) which is housed

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at the Wright Institute in Berkeley.

The picture of Abraham Maslow is a complex one. He comes across as a sensitive and warm man, deeply human, humorous, a creative, courageous thinker, a mystic. At the same time he reveals a deep-rooted and life-long timidity and fear -- with regard to his acceptance to others, his health, and his work. Much of his personal experience was so contrary to his theory of self-actualization that one must raise the question as to whether his writing was not in many ways a reaction formation to his own life.

The specific focus of the dissertation is the concept of the self. How clear, developed, coherent a concept of the self does Maslow include within his theory of self-actualization? How much attention does he give to different aspects of the self: the physiological, psychological, social and spiritual? How does he understand the unconscious as distinct from the conscious self? A detailed study has been made of the theory of self-actualization and the concept of the self which undergirds it, with questions like these as a focus. The adequacy of Maslow's concept of the self is tested according to specific criteria. First, is sufficient attention paid to the following aspects of the self: the physiological or biological self; the psychological self or self-image; the social self; the spiritual self? (Sufficient attention includes some explanation of how the various aspects of the self arise, develop, change; how the self is known.) The second criterion has to do with intellectual and emotional satisfaction of the concept of the

self. Maslow established criteria for judging the value of a religion. He says, "any religion...must be not only intellectually credible and morally worthy of respect, but it must also be emotionally satisfying (Religions, p. 43)." These criteria could appropriately be applied to any theory concerning human life. The second criterion, then, is an adaptation of Maslow. Namely, is what the theorist says about the four aspects of the self intellectually and experientially credible and is it emotionally satisfying? By intellectual credibility is meant both clarity of conceptualization and coherence of thought.

The concepts of the self of two other theorists are also examined in order to provide comparison and contrast as well as to serve as correctives to Maslow. The social psychologist George Herbert Mead and the depth psychologist Carl Jung have been chosen because they pay attention to aspects of the self less thoroughly handled by Maslow: Mead, for his understanding of the social nature of the self; Jung, for the emphasis he places on the unconscious extension of the self. The concepts of the self of both Mead and Jung are examined and tested according to the same criteria for adequacy as is used with Maslow.

The final chapter of the dissertation is an attempt to outline the constitutive elements of a more adequate concept of the self. The methodology is one of assemblage (Whitehead, Modes of Thought). Taking advantage of the strengths in Maslow's

writing and of the contributions and correctives provided by Mead and Jung, as well as conclusions drawn by the writer, a synthesis is made toward a more adequate concept of the self.

FOOTNOTES: INTRODUCTION

[1]Eulogy by William Bennis, included in Memorial, p. 20.

[2]M. Brewster Smith, "On many visions of the self," Psychology Today, IX, No. 9 (February, 1976), p. 76.

[3]James Bugental notes that the term "humanistic psychology" received its current usage from two papers which were published in Etc., both entitled "Toward a humanistic psychology." The first was written by Hadley Cantril (Summer, 1955), the second by Abraham Maslow (Autumn, 1956). James Bugental (ed.), Challenges of Humanistic Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 147, note 1.

[4]Bugental, p. 147; Frank G. Goble, The Third Force: The Psychology of Abraham Maslow, A Revolutionary New View of Man (New York: Pocket Books, 1972), p. 84; Memorial, p. 34.

[5]Colin Wilson, New Pathways in Psychology: Maslow and the Post-Freudian Revolution (New York: Mentor, 1972), p. 150.

[6]Goble, pp. 188-89.

[7]Frank Goble, "Leadership for survival," monthly letter published by the Thomas Jefferson Research Center, Pasedena, Calif., No. 62, p. 2.

[8]J. W. Porter, "Job attitudes in management: Perceived deficiency in need fulfillment as a function of job level," Jour. Applied Psychol., XLVI, No. 6 (December, 1962), pp. 375-84; D. T. Hall and K. E. Nougaim, "An examination of Maslow's need hierarchy in an organizational setting," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, III, No. 1 (February, 1968), pp. 12-35.

[9]Goble, Third, pp. 143-45.

[10]R. T. Goldberg, "Need satisfaction and rehabilitation of psychotic patients," Jour. Counseling Psychol., XIV, No. 2 (Summer, 1967), pp. 253-57.

[11]Wilson, p. 169.

[12]"Abe Maslow -- 1908-1970," Psychology Today, IV, No. 3 (August, 1970), p. 16.

CHAPTER I

THE ROOTS OF SELF-ACTUALIZATION: BIOGRAPHICAL INFLUENCES

Often enough the story line goes, deprived childhood, a lot of grit and a little luck, and a productive adult life. An added feature in Abraham Maslow's story is that the very fact of his early deprivation helped him arrive at one of the foundation stones of his philosophy of human nature: he recognized in himself an instinctive need to develop himself, to become self-actualized.

> If I was so timid and frightened and depressed and unhappy as a young man, how come I was able to have courage enough to stick my neck out so much and to be a revolutionary, and contradict everybody? One would think, to read my stuff, that I was a very courageous man, but not so.[1]

If Maslow were not to describe his indomitable spirit in terms of instinct, what was it? Both the given and the intentional experiences of his life are clues to the motivational theory that was to take over his thought. On the other hand, there are aspects of Maslow's life -- both given and intentional -- that seem to contradict his motivational theory. There is a drivenness about him, an insatiable need to accomplish that grew into a need to be a world savior. Maslow survived a major heart attack which he experienced as so near death that he called the next (and last) two years of his life a "post-

mortem life." Yet the pace of his work increased, he gave up many of the relaxations that had meant so much to him: theater, nature walks, bird-watching (Humanistic, no. 145, p.30). The picture is a complex one of a man who moves between deficiency and growth needs -- whose life was marked by ill-health, at least in part psychosomatic; by insecurity and self-doubt; and at the same time by vision, a passion for metavalues, and the flavor of self-actualization. Abraham Maslow's life does not seem to be an apt illustration of his own hierarchy of needs.

Abraham Maslow was born on April 1, 1908, in a slum district in Brooklyn. His parents were Russian Jews, cousins, who immigrated to America from Kiev. His father, a cooper by trade, was a man Abraham both feared and admired, describing him as a "very vigorous man, who loved whiskey and women and fighting...and stayed away from home as much as possible." Abraham's description of his mother explains why. He said she was "a pretty woman -- but not a nice one."

> Since my mother is the type that's called schizophrenogenic in the literature -- she's the one who makes crazy people, crazy children -- I was awfully curious to find out why I didn't go insane. I was certainly neurotic, extremely neurotic, during all my first twenty years -- depressed, terribly unhappy, lonely, isolated, self-rejecting...but in theory it should have been much worse. And so I traced it back and found that my mother's brother...who's a very kind and good man to this day, and who lived nearby -- took care of me, and then of my next younger brother, and the one after that. He liked babies and children, and simply took care of us, whenever my mother got herself a new baby. He may have saved my life, psychically.[2]

Maslow's mother "got herself a new baby" seven times: Abraham was her first. When he was nine, the family moved out of the

slums and into a non-Jewish Brooklyn suburb, where Maslow first discovered anti-Semitism. He was the only Jewish boy in the New York City public school he attended, an experience which he likened to being the first Black in an all-White school.[3]

Looking back on his childhood, Maslow describes himself as skinny, shy, and peculiar looking. His negative body-image was reconfirmed: he recalls a time at a family gathering when his insensitive father, "half in earnest" said, "Have you ever seen anyone uglier than Abe?"[4] Maslow's memories of grade school years were equally painful. He recalls a Miss Doyle who made him stand up in a spelling bee until he finally faltered. He misspelled "parallel" -- at which point she said "I knew you were a fake". Maslow says that he lived in the library, isolated and friendless. When he graduated to Brooklyn Borough High School he discovered happiness for the first time in his life, mostly through the encouragement of his extravert cousin Will Maslow. The two, at Will's instigation, were involved in a number of school organizations, literary or scientific in nature.[5] During summers Abraham worked for the family's barrel manufacturing company (now run by his brothers under the name of Universal Containers, Inc.).[6]

When he was sixteen, Maslow fell in love with his cousin, Bertha Goodman. She was fifteen. "For several years," he says, "I just sort of looked hopelessly at her and tagged along. I never dared to touch her -- didn't even dream of touching a girl, and I'd assumed that never would I have a girl."[7]

At the age of eighteen Maslow enrolled at New York City College. His father wanted him to study law, but he found that he could not. He was totally unable to apply his mind to any subject that did not interest him. Because he failed trigonometry the first semester, he was on probation the second semester. Then he discovered music and theater -- sold peanuts to buy tickets -- and his studies slipped even further. During the third semester he walked out of law class, leaving his books behind. His reason: "The cases seemed to deal only with evil men, and with the sins of mankind." Abraham Maslow was already on his quest for the best in life. When he explained his decision to drop law to his father, his father asked what he wanted to do. He wanted to study. What did he want to study? "Everything"! Abraham transfered to Cornell University.[8]

Cornell was in part a flight from Bertha. Her sister had pushed Maslow into Bertha's arms.

> I kissed her, and nothing terrible happened -- the heavens didn't fall, and Bertha accepted it, and that was the beginning of a new life....I was accepted by a female. I was just deleriously happy with her.[9] It was a tremendous and profound and total love affair.

Maslow considered that first kiss one of the major peak-experiences of his life.

But Cornell was not far enough away. He ran again -- this time to Wisconsin where he was to remain for seven years, but not without Bertha. During the first semester there, he says, "I thought about her all the time, and a few months later I sent her a telegram and said we were going to get married --

I don't think I asked her to marry me."[10] On New Year's Eve, 1928, Abraham and Bertha were married in New York.

When they returned to the University of Wisconsin, both studied psychology. After his unfavorable primary schooling and his only slightly more satisfactory period in high school, Maslow was pleasantly surprised by the friendliness of the faculty: "I had never talked with a professor before -- I'd never been that close."[11] He received his bachelor's degree in 1930, his master's degree in 1931, and his doctoral degree in 1934. During those years he was research assistant in social psychology (1929-1930), assistant instructor in psychology (1930-1934), and following the completion of his doctorate, teaching fellow in psychology (1934-1935). It was also during those years that Abraham Maslow puslished his first paper: "Delayed reaction tests on primates from the lemur to the orangoutan" (with Harry Harlow and Harold Uehling), Journal of Comparative Psychology, 1932. He admits that seeing his name in print was an overwhelming experience. "This was a great moment and I think then I got hooked...the awesome feeling of having contributed to the advancement of knowledge even if it was the tiniest bit -- just one coral on a whole coral reef of knowledge."[12] (This might also have been the beginning of Maslow's desire to be a world savior. Later he would aspire to give his world a whole coral reef, "to construct and write the comprehenisve and systematic psychology and philosophy of human nature and society" [Memorial, p.60].) At about the same time that Maslow's name first appeared in print, he wrote a paper on

Freud and Adler, "Psychoanalysis and mental hygiene as status quo social philosophy," which he was scheduled to read before the Wisconsin Academy of Science.

> But I was a very timid boy -- very shy, very easily frightened, very isolated -- an outsider...when the day came I was so frightened, so timid, that I just fled. I just didn't show up for the meeting and didn't give my paper (Humanistic, no. 145, p.20).

(That tendency to timidity and panic lasted until 1960. Maslow admitted that he sometimes delivered papers in a state of exhaustion. In 1959 when he gave the paper "Cognition of being in the peak-experiences" Bertha said he "delivered the paper as if throwing it at them" -- and then went to bed for several days.[13])

Maslow did not have the same positive estimate of his master's thesis as he had of his first publication or of his first paper for a learned society meeting. He wrote on learning retention, in lieu of what he really wanted to do -- a thesis on exciting and unexciting words -- because he was told that his idea was not psychological enough. The paper was accepted for publication. Later Maslow sneaked into the library, extracted his thesis and its file card, and destroyed them.[14]

After graduation Maslow worked for E.L.Thorndike, the Watsonian disciple, at Teacher's College, Columbia University. (Colin Wilson believes that one of Thorndike's animal observations might be considered the basis of Maslow's later work. In 1890, working with cats in mazes, Thorndike used reinforcement to measure success or failure of the animals' learning.

In the 1930's, he concluded that in animal learning success and reward have a far more powerful effect than failure or punishment.) Thorndike hired Maslow as a research assistant to work on a project designed to determine the percentage of behavior determined by genes, the percentage determined by culture. Maslow felt that"everything is determined by both." and decided he could not do the work because he didn't feel it was worth doing. Thorndike's rather remarkable response was: "Well, if I can't trust my own intelligence tests, I don't know who can." Maslow had achieved the second highest score ever achieved on Thorndike's test (195). Thorndike gave Maslow permission to do whatever he wanted and pick up his check once a month! This, in spite of the fact that Thorndike had stated that he did not like the work Maslow was doing on sex and dominance. Maslow was interviewing women in his office -- "and everybody was scandalised." Nevertheless, Thorndike went so far as to say that he would support Maslow indefinitely -- until he could find a job.[15]

It was during this time that Maslow became disenchanted with Watson's behaviorism. He describes the initial enchantment, prior to his move to Wisconsin. "Bertha came to pick me up and I was dancing down Fifth Avenue with exuberance; I embarassed her, but I was so excited about Watson's program. It was beautiful ("Conversation," no. 129, p.37)." Then Abraham Maslow became a father. His reflections on how his two daughters affected their psychologist father are worth quoting at length.

> Having a baby made my psychological training look ridiculous and blind. To this day, I simply cannot understand how it is possible to live with a healthy and well-loved baby and to be a literal behaviorist or a textbook Freudian. Of course, I understand that these philosophies are shed like masquerade costumes as one enters his home and greets his wife and children. And yet we must, trying hard to keep a straight face, take the written-down systems seriously as objects of criticism, even if their protagonists pay no attention to them outside of laboratory or office hours -- except perhaps for token genuflections now and then.
>
> So I must apologize and point to the obvious: that every baby is an individual, a self, idiosyncratic, different from every other baby in the most obvious ways; that I can see no evil in a baby, no malice, no sadism, no joy in cruelty, no guile, no phoniness or hypocrisy. I can see no persona, no role playing, no trying to be anything other than a baby. I see most clearly and unmistakably something that must be called wisdom of the body -- that is, tastes, preferences, choices, likes, and dislikes, which, acceded to, seem to keep the baby healthy and happy. Will is obvious; any baby absolutely insists on some things and absolutely refuses other things... How is it possible not to see that a normal baby is experiencing itself as worthwhile and self-starting, and that the world is interesting, even fascinating -- that it is a wonderful place to live in? (Memorial, pp.90-91).

And in another place Maslow says,

> Having a second baby, and learning how profoundly different people are even before birth, made it impossible for me to think in terms of the kind of learning psychology in which one can teach anybody anything. Or the John B. Watson theory "give me two babies and I will make one into this and one into the other." It is as if he never had any children. We know only too well that a parent cannot make his children into anything. Children make themselves into something. The best we can do and frequently the most effect we can have is by serving as something to react against if the child presses too hard (Farther, p. 169).

However, in 1968 when Mary Harrington Hall interviewed Maslow for Psychology Today and asked him about his having said he stopped being a behaviorist when his first child was born, he altered his earlier statements. Maslow explained that his

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training at Wisconsin as well as his reading and his exposure to American psychology in general, were all behaviorist. He only began to question behaviorism when he first read Freud and Gestalt psychology. As shall be seen, there are aspects of behaviorism that always played a part in Maslow's psychology ("Conversation," no. 129, p.55).

When Maslow left Teacher's College in 1937, he took a position at Brooklyn College which he kept until 1951 when he moved to Brandeis University. From among the life experiences which his biographers report during this period, three stand out as key to understanding Maslow's life and work.

First, the pre-war immigration from Europe. Maslow sought out what he called the "very cream of European intellect" which was migrating to New York City -- away from Hitler's Germany -- people like Eric Fromm, Karen Horney, and Max Wertheimer. Perhaps out of his hero-worshipping tendency (which will be explored later in this chapter), Maslow referred to them as his "teachers", and praised them in these words: "I think it is fair to say that I have had the best teachers, both formal and informal, of any person who ever lived."[16] Not only did Maslow's post-doctoral teachers have a lasting influence on him because of their thought and writings, but two of them in particular, by virtue of the richness and health that Maslow perceived in their lives, set him on his search for a pattern of behavior he was to call "self-actualization." Those two were Ruth Benedict and Max Wertheimer, whose influence on Maslow will be examined in the following chapter. (The irony

of Maslow's choice of Ruth Benedict as a paradigm of need-fulfillment will be explored at some length.)

Second, the war itself -- the Japanese attack Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. Maslow, beyond the age of fighting, made a decision to devote his life to design a "'psychology for the peace table,' based on factual evidence which could be accepted by all mankind."[17] He says that he gave up everything he was fascinated with in a selfish way in order to try to prevent war and hatred and prejudice -- an amazing goal for a man who was raised by a pathological mother in the midst of poverty, deprivation and later prejudice. Out of harsh realities and limitations, Maslow dreamed of preventing war and hatred and prejudice! On the day after Pearl Harbor he witnessed a parade in New York, made up of "boy scouts and fat people and old uniforms."

> As I watched, the tears began to run down my face. I felt we didn't understand -- not Hitler, nor the Germans, nor Stalin, nor the Communists. We didn't understand any of them. I felt that if we could understand, then we could make progress. I had a vision of a peace table, with people sitting around it, talking about human nature and hatred and war and peace and brotherhood...It was at that moment that I realized that the rest of my life must be devoted to discovering a psychology for the peace table ("Conversation," no. 129, p.54).

The third event during the years 1937-1951 which dramatically altered Maslow's life was the heart attack he suffered in 1945 at the age of thirty-seven. It was believed to have been brought on by over-work. From that time onward Maslow suffered from chronic fatigue. It was only in 1969, well after his near fatal attack of 1967, that a doctor diagnosed hypoglycaemia -- this was the real cause of Maslow's chronic

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fatigue. The disease had not been previously discovered because the insulin reaction was only detectable several hours after the glucose tolerance test.[18] But from the time of his first heart attack Maslow felt that he unconsciously favored his body ("Conversation," no. 129, p.37). Colin Wilson implies that Maslow told him that as a result of the heart attack he became afraid of sexual excitement. The frustration this caused, Wilson observes, is reflected in the quantity and the quality of his writing during the years 1945-1948. Many of the papers were extremely brief. One was for the most part a repetition of an earlier paper. Wilson continues,

> One significant paragraph in this paper reads: "Living at the higher need level means greater biological efficiency, greater longevity, less disease, better sleep, appetite, etc. The psychosomatic researchers prove again and again that anxiety, fear, lack of love, domination, etc., tend to encourage undesirable physical as well as psychological results." Which raises the question of whether these physical problems may not have been, to some extent, the outcome of creative frustration. Hypoglycaemia is itself, to some extent, a psychosomatic illness.[19]

Whether Maslow's physical condition colored his work or his frustration in his work caused his physical condition, there is evidence enough that his physical illness was at least in part psychosomatic in nature. Maslow's health raises another issue. It is too much to ask of any person that she or he exemplify the model of health or fulfillment such a person is convinced is attainable. Maslow did not claim to be the paradigm of self-actualization. He did claim to be lured by and living within the realm of the Being-values or meta-values (see Chapter Five). And the people around him believed he so

lived. In the presidential address at the meeting of the Association for Humanistic Psychology following Maslow's death in 1970, Denis O'Donovan said:

> I have an image of Abe Maslow as a person who could not conceive of insides being empty. I have an image of him... as a person who personally experienced, lustily experienced, both the hunger and the satisfaction of the hunger all the way up the hierarchy of his motives from the bottommost to the topmost and experienced them all with gusto (Memorial, p. 24).

Perhaps the truth as to the breadth and the intensity of Maslow's emotional life as well as the satiation or deprivation of his basic needs will never be known. However, the book Type A Behavior and Your Heart may provide a clue to the psychosomatic nature of Maslow's physical condition. The thesis of the book is that heart disease is closely related to a behavior pattern, a complex of character traits which the authors, Meyer Friedman and Ray Rosenman call "Type A." The behavior pattern is described as

> an action-emotion complex that can be observed in any person who is aggressively involved in a chronic, incessant struggle to achieve more and more in less and less time.[20]

While the number of titles an individual publishes within a given time period may simply reflect the number of occasions which that person has to address various audiences, occasions which multiply as the person becomes better known, it might also reflect an increase in pace of work. Maslow's comments about the urgency he increasingly felt to complete a large agenda led the writer to examine his bibliography. Looking at his list of writings as a whole, and working backwards from the last full year of his life, 1969, the numbers

of titles in five-year time intervals look something like this:

1965-1969	38	1945-1949	12
1960-1964	31	1940-1944	15
1955-1959	17	1935-1939	12
1950-1954	16	1932-1934	7

Maslow wrote for himself a massive agenda. A year before his death he spelled out this plan.

> My grand life-long plan is to construct and write the comprehensive and systematic psychology and philosophy of human nature and society...a world view or life philosophy that is not merely intellectual but is also a way of living; a system of ethics and values, of politics and economics, of education and religion; a philosophy of science, and so on (Memorial, p.60).

These lines were written during the period of time which Maslow called his "post-mortem" life, following his radically significant confrontation with death in his second heart attack. He knew that his time was limited. It was in an interview with Willard Frick, November 23, 1968, that Maslow referred to himself as a "world savior" (along with Rollo May) with crucially important work left to do. And his work was all-absorbing. Not only was he driven to do it because of its importance, but he felt that he was most himself, most what he was meant to be, when he was intensely involved in his work. Consequently, as was mentioned earlier, he gave up many things he liked to do: bird-watch, take long walks, go to the theater with Bertha. He said to Frick, "Supposing you found a cure for cancer, what would you do? Could you then go to the theater and sit and watch the play? (Humanistic, no. 145, p.30)." In this interview Maslow does sound very much like a man

"aggressively involved in a chronic, incessant struggle to achieve more and more in less and less time."

One senses that Maslow is making an autobiographical reflection when he says, in Motivation and Personality, that "a person who has had a bad heart attack very frequently behaves in a threatened fashion (p.109)." Much later in his life, in a published dialogue on the plateau experience, Maslow fleshes out what some of that threat meant to him. He said that as he aged his peak-experiences became less intense and less frequent -- he did not think his body could stand more intense or more frequent experiences.[21] Asked specifically about the alteration of sexual experience during a plateau phase, he answered:

> It seems to me that it's possible that the aging process makes sex less imperative. You can take it or leave it, and that this uncovers something which is precious. I can report that women look better to me now than they did when I was young because when I was young, sex was demanding. It was ego; I could be attracted to women that I despised, and then feel not good about myself. Now it seems to be possible to admire only women whom I like, which feels good. It feels cleaner and purer.[22]

Again, the statement feels more like autobiography than generalizable fact. At the memorial service following Maslow's death one of his colleagues from Brandeis, Dr. James Klee, said that during the final years of Maslow's life, "one sensed a disappearance of the overcautious dietary reserve and concern for health that had characterized so much of his earlier life. Tragically it came too late (Memorial, p.12)."

There are other aspects of the "Type A" behavior pattern that seem applicable to Maslow. Personality traits which

Friedman and Rosenman dub "Type A" include:

> excessive competitive drive, aggressiveness, impatience, and a harrying sense of time urgency. Individuals displaying this pattern seem to be engaged in a chronic, ceaseless, and often fruitless struggle -- with themselves, with others, with circumstances, with time, sometimes with life itself. They also frequently exhibit a free-floating but well-rationalized form of hostility, and almost always a deep-seated insecurity.[23]

What follows are illustrations of such traits in Maslow's personality, alongside contrasting views others held of him.

With regard to aggressiveness, struggle with others, hostility: Anthony Sutich, co-founder, with Maslow, of the Journal of Humanistic Psychology (and later of the Association for Humanistic Psychology), describes his first meeting with Abraham Maslow in 1949, arranged by a mutual friend.

> He was a proverbial roaring lion. He just paced back and forth, slashing right and left: he couldn't stand the adjustment people; he couldn't stand the behaviorists, and neither could I. Both of us realized that we were isolated from the mainstream of psychology.[24]

Balance this out with Mary Harrington Hall's description of Abraham Maslow as "one of the warmest and sweetest men I have ever met ("Conversation," no. 129, p.37)," with Colin Wilson's saying that Maslow was unable to hate a class or social group. He was not even able to perform brain surgery on animals during his years in animal research with Harry Harlow.[25]

With regard to his deep-seated insecurity: The same man who called himself a world savior, was in truth, according to one of his colleagues, "a great sufferer...possessed by doubts about himself and his system (Memorial, p.9)."[26]

Maslow confirms those doubts, as well as his frustration over not being acceptable to the mainstream of American

psychology.

> The first talk I gave on the peak-experiences and this B-cognition stuff, there was my old professor sitting in the front row and, God, I couldn't sleep for several nights beforehand, and I had to rest in fatigue -- just exhaustion before and after -- and I had dreams about being thrown out of my family.

He went on to describe a recurrent dream in which he is out in the street and someone yells that lions and tigers are loose,

> and then I would get frightened and run to the door behind which is my family -- not the blood family but somehow the whole clan -- and bang on the door, crying "let me in, let me in!" And the door is locked, and they don't let me in and it was definitely the American Psychological Association...If you say something that contradicts your teachers, this is kind of a cosmic, eternal thing (Humanistic, no. 145, p.25).

In the light of Maslow's tendency to be a hero worshipper -- more often than not one of his teachers being the object of his worship -- the import of this dream is heightened. And in light of Maslow's need to call many of the intellectuals he became acquainted with after the completion of his formal education, his "teachers." the price he would pay for positioning himself in contradiction to any of them must have been quite high.

With regard to his struggle with circumstances, Maslow speaks metaphorically: "I think if I were dropped out of a plane into the ocean and told the nearest land was a thousand miles, I'd still swim. And I'd despise the one who gave up (Memorial, p. 90)."

All of the above on Maslow's disposition and health is to point out the turn that his life took when he suffered his first heart attack in 1945, or, more accurately, to note the path his life had been taking for many years.

In 1951, Maslow moved to Brandeis University in Waltham, Massachusetts where he was to spend seventeen years. The school had opened only in 1948, and Maslow found the work less satisfying, the students less motivated, than at Brooklyn College. Colin Wilson mentions an unprinted biographical sketch of Maslow in which the author makes these remarks about the students Maslow was teaching at Brandeis: "Another generation of students, less eager to apprentice themselves than the depression day students of Brooklyn, have been more interested in spoon feeding, uninvolved learning process, which has not been satisfying or stimulating for the most part." Wilson adds that Maslow scrawled a comment in the margin: "And more recently, rebellious and elder-rejecting, including me. If I had the money, I'd stop teaching tomorrow." A year later he added, "still feel this way, only more so." Maslow felt isolated; he said "I have nobody in the whole world to talk with about my own work" -- except at a distance.[27] In January, 1963, he made this entry in his journal:

> 1 A.M. Can't sleep. Department meeting today. Fired G., and B. Probably will also drop A. later. C. made bad exam. Everybody crapped out. General failure -- of whole system? Then visited all the way from San Francisco by R. Nice boy -- all thrilled by my work and converted and wants to work with me. After I left him, much depressed because this reminds me of all the times I'd heard <u>that</u> speech and nothing came of it (<u>Memorial</u>, p.98).

The juxtaposition of various factors already referred to throws light on the teacher-student gestalt of Abraham Maslow: Maslow's own traumatic early school days -- the low self-esteem, friendlessnes, uhnappy home life that formed the background to his early schooling; a gradual emergence as a high school

student; closeness to professors during his years at Wisconsin; various assistantships and a teaching fellowship during those same years and close working relationships with faculty members; an additional post-doctoral apprenticeship under Thorndike; a long-lived and deep-seated fear of public performance that Maslow himself interprets as insecurity before his superiors -- namely, his teachers; his assuming the role of teacher; his finding less enthusiastic students who did not have to win their way financially and perhaps emotionally as he had done; students who could afford the luxury to rebel; few (if any) followers willing to work with their "teacher" as he had worked with and for his; a growing conviction not only that he had a many-faceted subject to teach, but that he could be a world savior. And an additional meta-consideration: Maslow felt that the meta-value which most possessed him, that most lured him, was truth.[28] Perhaps he saw his "teachers" as possessors of truth. Certainly there is evidence that he saw himself as enlightened -- his theory of human nature could transform the world. He had followed the truth. Where, in turn, were his followers? While all of the above factors cannot be seen apart from Abraham Maslow's warmth and creativity and ability to enjoy, his openness and humor and humility, they do throw revealing light on his drivenness and on his frustration.

It was during his Brandeis years that Maslow published most of his major works, years when he was recognized by his colleagues in various groups of the American Psychological Association, moving from one presidency to another right up

to the top: president of the Division of Personality and Social Psychology (1955-1956), president of the Division of Esthetics (1960-1961), of the Ma sachusetts Psychological Association (1960-1961), of the New England Psychological Association (1962-1963), and of the American Psychological Association (1967-1968). It would be curious to know what happened to the loose lions and tigers in Maslow's dreams during these years of recognition.

In 1967 Maslow suffered his second heart attack. He speaks ambiguously about his readiness to die. He felt it was a good time to die, that he was "even willing to die....Partly this was entirely personal and internal and just a matter of feeling good about myself, feeling proud of myself, feeling pleased with myself, self-respecting, self-loving, self-admiring ("Conversation," no. 129, p.29)." But Mary Harrington Hall did not believe Maslow when he said that he did not care whether he died or not, and he added:

> Well, I'd rather not die, because I enjoy life. And because I want to see more of my mission accomplished. I love the wearing of laurel leaves (p.57).[29]

Abraham Maslow did not die in 1967; having confronted death he felt that he moved into a "post-mortem" life, and that everything from then on was gravy. Maslow lived his last years on a plateau from whence he witnessed eternity. He was reconciled with death, and he found that, as he had predicted, his life changed. He had said, "it's quite clear that we are always suffering from this cloud that hangs over us, the fear of death. If you can transcend the fear of death, which is possible...your life today, at this moment, would change (Memorial,

p.53)." How did his life change? It became more poignant, more vivid -- he said of his post-mortem life,

> everything gets doubly precious, gets piercingly important. You get stabbed by things, by flowers and by babies and by beautiful things -- just the very act of living, of walking and breathing and eating and having friends and chatting. Everything seems to look more beautiful rather than less, and one gets the much-intensified sense of miracles ("Conversation," no. 129, p.16).

Just a few months before his death he said,

> The death experience makes life more precious and poignant and more vivid, and you're required to appreciate it and you hang on to it. With surf, you sense a contrast between your own temporary nature and the surf's eternity -- the fact that it will be there always, and that you are witnessing something that's a million years old and will be there a million years from now. I pass, and my own reaction to that is one of sadness on the one hand, and of great appreciation on the other hand. It seems to me that the surf is more beautiful to me now than it used to be, and more touching...This whole business of witnessing eternity means you are mortal and your mortality produces a fear of the witnessing. It is happy and also sad. It's a mixture, and very beautiful.[30]

In 1969, Maslow was able to stop teaching. He received a four-year grant from the Laughlin Foundation in Menlo Park, California. Maslow was able to write and to test out his motivation theories in an industrial setting. Tragically, he died of a heart attack in the midst of his work, on June 8, 1970.

To sum up the biographical roots of self-actualization: Abraham Maslow began his odyssey in a context fraught with deprivation. He was born of a mother he did not like and whom he describes as schizophrenogenic, and a father who avoided his own home. Abraham spent his childhood in a slum neighborhood. His early schooling meant isolation, loneliness, friendlessness, and his first experience of prejudice. He saw him-

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self as physically ugly; he was unhappy and depressed. Strangely enough, harsh reality did not preclude his remarkable idealism: he not only dreamed of but also over-worked himself to help create a perfect society peopled by good human beings (described in his"GHB notebook"[31]). The ill-health that colored Maslow's life must be seen his way -- holistically. A bad heart and undiagnosed hypoglycaemia marked most of his adult life with fatigue, an over-cautious concern for his body, and frustration. Perhaps the givens in Maslow's life were more difficult than many have to face, but the more important reality is what he did with them. He was able to avail himself of opportunities to rise above his deprivations: he looked upon his father with respect; he accepted the care of an uncle whom he would see in retrospect as his savior; he entered into a friendship with a cousin who was able to help him out of his isolation; he developed his exceptional intellectual ability; and he found Bertha. Bertha was his beginning in a new world -- Bertha, whom he always describes as a true companion and partner. He was able to accept the challenge and support of professors and professionals and find in them inspiration for a new way of looking at human nature.

Perhaps it is presumptuous for anyone who did not live and work closely with Abraham Maslow to attempt what this chapter has attempted: to understand how his life conditioned his theory of self-actualization. There are billions of unknowns. Exploring the knowns, however, and knowing that they tell only

part of a story, has been both revealing and personally satisfying. Abraham Maslow was (and is) human; he let his humanity be seen.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER I

[1]Wilson, p. 117. [2]Ibid. [3]Goble, Third, p. 11.

[4]Richard J. Lowry, A. H. Maslow: An Intellectual Portrait (Monterey, Calif.: Brooks/Cole, 1973), p. 18.

[5]Wilson, pp. 117-120. [6]Goble, Third, pp. 11-12.

[7]Wilson, p. 120. [8]Ibid., p. 119. [9]Ibid., pp. 120-21.

[10]Ibid., p. 122. [11]Ibid., p. 123. [12]Ibid., p. 137.

[13]Ibid., pp. 124-25. [14]Ibid., p. 139.

[15]Ibid., pp. 126-27. [16]Goble, Third., p. 12.

[17]Ibid., p. 13. [18]Wilson, p. 125, note 1.

[19]Ibid., p. 153 (Maslow quotation from "Higher and Lower," no. 41).

[20]Meyer Friedman and Ray H. Rosenman, Type A Behavior and Your Heart (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974) p. 67.

[21]Stanley Krippner (ed.),"The plateau experience: A.H. Maslow and others," Jour. Transpersonal Psychol., IV, No. 2 (Fall, 1972), p. 112.

[22]Ibid., pp. 118-19. [23]Friedman and Rosenman, p. 4.

[24]Peggy Granger, "Another view of Tony Sutich," Jour. Humanistic Psychol., XVI, No. 3 (Summer, 1976), p. 8.

[25]Wilson, p. 166.

[26]Comments by Frank Manuel, New York University.

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[27]Wilson, p. 133. Two issues of New Directions in Teaching included a discussion of extrinsic versus intrinsic education, using a seminar which Maslow taught at Brandeis in 1969 as the focus of the discussion. Comments by one of Maslow's students were included both on the front cover of the periodical and within the discussion. Mark Horowitz writes: "Maslow was a boring teacher. Monotonous and repetitive. His books were much clearer. In his office, in a one-to-one situation, he was one of the most beautiful men I have ever met. His warmth inspired me and his honesty was enlightening. Why wasn't he like that in the classroom?" (II, No. 2 [Winter, 1970], cover and p. 11).

[28]Undated tape recording.

[29]I am reminded of Freud when I read these lines. Both Freud and Maslow rejected belief in God. And both men wanted disciples; both needed to see their work immortalized.

[30]Krippner, p. 117.

[31]Lowry, pp. 81-105.

CHAPTER II

THE ROOTS OF SELF-ACTUALIZATION: INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES

When nineteen-year old Abraham Maslow was a sophomore at New York City College, he enrolled in a course entitled "Philosophy of Civilization." The professor predicted that any student who read William Sumner's Folkways would "never be the same again...never again be an innocent."[1] Maslow dropped the course but read the book, a book he would later refer to as his "intellectual awakening." Folkways is basically a book about the social construction of reality, specifically, of social norms: mores and folkways. The evolution of folkways, which is unconscious, is organic with the engagement of basic biological needs with an environment. Richard Lowry enumerates three effects which he believes Sumner had on Maslow.

1. Sumner's notion of inborn biological necessity or basic needs (apparently Maslow's first exposure to the idea) led Maslow to his convictions concerning the instinctive nature of human needs. Maslow read in Sumner:

> Every moment brings necessities which must be satisfied at once. Need was the first experience, and it was followed at once by a blundering effort to satisfy it. It is generally taken for granted that men inherited some guiding instincts from their beast ancestry, and it may be true, although it has never been proved.[2]

2. Lowry believes that Maslow could have found in Sumner's book a foreshadowing of Ruth Benedict's concept of synergy. The folkways help people live well and live together well. Sumner suggests that a society has to look closely at the ideal person it wants to produce.

> Is the ideal of the man-as-he-should-be to be found, for us, in the"common man," or in the highest product of our culture? That is a most vital question for any society. It includes the question whether the society has a discord in itself as to its own ideal of the type of men it wants to produce.[3]

3. As Maslow's professor had promised, the book did mean a "loss of innocence" -- there could be no such thing as a simple, unquestioning ethnocentrism.[4] From the time of his reading of Sumner, Maslow was aware of the importance of cross-cultural study for any theorist.

Maslow's second awakening came a year later with his discovery of John B. Watson's behaviorism, earlier reported in Maslow's own description of himself, dancing down Fifth Avenue wild with excitement. Watson was Maslow's beginning in the behaviorist world which in some ways he never left. While behaviorism's canon of stimulus-response, reinforcement, behavior modification explain and help change many things, Maslow knew that there are aspects of human life that cannot be reduced to a stimulus-response explanation. He used and advocated behaviorist techniques from the modification of chicken's diets to the structuring of the right environment in industrial situations. But Maslow held, from the birth of his first child, that the organism develops from within and is not simply the product of environmental determinism. If you "take away the

external determinants which shape behavior, behavior gets to be shaped by internal and intrapsychic determinants (Eupsychian, pp. 155-156)." Behaviorism provides helpful tools, means but not ends; it cannot account for the whole of personality.

There are three basic periods on Maslow's work.[5] The first, 1932-1935, I refer to as his "monkey years"; the second, 1935-1940, the Adlerian or self-esteem years; and after 1940 until his death, the "Maslovian years".

"My story begins in 1932 when I was working with Harry Harlow on delayed reaction time in monkeys," Maslow says.[6] (The delayed reaction intelligence test involved hiding a piece of food under one of several cups within an animal's reach and studying the animal's behavior.) Maslow found this particular project boring. But, as Colin Wilson points out, the principles of behaviorism were at work. Reinforced by seeing his name in print when Harlow's findings were published, Maslow repeated the experiment hundreds of times at the Bronx Park Zoo.[7] Among other things he was involved in at Wisconsin, Maslow worked as an experimental psychologist with monkeys, chickens and pigs. What struck him most about his animal work, and clearly affected his subsequent theories of human nature, was what he interpreted as a fundamental drive he observed in the animals toward knowledge, power, insight. Monkeys would work for bits of wood for a reward, just because the problem or game itself was intriguing to them. Maslow was attracted by the objectivity of his experiments. He would pour out energy in such experiments as trying to determine whether dogs

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were willing to eat dog meat, or in establishing food preferences of primates. His biographer says, "for the moment he was in love with science, with its cool, clean, odourless world of objective knowledge, its freedom from the trivialities of human emotion."[8]

The paper published in 1935, "Individual psychology and the social behavior of monkeys and apes" (according to Colin Wilson the most interesting of Maslow's early papers[9]), marks the beginning of Maslow's work on dominance and sexuality, the beginning of his Adlerian period.

The influence Adler had on Maslow, as will be seen, was considerable. Prior to reading Adler, however, Maslow had read Freud. And as with Maslow's behaviorism, there are ways in which he reamined part Freudian all his life. He was careful, however, to point out where he disagreed with Freud.

In what ways was Maslow Freudian? He believed in both the reality and the power of the unconscious -- although his emphasis on unconscious motivation is inconsistent. (Much more will be said about the evolution of Maslow's concept of the unconscious in a subsequent chapter.) In 1955 Maslow expressed the belief that Freudian psychotherapy was the best available and that there was not even a near second. Maslow was himself analyzed by Emil Oberholzer (Motivation, 1954 ed., p. x.). He found psychoanalysis profitable in helping him overcome the depressed feelings he suffered prior to his marriage; it brought him insight and understanding and helped him mature. However, he also learned that psychoanalysis in itself does not perform

all of the miracles, that self-analysis takes over and continues the work. In addition to his high appreciation of Freudian psychotherapy, Maslow also said that he thought Freud's was the best system of psychopathology (Memorial, p. 71). And in Toward a Psychology of Being, Maslow stated that he considered Freud's greatest discovery to be his insight "that the great cause of much psychological illness is the fear of knowledge of oneself -- of one's emotions, impulses, memories, capacities, potentialities, of one's destiny (p. 60)." But fear, pathology and its treatment only take care of the sick side of life. Maslow was in search of health and the full extent of human possibilities.

Maslow's disagreements with Freud included:

1. Freud's belief that all behavior is motivated. Maslow thought that Freud mistakingly identified motivation and determination. According to Maslow, all behavior is determined, but not all behavior is motivated. With regard to determination, Maslow distinguishes between external and internal determinants. Coping behavior is usually more externally determined: it is a response to something outside the individual. Expressive behavior is more internally determined: it is essentially a by-product of the character structure of the individual. With regard to motivation, coping behavior is purposeful -- it is motivated. Expressive behavior "simply mirrors, reflects, signifies or expresses some state of the organism (Motivation, p. 133)." Constitutional and/or maturational changes, situational or cultural determinants, psychological changes -- these are

instances of determinants that are not motives. The springy walk of the healthy person, the posture and voice-tone of the depressed, the beauty of the lovely woman -- again, reflections of the state of the organism that are unmotivated; they just are (Motivation, pp. 144, 231; Toward, p. 183). One must further consider that there are both deficiency motives and growth motives. Maslow distinguishes between people who are motivated by the basic needs and people who are motivated by higher needs. Prior to the crystallization of his concept of metamotivation, Maslow had held that self-actualized people are unmotivated. He also said that they are expressing rather than coping through their behavior (Farther, p. 300). But at the level of metamotivation the nature of the coping or purposefulness changes. It is no longer a question of whether the behavior is expressive or coping. It is true to Maslow to say that behavior at this level is both meta-expressive and meta-purposeful. The enticement to continue pursuing what he would call a meta-value is the actual satisfaction of the need for that value, but at the same time the need is insatiable. To return to Maslow's disagreement with Freud, Maslow would not call the behavior of self-actualized people motivated; he would call such behavior determined.

2. As mentioned above, Maslow felt that Freud dealt with the "sick half of psychology," that he left out aspirations, realizable hopes, godlike qualities. Freud had no "psychology of the higher life...of what the human being should grow toward, of what he can become (Religions, p. 7; cf. Toward, pp. 5, 12)."

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3. Maslow was opposed to Freud's tendency to dichotomize, to posit discrete parts of a system, mutually exclusive: conscious versus unconscious; ego versus id versus superego; instinct as opposed to society; the death instinct set against the life instinct. Maslow's was an anti-Aristotelian effort to get the parts back together again. In Being-cognition or in the peak-experience, the dichotomies are transcended and what is seen is seen as whole.

4. Maslow flatly denied Freud's contention that there is necessary, intrinsic opposition between the needs of the individual and the needs of society. Maslow's concept of synergy is the reverse: the needs of the synergistic individual are the needs of society; meeting these needs improves society (Farther, p. 174).

In 1935 when Maslow wrote the paper referred to above, "Individual psychology and the social behavior of monkeys and apes," he was really putting Freud and Adler to the test. Freud's sexual theory was founded on the belief that the organism's fundamental drive is the drive for pleasure, sexual pleasure. Freud perceived sexuality as something far more pervasive than genital sexuality. Sexuality included oral and anal pleasures as well. Adler's dominance theory was founded on the belief that the fundamental drive is a striving for mastery, for power, for superiority -- that this drive is more basic than the drive for pleasure. Maslow wanted to determine which theory was a more accurate description of motivation. He began his observations more Freudian than Adlerian, but reversed positions as a result

of his findings. Maslow concluded that while there are two kinds of motivation in sexual behavior, the sex drive and the dominance drive, the dominance drive is prepotent. A whole series of papers (and two tests or inventories) on this and related questions were subsequently written, roughly following this progression:

1. dominance and sexuality in primates (nos. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 20, 78).

2. dominance and sexuality in human beings and particularly in women (nos. 19, 21, 25, 28, 78).

3. security and insecurity in human beings (nos. 24, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 43).

In his primate studies, Maslow discovered a strict hierarchical structure among the monekys which determined the behavior patterns: the dominant monkey pre-empts the food supply; the dominant monkey grooms, bullies, initiates play more than the subordinate monkey; the dominant monkey mounts the subordinate monkey of either sex. In a last paragraph of the above mentioned paper Maslow observes that the higher the primate on the monkey scale, the less ferocious will be the display or use of dominance. There is both friendly, protective dominance and tyrannical dominance. (Harry Harlow, who supervised Maslow's dissertation research, believed that Maslow's most significant contribution was his finding that dominance was usually established through eye contact, without the necessity of fighting.[10]) Maslow wanted to know how the monkey studies would compare with studies of human beings.

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The year following the publication of his findings, he began to study sexuality and dominance in women. He chose women because he felt that they boasted less, gave less distorted evidence, and were capable of greater frankness.[11] One of his first attempts was to distinguish between dominance status, dominance-feeling and dominance behavior ("Dominance," no. 16; "Social behavior," no. 19).

Dominance status describes social relationship -- it is always relative to another person. One person is dominant, the other is subordinate.

Dominance-feeling refers to ego-level or self-esteem. Maslow means all of these things by dominance-feeling: self-confidence, self-respect, superiority, forcefulness of personality, strength of character, sureness, masterfulness, capability, pride. Dominance-feeling is an evaluation of the self which fluctuates less than dominance status. Maslow notes that while dominance-feeling largely determines dominance status, status determines feeling to a lesser extent. He claimed that he could get at dominance-feeling through his extensive interviews: dominance-feeling is "what the subject says about herself in an intensive interview after a good rapport has been established ("Self-esteem," no. 28, p. 260)."

Dominance behavior is compensatory behavior resulting from ego-insecurity: temper outbursts, open expression of hostility or resentment, insistence on one's rights, aggression. Compensation is operative when a subject's behavior is rated higher in dominance than her dominance feeling.

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Conclusions of Maslow's 1939 and 1940 studies of middle class women between the ages of 18-28 are hardly surprising ("Social behavior," no. 19, pp. 7ff; "A test,", no. 21, pp. 255-70).[12] He found that women with high dominance-feeling are self-confident, poised, self-possessed, unconventional; women with low dominance-feeling are timid, embarrassable, conventional, quiet, and the like. Maslow compared sexuality and dominance-feeling among women he studied and found a direct correlation: high-dominance women were freer in their experience of genital sexuality (including promiscuity, lesbian experience, masturbation, sexual experimentation) than low-dominance women, irrespective of the strength of the sex drive among the two groups of women. Maslow recognized the complexity and sensitivity of sexual behavior and attitudes. Influences include not only dominance or self-esteem and the sex drive, but religion, educational background, training, geography ("Self-esteem," no. 28, p. 274). The point he wanted to make, however, was that there is a closer correlation between sexuality and dominance than between sexuality and sex drive. (However, in The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, Maslow suggests that the same hormones may produce both the sexual and the dominance syndrome [p. 367].) In his 1942 article, "Self-esteem and sexuality in women," he differentiates the sexual behavior of the high-dominance woman who is secure from the high-dominance woman who is insecure. Parallels with his primate studies are obvious: "High self-esteem in secure individuals results in strength rather than power-seeking, in cooperation rather than competition.

High self-esteem in insecure individuals eventuates in domination, urge for power over other people and self-seeking ("Self-esteem," no. 28, p. 269)." Two other conclusions from the same study: the typical high-dominance woman in an insecure society "prefers straightforward, unsentimental, rather violent, animal, pagan, passionate, even sometimes brutal lovemaking (p. 283)." Second, the best marriages in our culture involve a husband and wife at the same level of dominance or with the husband slightly higher than the wife. If both are definitely secure, the difference in dominance level is not as important (p. 278).

To illustrate the variability of dominance and security, Maslow pointed to Jews in the 1940's: high self-esteem, low security; and to Catholic women: low self-esteem, high security. Yet he also admits that insecurity will effect self-esteem in some way (Motivation, p. 320-21).

The next step in the progression of Maslow's study was his focus on security and insecurity. In "The dynamics of security-insecurity," he sums up the insecure person as the one who

> perceives the world as a threatening jungle and most human beings as dangerous and selfish; feels rejected and isolated, anxious and hostile; is generally pessimistic and unhappy; shows signs of tension and conflict; tends to turn inward; is troubled by guilt-feelings; has one or another disturbance of self-esteem; tends to be or actually is neurotic; and is generally egocentric or selfish (no. 26, pp. 334-35).

The secure person is the reverse: sees the world as friendly, feels accepted, is optimistic and happy, etc. Consciously or unconsciously, the insecure person longs for security. (One of the conclusions of this dissertation is that Maslow did not

consistently account for the power of the unconscious longing for security as this affects the whole hierarchy of needs.)

Maslow distinguishes three levels of security-related needs: safety, belongingness, receiving love and affection. The single most important characteristic of the feeling of security being acceptance or receiving love and affection; the single most significant characteristic of insecurity being the feeling of rejection or being unloved ("Liberal leadership," no. 24, p. 27).

In the manual for the security-insecurity inventory (The S-I Test, no. 53), these three needs appear in reverse order at the top of Maslow's list of fourteen subsyndromes of security-insecurity.

Insecurity	Security
1. Feeling of rejection, of being unloved, of being treated coldly and without affection, or of being hated, of being despised.	1. Feeling of being liked or loved, of being accepted, of being looked upon with warmth.
2. Feelings of isolation, ostracism, aloneness, or being out of it; feelings of "uniqueness".	2. Feelings of belonging, of being at home in the world, of having a place in the group.
3. Constant feelings of threat and danger; anxiety.	3. Feelings of safety; rare feelings of threat and danger; unanxious.

The childhood gratification or frustration of the three basic needs results in adult security or insecurity, respectively. The deep-lying character attitudes and tendencies which complete Maslow's list of subsyndromes are the positive and negative effects of the three prior and causal needs having

been satisfied or frustrated. These include the way one perceives the world and life and other people as well as the way one deals with the world so perceived.

Having identified the grounds of security-insecurity, Maslow went on to study and describe the insecure person as she or he is exemplified in the authoritarian character structure.

Along with the character traits of the insecure individual already mentioned: the jungle world-view in which safety lies in gaining the power to dominate; hostility, anxiety, etc., Maslow pinpoints others. Among them are: a tendency to see people hierarchically -- superior-inferior, as opposed to the democratic person who perceives and appreciates differences without rating people in the same fashion; a tendency to judge by externals; adherence to a single value scale which makes every person with a different set of values a threat, as opposed to the democratic person who can handle a multiple scale of values; identification of kindness with weakness and cruelty with strength ("Authoritarian," no. 33, pp. 403ff).

Maslow labeled the authoritarian's philosophy of life sick and false, a jungle philosophy which is a reaction to "an outgrown past, rather than to the real present." The authoritarian is less efficient in thinking, perceiving, remembering. Authoritarians do not dare to get close to anyone. They understand only a dominating power relationship and are blind to friendship and love. Maslow defines power relationships as "the ways in which strength relates itself to weakness." To the authoritarian there is only one way: power

over the other ("Power relationships," no. 65, pp. 130-31).

It is easy to see how important the self-esteem and security-insecurity studies were to Maslow's later writing; one can see the shaping up of the hierarchy of needs between the lines of the earlier work. But with the emergence of Maslow's interest in self-actualization, he moved beyond Adler's dominance theory and into his own philosophy and psychology of human nature. The "canon" of Maslovian theory appeared in the 1943 article, "A theory of human motivation," which has subsequently been reprinted in twenty-three works (and included in Maslow's Motivation and Personality). Among those who influenced Maslow at this point in his career, one, whose name was first associated with self-actualization, is particularly significant: Kurt Goldstein.

Maslow believed that he could start with Goldstein's work on wholism and end up with a social psychology of the whole world (Eupsychian, p. 116). Reading Goldstein's classic work on brain injury and the organism, The Organism (1939), one is struck by the strong influence that the book must have had on Maslow.

The central observation behind Goldstein's theory of self-actualization was that the damaged organism reorganized its whole environment in proportion to its defect. Goldstein sought to disprove the theory that the nervous system is made up of independently functioning mechanisms and that if one mechanism were injured, a disorder specific to that mechanism would result. The brain-injured person responds holistically to its

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shrunken environment, living at a diminished, less efficient level of life.[13]

The two predominant ways in which Maslow follows Goldstein are:

1. in the belief that the drive for self-actualization is the basic human drive, and

2. in distinguishing two classes of behavior -- efficient and deficient.

Goldstein coined the term "self-actualization" to describe the one fundamental drive of human life, the tendency to actualize individual capacities. The goal of that drive is growth, fulfillment, and not the discharge of tension.[14] With the drive for self-actualization as a given, Goldstein went on to say that potentialities are needs: "The organism has definite potentialities, and because it has them it has the need to actualize or realize them. The fulfillment of these needs represents the self-actualization of the organism."[15]

And Maslow writes: "Capacities clamor to be used, and cease their clamor only when they are well used. That is, capacities are also needs (Toward, p. 201)."

Having established the innate drive for self-actualization, Goldstein contends that the organism will prefer that behavior which it can perform adequately.[16] Maslow, along the same lines, speaks of the "wisdom of the body," the trustworthiness of human choices. (He also recognizes the reality of poor choices, understanding the latter as a result of not listening to the weak impulse voices of the human being's higher nature.)

Also as a consequence of the drive for self-actualization, Goldstein speaks of the need for completion or perfection. He understood children's tendency to repeat a task to be a result of the experience of imperfection countered by the drive to completion and perfection.[17] And Maslow concludes that the most common trigger of a peak experience is the experience of perfection.

In distinguishing between two levels of behavior Goldstein uses the terms higher and lower functional significance or value. The former is behavior that is intrinsically valuable because of its significance, described by such terms as effectual, ordered, constant, correct, adequate to the organism. The latter is of survival importance, described by terms such as deficient, disordered, catastrophic, inadequate, inconstant, inconsistant.[18] In turn, Maslow distinguishes between levels of need, of motivation, of value. The higher level is growth need or metamotivation; the lower level is deficiency need or deficiency motivation. These become B-needs or being needs and D-needs or deficiency needs in Maslow's system.

The influence of Ruth Benedict and Max Wertheimer on Maslow was twofold: they taught what they had mastered cognitively and they taught by their lives. Max Wertheimer introduced Maslow to gestalt psychology and this, in conjunction with Kurt Goldstein's wholism or organismic psychology, greatly influenced Maslow's concept of human nature. Ruth Benedict introduced Maslow to her concept of synergy (which will be explored in a subsequent chapter). Benedict exemplified the

gestalt approach in her anthropological studies, seeing societies as unitary organisms. But Wertheimer and Benedict had another most significant influence on their student. Maslow was so impressed by the quality of their lives, by the wholeness and fullness of their personalities, that he set out to understand what made them the people they were. And so began his extensive study of self-actualization.

The question becomes, how well did Maslow know the life-history of Ruth Benedict? According to Richard Lowry, Abraham Maslow began to "devour the works" of anthropologists when he transferred to the University of Wisconsin in 1928, Ruth Benedict being one of the authors he read. (Actually she had only one published work before 1930, but in any case Maslow was one of her avid readers before he moved to New York in 1935 and began sitting in on her anthropology seminars at Columbia University.[19]) He was as fascinated by the woman as he was by her thought. He describes her (as well as Max Wertheimer) as "something more than a person," "non-comparable," a "very, very wonderful" person (Farther, pp. 41-42).

Yet when one reads Margaret Mead's biography of Ruth Benedict (and passages in Margaret Mead's autobiography, Blackberry Winter), one discovers that Ruth Benedict was a very complex, long-suffering woman who spent much of her first thirty years in chronic depression, often in sheer agony.

Ruth Benedict's father died in March, 1889, when she was under two years of age, and three months after the birth of her sister. Benedict was later told that her mother took

her into the room where her father's coffin lay open, and amidst hysterical weeping, begged her daughter to remember. Her mother, Benedict says,

> made a cult of grief out of my father's death, and every March she wept in church and in bed at night. It always had the same effect on me, an excruciating misery with physical trembling of a peculiar involuntary kind which culminated periodically in rigidity like an orgasm. It was not an expression of love for my mother, though I often pitied her. The affect was devastating, an affect that would be intelligible if it were a calling up of my "primal scene," the forgotten hour when my mother had implored me to remember, and, loving my father's face, I had violently repudiated her and her grief.[20]

Ruth Benedict was not certain how directly her creation of two separate worlds related to her father's death, but she believed that from her earliest childhood she did recognize and maintain two quite distinct worlds. There was her private world, the beautiful world, the world of precious moments, of happiness, of her real feelings which she shared with no one. In an autobiographical essay Ruth Benedict reports that when she was fourteen a visitor commented that she was beautiful.

> It is the single comment of the sort I ever heard till I was thirty. I hated reference to myself, and it was quite irrelevant to me whether I was ugly or beautiful. It just didn't belong to "my" world.[21]

It is hard to imagine a fourteen-year old girl indifferent to whether she was ugly or beautiful.

Ruth Benedict's private world was also the world of death, the world in which her father belonged; it would become the world of poetry, the world of Anne Singleton (Benedict's pseudonym). The other world was one of confusion, explosive weeping -- the public world which she apparently associated with

her mother whom she did not love. In reaction to her emotionally demonstrative mother, she learned two tabus: against crying before anyone and against expressing pain.[22] This might have been related to an incident, described by Margaret Mead as follows:

> The violent temper of her early years was subdued summarily by an event which, as she described it, had an almost medieval quality -- when her mother forced her to kneel with a candle on a cold floor until God granted her prayer that she would never again so completely lose control of her temper. And she never did.[23]

However the pattern originated, Ruth Benedict remembered that from age six she did not talk to anyone about things that mattered most to her, convinced that this way no one could take what was precious away from her (perhaps has her mother had taken her temper?). She said that she lived on that presupposition until she was thirty-five.[24]

Benedict reports two separate but perhaps symbolically related trials of her early life. One was what she called her "bilious attacks," a few days of vomiting, which she thought dated from her father's death and continued until menstruation. They occurred at six-week intervals, the same pattern that her menstrual cycle was to take. The second chronic condition she endured involved tantrums, vomiting, seizures in which she felt as if "devils swept down upon me." At the age of eleven she had a seizure every day or so. At this point, her mother designed a ritual, with bible and candle and an invocation to Jehovah, instructing her daughter to promise never to have another tantrum. Ruth Benedict made the promise. The exorcism worked: she never had another tantrum. However, the seizures

succeeded by depressions. She says,

> all my ideology connects my tantrums and my depressions as two different manifestations of the same kink, one supplanting the other. Both I have always called my "devils," not realizing until now that I had slipped into the same usage about my depressions that I had always had for my tantrums. Both of them were protests against alienation from my Delectable Mountains, and both of them thrust me further from them and were therefore sins. I don't think during all these years I've ever loved and luxuriated in my fits of depression. They were always set over against my beautiful country, but they were more acceptable than unwanted participation in the "other" world that was not "mine."[25]

Ruth Benedict's adolescent and young adult life involve a double search: for the right love relationship which would save her from her loneliness and isolation; for a meaningful cause or work which would save her from boredom. In 1912, before she had found either, she wrote in her journal:

> I've just come through a year in which I have not dared to think; I seemed to keep my grip only by setting my teeth and playing up to the mask I had chosen. I have not dared to be honest, not even with myself. I could only try to live through day after day, day after day, and not dishonor them overmuch. In spite of myself bitterness at having lived at all obsessed me; it seemed cruel that I had been born, cruel that, as my family taught me, I must go on living <u>forever</u>....the boredom had gone too deep; I had no flicker of interest in my character. What was my character anyway? My real <u>me</u> was a creature I dared not look upon -- it was terrorized by loneliness, frozen by a sense of futility, obsessed by a longing to <u>stop</u>. No one had ever heard of that Me. If they had, they would have thought it an interesting pose. The mask was tightly adjusted.... I am not afraid of pain, nor of sorrow. But this loneliness, this futility, this emptiness -- I dare not face them.[26]

She tended to blame her trouble on being a woman, for whom the only crown which makes life worthwhile is "a great love, a quiet home, and children....There are so few ways in which we can compete with men."[27]

And then Ruth Fulton and Stanley Benedict fell in love

with each other. She wrote:

> I have attained to the zest for life....a woman has one supreme power -- to love. If we are to arrive at any blytheness [sic] in facing life, we must have faith to believe that it is in exercising this gift, in living it out to its fullest that she achieves herself, that she justifies her existence.[28]

About six years after her marriage, and soon after her return to study, she wrote of her relationship with Stanley Benedict:

> We grow more and more strangers to the other -- united only by gusts of feelings that grow to seem more and more emptiness in our lives, not part and parcel of them; and by an intolerable pity for each other as human beings cruelly tortured.[29]

And several years later, even after a turning point had come in the discovery of her passion for anthropology, she wrote:

> Quickening of the spirit is pain almost to madness. And in spite of all I say, pain is not indifferent to me! I can't exclude the knowledge of pain from my choices. I dread intense awareness. -- And yet it comes with such ghastly frequency...And then it seems to me terrible that life is passing, that my program is to fill the twenty-four hours each day with obliviousness, with work -- And oh, I am lonely.[30]

It seems that first Stanley Benedict and then the study of anthropology and a subsequent career as an anthropologist spasmodically filled the vacuum of meaninglessness in Ruth Benedict's life. In an undated note during her early years at Columbia she says, "for the first time in my life I could go among people without wondering how and why they endured living."[31]

And how did students perceive her? According to Margaret Mead she appeared to her fellow students at the New

School for Social Research (where she studied for one year before beginning her doctoral studies at Columbia University) as

> a gentle, wraithlike figure, her hair going prematurely gray and never staying in place, dressed with a kind of studied indifference, just deaf enough to miss a great deal of what was being said before others recognized it, and painfully shy -- the beauty which had been hers as a young girl misted over by uncertainty and awkwardness... Essentially she was isolated from any milieu, meeting others only at occasional dinners with colleagues of her husband or at lunches or dinners alone with individual old friends.[32]

Describing Ruth Benedict as she perceived her during the same period of her life, Margaret Mead says,

> Her deep, cut-off melancholy was accentuated by a deafness in one ear, so that her detached smile was often a smile of gentle incomprehension as well as one of equally gentle estrangement. Yet combined with this strain of almost unmanageable depression went a sensuous delight in life -- in swimming and dancing, in the heat and sting of the changing seasons.[33]

What clearly comes through in Mead's biography is that Ruth Benedict was different; she knew she was different. Her "own world" as distinct from the public world persisted. Her students were put off by her shy manner.[34] She was pained when publishers revealed the Ruth Benedict behind Anne Singleton's poetry. And not just the poetry -- Mead comments:

> The fact of publication, having her name in print, mentioning that she had written anything were all almost too difficult to manage.[35]

Not surprisingly, her tendency to withdraw was in inverse proportion to her ability to seek professional promotion. She remained in a position of lecturer at Columbia University from 1923 until she was under the pressure of self-support when she separated from her husband in 1930. At that

point she became assistant professor, and associate professor six years later.

All of the above considered, the trait in Ruth Benedict's character which seems most incompatible with Maslow's description of the self-actualized person is Mead's contention that Benedict was unable to expect the best from others. Mead speaks of her own conviction about reliance on strength, her appeal to strength in others, and adds:

> Ruth never had this kind of trust. In many ways she expected the worst from people and steeled herself against it. In later years I had to fight for what I believed people were capable of at their best, while she acted in terms of the expected worst.[36]

How much did Abraham Maslow know of the details of Ruth Benedict's life? He reports that he studied her, made notes on her, tried to understand her, and found "wonderful excitement" in the process. He also tells us that he found that the patterns in the lives of Ruth Benedict and Max Wertheimer could be found in other individuals, namely, in those he called self-actualized individuals (Farther, pp. 41-42).

At least two possibilities become evident: Ruth Benedict either illustrates Maslow's theory of need fulfillment and self-actualization, or she disproves or at least throws the theory into question. (A third is that Maslow projected his anima onto Ruth Benedict, in so doing unconsciously elevating her into a paradigm of perfection which was unrealized/unrealizable by her.)

Maslow must have found many similarities in the background of Ruth Benedict and his own: isolation in childhood

and youth, poor body-image, a psychologically unhealthy mother, excessive shyness, enormous fear of public appearance, prolonged depression. Did Maslow unconsciously (or perhaps consciously) identify with Benedict and her ability to transcend her unusually lonely and emotionally deprived early life? Both were apparently able to embrace a new world through a first deeply loving relationship. Both became significantly involved in a search for truth, specifically, for an understanding of human nature, human community, a search for the good person who would help create the good society. Seen in this light, Ruth Benedict (as well as Abraham Maslow) illustrates the fact that a "filled" need for love and belongingness, and for self-esteem and esteem by others which are thereby made attainable, prepare an individual for the realm of Being-value, in this case, for the need for truth. Furthermore, self-actualization is proved accessible to one who pursues higher values, in spite of long-term deprivation of the deficiency needs.

A contradictory illustration would be that Ruth Benedict throws into question Maslow's theory of need fulfillment and self-actualization. In the first place, there is little evidence that Benedict ever achieved self-actualization. There is less that she should be considered by Maslow to be among the healthiest one per cent of the population. Exactly how did Maslow measure her need fulfillment and her self-actualization? If she is one of the cornerstones of his theory, how subjective is the theory? As for her general level of need fulfillment, there is little evidence of her having experienced love and

belongingness the first quarter-century of her life. As an adult, she did temporarily find great happiness in the early years of her marriage and great satisfaction in her relationships with co-anthropologists: in particular, Margaret Mead (twnety-five years her friend), Edward Sapir and Franz Boas. But if her closest friend can say of her that she was not able to trust others, to expect the best from others, can she have trusted herself, expected the best from herself? And can one who does not so trust be said to have arrived at the farther reaches of human nature?

Maslow admits to the problem of subjectivity in his selection of self-actualized people. There is little doubt that Ruth Benedict illustrates this acknowledged limitation in the workability of his theory.

For the sake of completeness, two other European intellectuals who left their marks on Maslow need mention. Two more "teachers": Erich Fromm, whose humanism and concern with mechanized, impersonal society had a lasting influence; Karen Horney, whose concept of the "real self" and distinction between neurotic and inherent needs find their place in Maslow's writing.

Between the publication of "A theory of human motivation" in 1943 and the next paper, "Self-actualizing people: A study of psychological health," 1950, Maslow did his "GHB" or "Good Human Being" research. He kept an on-going notebook between 1945-1949, for the most part reflections on students he studied, on his own methodology, on his evolving thoughts

about the self-actualized person. (During this time Maslow used the terms "self-actualization" and "good human being" interchangeably.[37]) And for the rest of his life -- the next twenty years -- Maslow continued to explore self-actualization and to test out the social implications of his value hierarchy in educational and industrial contexts.

Abraham Maslow saw himself as a great synthesizer. He would describe the three "separate, noncommunicating" branches of psychology: behaviorism, depth psychology (Freudian and neo-Freudian) and third force psychology, and hold that third force included the first and second. Of himself he would say, "I am Freudian and I am behavioristic and I am humanistic, and as a matter of fact I am developing what might be called a fourth psychology of transcendence as well (Farther, p. 4)." His aim was to enlarge psychology. "To throw away anything is crazy. Good psychology should include all the methodological techniques without any kind of loyalty to one method or one idea or one man ("Conversation," no. 129, p. 57)."

Abraham Maslow lived that dictum. As we have seen, there is evidence that he was behavioristic; he was Freudian; he was Adlerian; he was a disciple of William Sumner, of Kurt Goldstein, of Ruth Benedict, of Max Wertheimer, of Erich Fromm, of Karen Horney. At the same time, he was Maslovian -- his stance, as the following chapters illustrate, was his own.

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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER II

[1]Lowry, p. 1.

[2]William Graham Sumner, Folkways (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1906), p. 2.

[3]Ibid., p. 205. [4]Lowry, pp. 1-3. [5]Wilson, p. 142.

[6]Ibid., p. 135. [7]Ibid., p. 137. [8]Ibid., p. 138.

[9]Ibid., p. 140. [10]Lowry, p. 1. [11]Wilson, p. 143.

[12]Two results of the 1939 study may well be more the result of cultural conditioning than the result of dominance-feeling or self-esteem. Maslow concluded that highest dominance women do not cry. The women one notch lower on the scale are more likely to cry from anger than from hurt. Insecure women tend to weep. (Yet in a subsequent article Maslow reported that weeping is relatively uncorrelated with dominance-feeling.["A test," no. 21, p. 259].) I question whether the woman who does not cry has greater strength of character, self-confidence, etc., than the woman who does express deep emotion through tears. The second finding which needs "unpacking" is Maslow's conclusion that low-dominance women tend to be more religious than high dominance women. He does add that the religion of high-dominance women tended to be more intellectualized and social-ethical than dogmatic and submissive. My question would have to do with what Maslow is defining as religion -- is it an indication of Church membership and attendance, or religious experience, of a concern for large concerns and/or the faith dimension of life?

[13]Kurt Goldstein, The Organism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1939), pp. 19, 46.

[14]Ibid., pp. 196-97. [15]Ibid., p. 197. [16]Ibid., p. 361.

[17]Ibid., pp. 204-05. [18]Ibid., pp. 34-37.

[19]Lowry, p. 3.

[20]Margaret Mead, An Anthropologist at Work: Writings of Ruth Benedict (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1959), pp. 98-99.

[21]Ibid., p. 104. [22]Ibid., pp. 99-106. [23]Ibid., p. 85.

[24]Ibid., pp. 101-02. [25]Ibid., p. 108. [26]Ibid., p. 119.

[27]Ibid., pp. 120-21. [28]Ibid., pp. 129-30.

[29]Ibid., p. 143. [30]Ibid., p. 67. [31]Ibid., p. 150.

[32]Ibid., pp. 8-9. [33]Ibid., p. 86.

[34]Margaret Mead, Blackberry Winter: My Earlier Years (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1972), pp. 112-13.

[35]Ibid., pp. 4-5. [36]Ibid., p. 130. [37]Lowry, p. 29.

CHAPTER III

THE ROOTS OF SELF-ACTUALIZATION, CONCLUDED: RELIGIOUS INFLUENCES

Early Experiences

Abraham Maslow claimed over and over again to be a confirmed atheist. His atheism began early in life, first as a response to his mother's superstitious beliefs, later as a response to "supernaturalism" of every kind, to any belief that increased reliance on supernatural power, thereby diminishing the realization of human possibility. Institutional religious beliefs stood in the way of Maslow's over-riding passion to revolutionize the philosophy and psychology of human nature. His accusation, aimed not only at religious but at any cooperating institution, was strong:

> Any belief that makes men mistrust themselves and each other unnecessarily, and to be unrealistically pessimistic about human possibilities, must be held partly responsible for every war that has ever been waged, for every racial antagonism, for every religious massacre (Motivation, p. 86, emphasis added).

Abraham's father was a free thinker; his mother, an orthodox Jew. As a child Abraham challenged his mother's superstitions.

> She would say..."don't step over the leg of your brother, because he will stop growing immediately." So what I did was to step over the legs of the brother. Then she said..."you mustn't go through a window because you will go blind"...Oh, she had lots of them. So I went through

> a window, and I remember testing all these things at the age of four, five, and six.[1]

Maslow found the religion he was exposed to as a child so ludicrous that he "abandoned all interest in religion and experienced no deisre to 'find God' (Farther, p. 195)." After his bar mitzvah at age thirteen he became a "fighting atheist"; Fabian socialism was his weapon. One of his dreams was to abolish religious superstition.[2] In fact, it was more than superstition that Maslow deplored. Richard Lowry points out a difference between Maslow's tempered public utterances on the subject of religion and the unmistakably negative conclusions recorded in his private journals. There Maslow reveals his conviction that theistic religion was a "childish looking for a Big Daddy in the sky."[3] But Maslow's is indeed a rare variety of atheism. He was a mystical atheist! At the end of an undergraduate paper he wrote entitled "The Over-Soul -- Emerson," October, 1918, he said:

> I have myself had the mystic experience...[in which] I experienced a blind groping for something, an overwhelming sense of unsatisfied desire, a helplessness which was so intense that it left me almost weeping.[4]

Maslow did not ascribe such experience to the Over-Soul or to God. The conclusion of that 1928 paper can be read as an introduction to Maslow's life-long effort to explore and realize the "farther reaches of human nature."

> At the moment of the mystic experience we see wonderful possibilities and inscrutable depths in mankind....Why not ascribe [the wonder of the experience] to man himself? Instead of deducing from the mystic experience the essential helplessness and smallness of man,...can we not round out a larger, more wonderful conception of the greatness of the human species and the wonderful vistas of progress

just faintly glimpsed against the future?[5]

The Atheistic Religion of A. H. Maslow

Maslow was convinced that the human being needs a religion or framework of values to live by, something bigger than self to be awed by and committed to, "in about the same sense that he needs sunlight, calcium, or love (Toward, p. 206)." Maslow viewed needs as basic, instinctive capacities that clamor to be used, and must be used if one is to reach self-actualization. The human being, then, is basically, potentially religious. But what does Maslow mean by religion?

He means something naturalistic, empirical, and nonchurchly (Toward, p. iv). He means humanistic psychology.

> If Paul Tillich defined religion as "concern with ultimate concerns" and I then defined humanistic psychology in the same way, then what is the difference between a supernaturalist and a humanist? (Religions, p. 45)

The difference may well be in what is seen as "ultimate." Is the ultimate "other"; or is it of our nature? Most religious believers are supernaturalists. Most believe in a God (or force) who (or that) is of another order or nature than the human and every day. Maslow did not believe in God. He rejected the thought of a supernatural and/or a personal being as "ultimate." And yet he admitted that when he heard theologians and sophisticated thinkers in general define God as a force or principle of integration, a "power that expressed the unity and therefore the meaningfulness of the cosmos, the 'dimension of depth'," disagreement failed (Religions, pp. 45, 55). At that point, he believed, naming the integration

"God" or not became an arbitrary, personal decision shaped by "one's personal history, one's personal revelations, and one's personal myths (Religions, p. 56)."

The question, however, is not only whether the word or name "God" is used to describe the power of integration. The question beyond this question becomes: What is the source or origin of the power of integration? Is it something rooted in the depths and/or heights of human nature, or is the ultimate beyond the human -- is it "other"? Jung speaks as a psychologist when he roots the God within, within the self, and says that he cannot comment on whether or not God has an external referrent. He leaves that conviction to the faith of the individual. Maslow is more ambiguous. His effort is to explore and realize human, natural possibilities, and to do this he needed to correct the tendency on the part of religious people to leave some external power to do what they could do for themselves. He wanted to regain or reteach the lesson which he believed the true mystics taught,

> that the sacred is in the ordinary, that it is to be found in one's daily life, in one's neighbors, friends, and family, in one's back yard, and that travel may be a flight from confronting the sacred...To be looking elsewhere for miracles is to me a sure sign of ignorance that everything is miraculous (Religions, pp. x-xi).

At the same time he did not exclude the possibility that concepts such as the holy, the eternal might have a supernatural reference. As will be seen, when pointing out where he was in agreement with others with regard to religious experience, he said that he did not feel that such experiences necessarily implied any supernatural reference (Religions, pp. 4-5).

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He was aware that concepts like the sacred, the eternal, heaven and hell were going through a metamorphosis, and believed that such concepts "are not mere hallucinations, illusions, or delusions, or rather more accurately, that they need not be. They can and do have referents in the real world (Religions, p. 44)." But how does Maslow use "real world"? Clearly, it is not a supernatural world. Perhaps we could coin the word "metaworld" or "metanatural" as the place or level of life where one transcends herself or himself. One of the thirty-five meanings that Maslow ascribes to the word "transcendence" is "to become divine or godlike, to go beyond the merely human (Toward, p. 274)." But the "merely human" is less than the "fully human." To become divine or godlike, for Maslow, was to become fully human or "metahuman" or "B-human," to realize an instinctive potentiality within human nature. So that however closely Maslow may have felt he was drawing to some theologians and sophisticated thinkers of his day, his own remained a non-theistic "theology," more appropriately called a humanistic psychology.

When Maslow studied organized religion he was aware of a tendency for two wings to develop: the mystical and individual wing, as opposed to what he called the "legalistic and organizational" wing. Whereas he believed that the authentically religious person could successfully integrate the two trends, he found that organized religion often became the enemy of religious experience, and such integration did not take place. His book Religions, Values and Peak-experiences develops that

basic thesis. One can surmise that Maslow's experience of organized religion was so negative that he did not see that the two wings, the individual and the social or communal, can be mutually supportive, that organization is for the sake of the group, that mystical experience is for the sake of a better individual member leavening a better community. However, something happened after Maslow published Religions, Values and Peak-experiences. Colin Wilson describes it as a shift in emphasis from negative to positive aspects of religion. He felt that Maslow was exploring new territory like a beginner.[6] Maslow attempted to correct the overstatement he found in Religions, Values and Peak-experiences. He said that he considered the book "too imbalanced toward the individualistic and too hard on groups, organizations and communities (Farther, p. 347)." He admitted that he did not sufficiently stress the traps of the mystical side of a person's religion: the fact that the mystic can become selfish and even evil. The mystic can reject the guide, the teacher or counselor. He added, too, that basic needs can be fulfilled only by and through another, only within a society (Farther, pp. 343-350).

In his own writings, Maslow did not explicitly distinguish between the two wings to his understanding of religion, but the distinction is not difficult to find. On the one hand Maslow emphasizes the individual side of religion; on the other, while he does not use the word "religious" in developing it, the framework of values he adheres to has a strong social aspect.

The term "peak-experience" is readily associated with the name Abraham Maslow. The word "synergy" (which he borrowed from Ruth Benedict but spent considerable time developing and integrating into his own "system") is perhaps less well known or less readily associated with Maslow. The two terms represent the dual-nature of Maslow's religion.

The Individual Side of Abraham Maslow's Understanding of Religion

"Peak-experience," as will be explored in greater detail, describes one of the happiest, fullest, most ecstatic moments of life in which a person is most herself or himself. Maslow believed that peak or mystical experience was the core or essence at the heart of religious phenomena (Religions, p. 19). (But here he is restricting the use of the word "religious," implying that it cannot be applied to those aspects of one's framework of values that do not include an intense emotional quality.) Maslow felt that atheists and theists alike could accept what Rudolf Otto defines as characteristics of religious experience:

> the holy; the sacred; creature feeling; humility; gratitude and oblation; thanksgiving; awe before the mysterium tremendum; the sense of the divine, the ineffable; the sense of littleness before mystery; the quality of exaltedness and sublimity; the awareness of limits and even of powerlessness; the impulse to surrender and to kneel; a sense of the eternal and of fusion with the whole of the universe; even the experience of heaven and hell (Religions, p. 54).

Disagreement would come in the interpretation of the experience.

Just as the interpretation of religious experience would vary according to the belief system of the experiencer, so too, the consequence of the experience would be expressed differently.

Gratitude might be felt by all -- theists to their God, others to people or events or things which made the experience possible. The gratitude might issue in worship, according to the belief system of the worshipper (Toward, p. 113).

However one interpreted the religious or mystical experience, Maslow did not believe that anyone could share the transcendent experience with another -- it is totally private and personal. Each individual develops a private religion out of private revelation. It follows that the private religion could be theistic or non-theistic. "Each 'peaker' discovers, develops, and retains his own religion (Religions, p. 28)." (At this point Carl Jung would radically disagree with Maslow. For Jung the very possibility for religion grows out of a collective, shared unconscious. And even though each individual develops the religious tendency or archetype in an individual, personal, unique way, the communal pattern of experience is always there and is always evolving because of and through those who participate in it.) The organismic, relational quality of Maslow's thinking does not emerge at this point -- perhaps because Maslow did not bridge the gap between the individual and collective aspects of his view of religion.

The Collective or Communal Side of Maslow's Understanding of Religion

An equally important but perhaps unequally emphasized side of Maslow's understanding of religion provides an essential balance. Eupsychian Management is a necessary companion

piece to Religions, Values and Peak-experiences. In the latter Maslow stressed the essential importance of religious experience; in the former he defines religion in terms of "deep concern with the problems of ethics, of the relationship to nature, of the future of man (Eupsychian, p. 62)." In Religions, Values and Peak-experiences Maslow lays himself open to the accusation of privatism; Eupsychian Management is clear evidence that Maslow's deep social concern is anything but privative.

In Religion, Values and Peak-experiences Maslow advises anyone interested in his theses to read John Dewey's Common Faith. There are obvious points of contact between the two men: both revolt against reliance on the supernatural; both insist that religious experience needs no external criterion or guarantee for its value; both describe "God" in terms of ideals or of a principle of integration; both saw deep opposition between religious values and religions. John Dewey refuses to give substantive meaning to the word "religion"; he prefers to use the adjective "religious" to describe that which enhances the quality of human life: "Whatever introduces genuine perspective is religious."[7]

> Any activity pursued in behalf of an ideal end against obstacles and in spite of threats of personal loss because of conviction of its general and enduring value is religious in quality.[8]

Had Maslow followed Dewey in use of the word "religious," he might appropriately have called his book Religious Management! Instead, Maslow moved away from "religious" and "religion,"

replacing these words or translating them into his own psychological vocabulary. In the relatively small number of books on religion in Maslow's private collection he often makes marginal notations of concepts he prefers to the religious language being used. In place of "God" or "religion," Maslow writes "cosmic consciousness," "B-cognition," "peak-experience," "synergy," or "third psychology." No matter whether the word "religious" is used or avoided, the fact is that both Dewey and Maslow believed that what people called "religious" is a dimension of value to be found within human life.

Eupsychian Management is indeed a religious book (with a strange-sounding title). Maslow thought that "Eupsychia" was a better word than "Utopia" to describe the kind of culture that would evolve if one thousand healthy, self-actualizing people established themselves on a sheltered island or deserted land where they would not be interfered with (Eupsychian, p.ix; cf. Motivation, p. 277, Farther, p. 208). Maslow is not talking about a Utopia which is in fact a flight from complicated civilization, a running away from rather than an improvement within. Nor is he talking about a materially-based Utopia -- Eupsychia is above all a psychologically healthy culture (Eupsychian, p. 62; "Eupsychia," no. 81, p. 2). Maslow raises questions about the education that would be fostered, the kind of economy that would flourish, the way people would deal with sexuality, the religion that would emerge. He is confident that it would be a loving culture, that basic needs and metaneeds would be respected more than they are in our society, that

there would be more freedom, less pressure to conform (Motivation, p. 277).

The book Eupsychian Management is not a flight to a sheltered island -- it is not a book of fantasy. Rather, Eupsychian Management is a journal of notes, reflections, principles, policies -- embodying the kind of attitudes and thinking that would raise the level of life, and specifically of industrial life, from the merely human to the meta-human. Just as Maslow says there is not the possibility of Utopia or Eupsychia without the presence of what he calls synergy or synergistic relationships, so there is no way to understand Eupsychian Management, or broader still, to understand Maslow's religious attitude, without dealing with the concept of synergy.

Synergy is a medical term describing the action of chemicals and cells that combine to produce benign results greater than the sum of the parts.[9] The word is derived from the Greek synergos or working together, "combined action or operation (as of muscles)" (Webster's). Maslow borrowed it from Ruth Benedict, specifically from a manuscript (since lost) of a lecture she delivered at Bryn Mawr College in 1941. Before she coined the word "synergy" for her purposes, Benedict had used the terms "secure" and "insecure" in describing cultures. She felt that "high synergy" and "low synergy" were more objective (Farther, pp. 199, 202). A high synergy society would be characterized by non-aggression, by social orders in which the actions of the individual and the group mutually

serve one another's advantage. A low synergy society would be competitive and antagonistic: one person's gain is the next person's loss (Farther, p. 202). Benedict labeled systems "siphoning" or "funneling." Where wealth is funnelled, the results are slave labor and exploitation. Where wealth is siphoned, the goods of a society are siphoned from their sources and spread around. Maslow illustrates the difference by pointing to the graded income tax and property tax as synergistic, siphoning systems. Philanthropy is an obvious example of high synergy. He suggests another: give tax credits to the company that helps improve the whole society (Eupsychian, pp. 59, 91). An example of funneling is exorbitant rent or usurious interest rates (Farther, p. 205). Grading on the curve is a low synergy practice, or what Maslow calls the result of antagonistic thinking: "What's good for my enemy is bad for me (Memorial, p. 106)." Applying Benedict's principle as she did to the study of another culture, Maslow often used the Northern Blackfoot Indian culture to illustrate the principle of synergy. At the annual Sun Dance ceremony the tepees of the tribe are gathered in a circle. The possessions that the rich men have accumulated during the year are piled high. As part of the ceremony, the rich man boasts of his achievements, magnanimously distributing the wealth to widows, orphans, the blind, the diseased. He ends with only the clothes he is wearing. (A rich man who does not give away his riches would not be considered wealthy.) Therefore everyone is happy when the chief gets rich -- everyone knows that his wealth will

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be generously shared (Farther, pp. 203-04). Maslow also points out that in the group of eight hundred Blackfoot Indians, he was told that only five fist fights had been observed over a period of fifteen years (Motivation, p. 124).

The key to the principle of synergy is a sense of world community or world connectedness.

> The truth is that everything in the world is related to everything else and everybody in the world is related to everybody else and everybody now living is related to everybody who is going to live in the future, and in this way we all influence one another (Eupsychian, p. 115).

This is the vision behind Maslow's passion to nourish and foster the "good person" who could help create the "good society." First we need self-actualized individuals, persons who have incarnated their innate trend toward integration and wholeness via the fulfillment of their basic and higher needs. With this will come an understanding that all people reside within a world-wide, trans-time, network of relationships. We are interdependent. Maslow called synergy the "actual perception of a higher truth, of a higher reality, which actually exists," He believed that the realization of this truth and movement toward its enactment "is like the development from becoming blind to becoming seeing (Eupsychian, p. 97)."

But Maslow also recognized that we need the right social conditions for synergy or mutual interdependence to become operative. We need a world good enough and wealthy enough so that there are goods to share; an integrated world in which the parts are in communication. Given these conditions, Maslow says, it will be true that

> what's good for the world is good for the country, which is good for the state, which is good for the community, which is good for the enterprise, which is good for the managers, which is good for the workers, which is good for the product. This comes close to the statement that roused so much fuss that "what's good for General Motors is good for the country," and yet the fact is that in an ideally holistic or organismic or integrated world situation exactly this would be true and should be true (Eupsychian, p. 111; cf. Farther, p. 214).

In a synergistic world, the dichotomy between selfish and unselfish is transcended. One's advantage is the other's advantage. A person "seeking his own selfish good necessarily helps other people whether he wishes to or not (Farther, p. 20)." On the other hand, a person seeking the good of the other necessarily reaps "selfish benefits." Maslow uses the graded income tax as an example. However, it is hard to imagine a synergistic society flourishing unless its members did indeed glimpse the higher truth of world unity and interrelatedness which inspired Maslow. And it is hard to imagine such people of vision who do experience a kind of love-identification helping other people without wishing to do so. In any case, in a synergistic situation one can "selfishly enjoy other people's happiness (Eupsychian, p. 95)." Maslow had a favorite example which he used to illustrate the principle of synergy as a resolution of the dichotomy between selfishness and unselfishness. If you enjoy strawberries and know that your young child does also, and if you take every bit as much pleasure in feeding the child your portion of strawberries as you would in eating them yourself, is it selfish or unselfish to feed the child your strawberries? The gesture is both selfish and unselfish, or neither selfish nor unselfish --

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it is synergistic. (On the other hand, Maslow points out, "where selfishness and unselfishness are mutually exclusive, this is a sign of mild psychopathology within the individual (Eupsychian, p. 88)."

But to return to Maslow's contention that the right conditions are necessary for synergy to become operative, he says that in the short run or in emergencies or under bad conditions, mutual interdependence cannot work (Eupsychian, p. 115). In those situations, it will be true that one person's gain is the next person's loss, because there is simply not enough to go around.

Maslow set out to research and help evolve the right conditions. Much of the effort of his last years was spent studying the industrial, managerial situation. His aim was to help people at all levels of industry work collaboratively toward the same ends (Toward, p. 208). Rather than seeing people in the employer-employee model, he wanted every person to be transformed into a partner. Partnership and synergy are the same thing (Eupsychian, p. 66).

Eupsychian Management contains Maslow's theory of work, of leadership, of teamwork, of power, of social improvement. It is an attack on privatism. It is a book filled with religious vision, religion not in the sense of binding one to God, but in the Dewey tradition of "genuine perspective," "ideal end," "enduring value."

By way of conclusion, the writer finds Abraham Maslow's understanding of religion paradoxical and dissatisfying.

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Paradoxical that he is a mystic who is also an atheist. Paradoxical that independent of the early Christian writers and of the vast literature on prayer and/or spirituality, he comes to the age-old conclusion as if he were the first to consider it: that all of the higher values or meta-values are connected or mutually inclusive. Truth is beautiful, is good, is alive, is perfect. Paradoxical that he focuses on the attributes that have traditionally been affirmed of God, and affirms them -- but of no thing or no one: truth, goodness, beauty, aliveness, perfection, necessity, justice, simplicity, order, self-sufficiency. There is another note that seems paradoxical. Maslow wants a synergistic society where people are truly, deeply interdependent. Therefore, independence is not the answer. But he seems to reject the notion of God in part because belief in God takes away some of the human person's independence or self-sufficiency. Does the existence of God intrinsically imply a threat to human autonomy? Why would the relationship between human beings and God not be synergistic or interdependent?

A believing Christian would find Maslow's understanding of religion to be both intellectually and emotionally dissatisfying. His whole system makes more sense when God is seen as the source of self-actualization, as the embodiment of the meta-vlaues, as the lure to the higher life, as the subtle impulse voice toward self-fulfillment. So too, the mystic experience is more satisfying, more overwhelming, more

compelling when one believes that it is an awareness of the unifying reality of God in one's life and in all of life.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER III

[1]Tape recorded interview reported in Lowry, pp. 12-13.

[2]Wilson, pp. 166, 184. [3]Lowry, p. 14.

[4]Ibid., p. 14. [5]Ibid., p. 15. [6]Wilson, p. 184.

[7]John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1934), p. 24.

[8]Ibid., p. 27.

[9]T. George Harris, "About Ruth Benedict," Psychology Today IV, No. 1 (June, 1970), p. 52.

CHAPTER IV

THE EVOLUTION OF MASLOW'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

The collection of Maslow's thoughts on the unconscious has been studied developmentally over a thirty-year period, 1939-1969. There is a steady evolution from (1) a concept of the unconscious in terms of conflict, repression, danger and darkness (more implied than articulated), to (2) a conviction that unconscious motivation is operative mostly in neurotic people and can be ignored in healthy people, to (3) a concept of the unconscious as the source of creativity, joy, play, humor, free expression -- an area of study essential to anyone interested in motivation. In other words, Maslow moved from a Freudian to an Adlerian to a Jungian position. However, he was more thoroughly aware of his Freudian and Adlerian positions, relatively unaware of Jungian psychology.[1] Maslow makes passing reference to Jung in his writings, includes a few Jungian titles in his bibliographies. However, when he is talking most like a Jungian he does not mention Jung's name, leaving the reader with the feeling that Maslow was unaware of the congruence of his thought with Jung's.

Clarifying Maslow's position(s) on the unconscious is further complicated by the fact that he uses the word analogously. Unconscious can mean simply unaware or unattended to.

For example: normally one is unaware or unconscious of bodily functions when they are functioning well; one is conscious of something bodily -- internal or external -- when it is malfunctioning. If one lives within a network of strong, supportive and loving relationships, one is not conscious of love and belongingness needs as needs. (One may be very conscious of love and belongingness as capacities.) The word is used with a slightly different twist when Maslow refers to un-self-conscious, spontaneous, expressive behavior as unconscious. One is not aware of the springy walk and radiant expression that reveal the sense of well-being one is experiencing when life has a "just-rightness" feel to it. Maslow also speaks of "the unconscious" in a more topographical sense of a "place" where repressed thoughts are buried alive, and/or a reservoir of potential energy waiting to be actualized.

Chapter Two included an explanation of how Maslow put Freud's sexual theory and Adler's dominance theory to the test in studying first infrahuman primates and then the behavior of women. Adler "won out." Maslow was less explicit about another way in which he became more Adlerian than Freudian at about the same time: he adopted Adler's theory of the unconscious.

Alfred Adler and the Unconscious

Basically, Alfred Adler considered unconscious drives as more characteristic or neurotic people than of normal people. In fact, he did not think it was necessary to attend much to the unconscious motivation of healthy people -- they were pre-

sumed to be mostly in conscious control of their choices and their behavior.[2] But Adler's position is more complex than that.

Adler believed that the basic drive in human life is the striving from inferiority to superiority, the drive for power or dominance. Seen from a more positive side, it is a social urge to cooperate with others. The dynamic begins in early childhood when an individual is thrown into interpersonal conflict out of which will be created a goal or self-ideal. Adler calls this self-created goal a fiction: it is an ideal, impossible to realize, and it will govern the individual's strivings and explain her or his conduct.[3] For the most part, the fictive goal is created unconsciously. It is constructed at a time when the child has neither the language nor the concepts to formulate the ideals, emotions, wishes or inclinations that go into the "movement." The goal then becomes part of what Adler calls a "style of life." Everything about the person's life, conscious or unconscious (recognized or unrecognized), is somehow related to that individual's fictive goal and style of life.

Adler tends to avoid the word "unconscious." He uses "hidden" or "not understood" or "unrecognized" instead. One reason is that he does not want to reify the unconscious. A related reason is that he does not want to use the word in a Freudian sense: he does not want to infer that what is unconscious has once been understood.

The unconscious is nothing other than that which we have

> been unable to formulate in clear concepts. It is not a matter of concepts hiding away in some unconscious or subconscious recesses of our minds, but of parts of our consciousness, the significance of which we have not fully understood.[4]

Rather than call what the child was not able to articulate repressed and therefore unconscious, Adler says that something has simply not been understood.[5]

Adler perceives the dominance or aggression drive as the striving for perfection or realization of the fictive goal. In fact, "every conscious manifestation of the psyche points to the unconscious, fictional, final goal, just as does the unconscious striving."[6] The neurotic person needs help in understanding her or his frustration in light of the style of life which is operative. Adler proceeded by way of interview and keen observation to unveil or make conscious earliest childhood memories, and thereby reveal to the individual her or his style of life.

How does Adler's position affect Maslow? In his 1939 study of dominance-feeling and social behavior in women, Maslow states that his research was "designed to ignore the concept of the unconscious." His claim:

> Many of the Freudian mechanisms could be seen overtly and superficially in well-adjusted people, in spite of the fact that Freud describes them as unconscious, repressed, and hidden. Such well-adjusted people seemed to be almost completely understandable without any reference to the concept of the "unconscious" ("Social behavior," no. 19, p. 5).

He added that the importance of unconscious motivation had been "definitely overrated" in the study of the personality of relatively well-adjusted people (p. 30). (While Adler's

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influence is obvious, Maslow explains that his decision to take the responses of well-adjusted people at face value, without interpretation, came out of exchange with Erich Fromm [p. 29, note 4].)

Three years later Maslow's position remained the same. In a follow-up study of dominance-feeling and social behavior in women he says:

> Our subjects were relatively "normal" (as distinguished from neurotic) and a good many experimental psychologists feel that extensive and important unconscious influences and sexual repressions are less frequent or less crucial in normal people than in neurotic individuals ("Self-esteem," no. 28, p. 265).

Maslow recognized the importance of understanding the unconscious motivation of people with authoritarian character structures because he felt that the tendency to seek psychological satisfaction through power was unconscious. However, this is consistent with his 1939 position because he makes it clear that he considers authoritarian people to be neurotic (see "Authoritarian," no. 33 and "Power relationships," no. 65).

It was out of the dominance, self-esteem studies of Maslow's Adlerian years that the hierarchy of needs evolved, at least the four levels of that hierarchy which lead up to (and are presupposed by) the growth or metaneeds. It is interesting to note that when Maslow "converted" to a combination Freudian-Jungian position of not only (re-)recognizing, to some extent, the importance of unconscious motivation, but also of viewing the unconscious as the source of creativity and of joy, Maslow did not change the first four steps

of the hierarchy. What he did at this time (and possibly unconnected with his recognition of the significance of the unconscious) was to add a fifth level of growth needs. This must say that in Maslow's mind there was a close connection between conscious and unconscious needs: recognizing the importance of unconscious motivation did not, for him, necessitate a re-working of the need hierarchy. As will be explored in greater detail (at the end of this chapter and in a subsequent chapter), the way one makes use of the hierarchy of needs in studying or measuring or predicting human behavior cannot be as simple as Maslow might have thought in his dominance and sexuality studies. For example, he may still hold as true what he stated in 1942, that he considers "conscious self-confidence or self-esteem or a similar concept to be a fundamental and important determining force in a descriptive dynamic analysis of the normal adult personality and particularly in the sexual life ("Self-esteem," no. 28, p. 265)." But how does conscious self-esteem relate to unconscious self-esteem or its opposite, self-hate? In 1965 Maslow believed that "most people on unconscious levels do not have enough feelings of self-love, self-respect (Eupsychian, p. 15)." Therefore it would be hard, in fact incorrect, to assume that the person with conscious self-esteem is necessarily on the way to self-actualization or realization of the metaneeds. Maslow did not recognize the degree to which unconscious deprivation affects conscious needs.

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An Enlarged View of the Unconscious

There is a marked shift in Maslow's thinking in his 1949 article, "Our maligned animal nature," in which he expresses the importance of including higher needs in an understanding of human nature. There he surmises that a large section of our culture unconsciously believes that the deepest impulses of the human person are evil and undesirable. This view is held by "many, perhaps most, psychiatrists and psychoanalysts," by many theologians, publicists, social scientists and everyday people (no. 44, p. 273). Surely Maslow is here recognizing the importance of understanding, dealing with, perhaps changing, unconscious convictions and motivations and admitting that unconscious thought does affect "well-adjusted" people. (Perhaps Maslow would not call these people "normal" because normal for Maslow became the possible, the self-actualized person. Nothing less could be the "norm" for human life.)

One can see two sets of reasons why Maslow was brought to a new understanding of the unconscious: to more adequately explain human motivation he necessarily had to recognize the complexity of our desires; and, even more crucial, he saw that to neglect the depths of the unconscious was to cut out an enormously important part of human life.

Maslow realized that all of us, not just the neurotic, are often unaware of the complexity of our purposes -- we are unaware of the unconscious aim that underlies our conscious desires. He knew then that a sound motivation theory could

not neglect the unconscious life. For example, in line with his earlier research on self-esteem and sexuality, Maslow realized that sexual behavior can be motivated by a desire to assure oneself of masculinity (or femininity), a desire to impress or to feel safe (Motivation, pp. 22-23). Motivations are complex.

For the sake of a more complete picture of human life, of human possibility, Maslow recognized that the depths of the unconscious are "the source of joy, love, creativeness, play and humor as well as of dangerous and crazy impulses (Religions, p. 42, note 1; cf. Farther, p. 82, Toward, p. 182)." [7] Out of these dpeths comes the ability to be ourselves, our deeper selves (Farther, pp. 84-85). Compare the following with the statements about the unconscious in the 1939 and 1943 papers:

> The normal adjustment of the average, common sense, well-adjusted man implies a continued successful rejection of much of the depths of human nature, both conative and cognitive...It means that the person turns his back on much in himself because it is dangerous. But it is now clear by so doing, he loses a great deal too, for these depths are also the source of all his joys, his ability to play, to love, to laugh, and most important for us, to be creative. By protecting himself against the hell within himself, he also cuts himself off from the heaven within (Toward, p. 142).

(In a 1958 paper Maslow called the new approach to the unconscious a "new frontier," "found during the last ten years or so." He prefers the words "deeper self" to the unconscious in describing it. Maslow makes no reference to Jung in this paragraph [Farther, p. 82]. Nor does he mention Jung or the collective unconscious when he says that "the deeper we go

into ourselves or any other person, the more universal we get. At our deepest levels, we seem to be more alike than different ["Philosophy," no. 64, p. 241].)

Primary Process and the Unconscious

To understand the deeper self or unconscious Maslow realized the necessity of getting into primary thought processes. Primary processes are unorganized, illogical, primitive ways of perceiving and evaluating inner experience. Secondary process represents a rational, organized way of thinking and dealing with external reality. Because the roots of mental illness were first found in the unconscious, which operates according to non-rational, primary process thinking, such thought processes have been presented as childish, immature, crazy. This is the thought-behavior pattern of the neurotic and the psychotic patient. But Maslow came to see that the same thought patterns are also archaic, poetic, mystic, childlike. Without attending to these pre-moral, preverbal depths, we cannot give a complete account of the human person. Maslow's goal was two-fold.

He wanted us to stop thinking of primary process as pathological thinking. Instead, one must learn to recognize and contact the primary thought processes of the unconscious through attending to dreams, fantasies, wishes. Maslow even suggests sensory deprivation as a way of cutting off the outer world in order to allow the inner world to come to consciousness. In other words, stop denying and repressing unconscious

and preconscious wishes and fears. Become aware of and give up your chosen techniques for maintaining repression: denial, projection, reaction formation (Toward, pp. 96,182,185,192; Farther, pp. 69, 90-91; Eupsychian, p. 171).

Maslow had hopes that the human potential movement would educate people to discover and claim those parts of themselves:

> Practically everything that happens in the T-group could be summarized from the centering point of the first confrontations with psychic realities, all of which have been neglected or underplayed or suppressed or repressed by our culture, which insists on being a culture of things and objects...a culture which leaves out almost entirely the subtleties of the inner life...Our pragmatic stress on results in the real world, our pure stress on repression and suppression, the doctrines of original sin and of the human psyche as deeply evil, these are all designed to encourage people to suppress or repress the whole of the psychic life, to keep it under tight control at all times (Eupsychian, p. 170).

That step -- being open to the "subtleties of the inner life" -- is a prerequisite for the next. Maslow advocated the fusion of the primary and secondary processes, "so as to make them both more conscious (more mature) and both more unconscious (more automatic and spontaneous and less self-conscious)." He deplored the dichotomization of two processes which are intrinsically interdependent, saying that it resulted in the creation of "two monsters where none was before ("Two kinds," no. 67, preprint, p. 3)."

If the primary process is walled off by dichotomizing, it will remain childish -- it will remain the unconscious of the child in whom it was walled off. In other words, to lose touch with deep wishes and fears and gratifications is to

leave them fixated, immature and dangerous. Secondary process thinking, in such a case, becomes an organized attempt to control what cannot be expressed. The result is an unconscious that cannot grow up and an "adult" consciousness that cannot be childlike.

There are many ways to facilitate the fusion of primary and secondary process thinking. Maslow hoped that education would be a catalyst in the movement toward human wholeness: creative art education, creative dance education, exposure to non-verbal techniques. All of these might facilitate the process of fusing primary and secondary process thinking. Therapy provides an intensified method for uncovering and integrating into consciousness, unconscious, primary process thinking. Attention paid to dreams, to fantasies, to desires, allows unconscious perception to surface. One can also study her or his emotional outbusts, over-reactions, unpremeditated acts, compulsions, projections, humor, in order to understand the unconscious needs expressed therein. Maslow suggests that we may one day add to the list of ways in which unconscious needs express themselves "rituals, ceremonials, folk tales and the like (Motivation, p. 141)." (Again, he does not mention Jung in making this statement, apparently "unconscious" of the fact that Jung had long included such things as ritual and fairy tale as paths to -- which are also paths from -- the unconscious.)

The Unconscious as Described in a Maslow-edited Book of Readings

Before concluding this section on the unconscious, mention might be made of three of the essays which Abraham Maslow and Hung-Min Chiang included in their collection of readings, The Healthy Personality, all three of which are congruent with Maslow's final position on the unconscious.

Erich Fromm, in "Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism," advocates the uncovering of the unconscious, which he believes would mean

> the overcoming of affective contamination and cerebration; it means the de-repression, the abolition of the split within myself between the universal man and the social man; it means the disappearance of the polarity of conscious vs. unconscious; it means arriving at the state of the immediate grasp of reality, without distortion and without interference by intellectual reflection; it means overcoming of the craving to hold on to the ego, to worship it; it means giving up the illusion of an indestructible separate ego, which is to be enlarged, preserved as the Egyptian pharaohs hoped to preserve themselves as mummies for eternity. To be conscious of the unconscious means to be open, responding, to have nothing and to be (p. 120).

In the name of psychoanalytic psychiatry, Lawrence Kubie, in "The forgotten man of education," offers a Socratic challenge to all educators at all levels of academic training: "Know thyself in depth." His thesis is that all of our perceptions of external reality are seen "through a cloud of distorting projections of our own unconscious problems (p. 127)." Through education this fact could be changed. Educators must first become conscious of how their unconscious needs and purposes distort and prevent their knowledge and teaching. So freed from their enslaved pasts, they could then transform

the educational process so that students from the earliest years avoid the dichotomizing between conscious and preconscious on the one hand, and the unconscious on the other. Where necessary, the educational process would make intervention in a curative way when the split or dichotomy had been made. Kubie believes that if his ideal were to be actualized, therapeutic analysis would become necessary only for those for whom the educational process was not successful (pp. 126-36).

The third article that addresses itself to unconscious life is a selection from Marion Milner (Joanna Field, pseudonym), A Life of One's Own. The editors of The Healthy Personality describe Milner as a woman who "much troubled by a constricting tendency in her personal life, courageously set herself to search for the solution (p. 186)." Her search began with a kind of free-associative writing (and later painting) which put Milner into a fascinating self-analytical process of expanding her awareness. For example, she learned to push the center of her awareness from her head to other parts of her body -- her heart, the soles of her feet. Or, at a concert she would send herself out of her body, leave herself so to speak and move in close to the music. (One is reminded of the late nineteenth century French symbolic poets when Milner says: "I was feeling what I saw as well as thinking what I saw [p. 188].") Milner found such experiences both exhilarating (she calls the effect they produced "moods of delight") and terrifying. She would

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sometimes go into a panic fear of annihilation as she spread out invisible feelers and pushed herself out into a landscape. Or, when carried away by music she would suddenly "clutch wildly at some wandering thought" to bring herself back to the "familiar world of bored self-consciousness (p. 196)."

In a subsequent book by Marion Milner which Maslow recommends (Knowledge, p. 246), On Not Being Able to Paint, the author reflects on the kind of psychic experience she had generated: "Our inner dream and outer perception both spring from a common source or primary phase of experience in which the two are not distinguished, a primary 'madness' which all of us have lived through and to which at times we can return."[8]

These three essays further illustrate the complete circle Abraham Maslow's concept of the unconscious underwent between 1939-1969.

An Evaluative Note

I actually knew where I would end before I started when I made the decision to read through Maslow's works chronologically -- I had read the "end of the novel" first. It seemed incredible that when Maslow set out to study dominance feeling or self-esteem in 1939, he thought he could ignore the unconscious. The evolution of his thought made it clear that Maslow did move away from his initial position and became aware of the enormous significance of the unconscious

in one's journey toward self-actualization. He came to recognize the unconscious as the source of creativity and was also aware of the distortion and diminishment an unclaimed repressed life can effect. There is one area critical to his basic thesis where Maslow continued to give minimal attention to the difference between the conscious and the unconscious. A way of indicating this area is to ask the question: when are deficiency needs met and how is that known? The answer becomes an important measure of the usefulness of his whole need hierarchy. How conscious are most people of deep-seated safety and security needs?

For example, a thirty-two year old woman, Grace, enters into a counseling relationship in order to decide whether she wants to break her marriage and marry a man with whom she has been having an affair, or break that relationship and reinvest herself in her marriage. At face value, she has never been aware of a lack of safety or security. Her parents have supplied for her every material need since birth: both necessities and luxuries. She grew up in a surrounding of beauty, affluence and social status. Her parents have had a long, externally successful marriage, raised six unusually beautiful and quite talented children, and spend their retired years appreciating and lavishing gifts on their children and grandchildren. Grace and her husband, whose father is a multi-millionaire, married ten years ago, have three healthy, attractive children, a wide circle of friends, opportunities to travel, to indulge hobbies and interests -- at

face value they are the "beautiful people" living the "beautiful life." Then why the affair? Grace has been the "perfect" daughter of "perfect" parents, the model oldest child who consistently shared responsibility for her siblings, model housewife and mother -- then she suddenly realized that she had been living up to other people's expectations for so long that she did not know who she was beneath her perpetual good cheer and illustrative sense of responsibility. But had she been safe and secure? Always. Only months into the counseling process, after a decision to break off the relationship with the second man and a painful period of living through that decision, did she discover a deep, depressing insecurity.

When her first sibling was born with congenital defects, her parents regularly sent Grace to nearby relatives' homes for weekends. It was only when she was a young adult that she learned of her brother's multiple operations during the first year of his life. The birth of the third child followed a terribly risky pregnancy, during which Grace's mother spent four or five months in bed. After the premature birth of Grace's first sister, Grace was again frequently sent to relatives' homes, and was never allowed to touch the frail baby. Grace's efforts to surpass anyone's expectations of her was the myth she fashioned in order to assure her acceptance by her parents -- later by teachers, friends, and, finally, by her husband. Many additional details could be added to this picture of a woman whose safety and security

needs on the unconscious level had never been met. "Why am I not allowed to stay at home?" "What is really going on with my mother...my brother...my sister?"

Before her counseling experience, Grace might have checked Maslow's list of aspects of safety needs: security, stability; dependency; protection; freedom from fear, anxiety, chaos; need for structure, order, law, limits (Motivation, p. 39) -- and decided that she was indeed a safe, secure person. But once she engaged in an extensive therapeutic process she began to see the deeper aspects of her need for safety and security, particularly for the assurance of being wanted, and she discovered in herself a crippling insecurity. A part of the well-hidden problem between Grace and her husband was that she needed almost constant reassurance that he loved her; he felt that her desire for such affirmation was excessive and ridiculous -- his life, he felt, proved his love for her. It was only as he began to see the roots of her insecurity that he was able to really help her toward the kind of security which he had assumed was there all along. This illustration is complicated by the fact that unconscious aspects of safety and security are of the same "stuff" as unconscious aspects of love and belongingness, and of self-esteem and esteem by others. While Maslow's needs may be distinguishable on the conscious level -- safety is not precisely the same thing as self-esteem -- they are all aspects of the larger need for acceptance, a need which is mostly unconscious. Few parents are able to articulate that they

do not accept a child; many parents do, in fact, unconsciously reject their children. Of course, there are levels of acceptance and rejection. Not many parents totally reject their children, nor can many parents articulate partial rejection of their children and/or of their parenthood. But casebooks of psychiatry as well as our own experience and the experience of those whose lives touch ours give ample evidence of the struggle many people have with the feeling of acceptance, initially of acceptance by parents. This struggle remains unconscious, either until a deep acceptance by another allows it to surface or until intervention is made by means of some other therapeutic process. Acceptance or rejection seriously affects one's safety, security, love, belongingness, self-esteem and esteem by others. In Grace's case, it would be more accurate to say that she was struggling with the need for acceptance than with the need for safety or security. Maslow's terms are used consciously in an attempt to view the case in light of the need hierarchy. There is not sufficient evidence that the hierarchy holds up when one looks at unconscious roots of the conscious needs or deprivations. Nor is it convincing that people with unmet deficiency needs can get to the unconscious sources of these needs without professional guidance. In which case one has to question the value of Maslow's theory of motivation for a general audience because his theory can be too easily misinterpreted.

A corollary to the fact that Maslow does not suffi-

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ciently deal with unconscious deficiency needs is that the people he defined or described as self-actualized, poeple who lived at a being-need level, may in fact have been operating at a deficiency level. A conscious pursuit of being needs may be an unconscious way of compensating for unmet deficiency needs. And what may be the most optimistic but ironical outcome of Maslow's hierarchy is that such a disguised deficiency operation may in fact work. One certainly can point to unmet needs in Maslow's life. One can point to unmet needs in Benedict's life. And one can just as easily point to the lure of Being-values in their lives. More will be said on this subject in the section detailing the hierarchy of needs.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER IV

[1]Colin Wilson makes a parenthetical remark about Maslow's remaining relatively unaware of Jung, possibly because Jung was across the Atlantic (Wilson, p. 149).

[2]Goble, Third, p. 122.

[3]One is reminded of Karen Horney's "idealized self." See the chapter on George Herbert Mead in this dissertation -- p. 227.

[4]From Zur Rolle des Unbewuesten in der Neurose (1913), p. 163; cited in Heinz and Rowena Ansbacher, The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler: A Systematic Presentation in Selections from his Writings (New York: Basic Books, 1956), p. 232.

5 [5]Ansbacher and Ansbacher, p. 191.

[6]from Structure of Neurosis (1932), p. 10; cited in Ibid., p. 233.

[7]Ernst Kris holds that creativity can be enhanced by neurosis and/or psychosis. Treatment of illness can result in a diminishment of creativity. See Ernst Kris, Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art (New York: International Univ. Press, Inc., 1952).

[8]Marion Milner, On Not Being Able to Paint (New York: International Univs. Press, Inc., 1957), p. 28.

CHAPTER V

THE THEORY OF SELF-ACTUALIZATION

Methodology

In general, Maslow uses descriptive analysis of empirical, phenomenological observation. However, there is a marked difference between the methodology of his earlier and his later years, signaled by the shift from studying infrahuman primates to the study of human beings. Mid-stream he studied both primates and human beings. Maslow explained that he would include a control group of infrahuman primates in experiments on the social behavior of human beings for certain problems: leadership, dominance, influence of language, aggressiveness, social-emotional expression, altruism, friendship, sexual behavior, systems of sex organization, principles of group organization, cooperation, competition and social motivation ("Comparative," no. 14, p. 488). But Maslow was aware that the use of animals guaranteed the neglect of uniquely human capacities -- self-sacrifice, shame, symbols, love, humor, art, beauty, guilt, ideals, the production of poetry, philosophy, music, science (Motivation, p. 289). When Maslow's interests moved to such higher needs, he no longer conducted careful research studies of the behavior of infrahuman primates. He moved from the impersonal to the personal; from careful research and controlled experiment to

intuitive, explorative, non-conventional research; from repeatable experiment to clinical case history and extensive use of interview; from means-centered to problem-centered research.

Maslow called the conclusions he drew during his self-actualization or Maslovian years "prescience." He knew that his was exploration and not final research (Farther, pp. 42, 295; Toward, p. xi). He also knew that he often yielded to a tendency to move on to the next project before the final research on the first project was done. At the end of his life he said of himself: "I'm someone who likes plowing new ground and then walking away from it. I get bored. I like discovery, not proving. For me the big thrill comes with the discovering ("Conversation," no. 129, p. 37)."

The methodology Maslow used in his self-actualization studies had been evolving since the late thirties and the beginnings of his self-esteem and security studies. Maslow did not study self-esteem or security in an isolated fashion. He studied the role of self-esteem or of security in the total personality. Preliminary to his focus on either self-esteem or security, he studied the whole organism or personality, inquiring by means of extended interview into all aspects of a person's life: family relationships, the subculture to which the individual belongs, her or his style of life, hopes, ideals. Self-esteem and/or security was then seen against this background. Maslow called his methodology holistic-analytic as opposed to reductive-analytic (Motivation,

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pp. 296-99).

During the 1940's when Maslow was at Brooklyn College he carried on his "GHB" or "Good Human Being" research, clearly a foreshadowing of his self-actualization studies. An entry in his GHB notebook (May 6, 1945) outlines the rather remarkable procedure he used (remarkable to think that Maslow believed it could work!) He would pick out healthy subjects in class, just by looking at them! Next, he checked their security score on the security-insecurity inventory. He then interviewed the individual for one hour, after which the interviewee was asked to write a memorandum of the interview. Finally, he gave the subject the Rorshach test. Overall, the results were disappointing. Maslow notes that practically all of those he picked showed a poor Rorshach and that he was not good at choosing high security individuals.[1]

By 1950 Maslow had devised what he believed were more satisfactory procedures. He calls the methodology he used in his self-actualization studies "iteration." It included these steps:

1. Gather and collate the various operative definitions of the syndrome being studied -- including folk definitions (in this case, definitions of self-actualization or psychological health and personal fulfillment). From this collation arrive at a more careful definition, devoid of logical and factual inconsistencies. (This will be a non-technical definition.)

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2. On the basis of the refined definition, select two groups of subjects: a group high in the designated quality; a group low in the same quality. These people are studied individually in depth through extended interview. On the basis of the study the definition is further refined or corrected. Maslow called the result of this step the "first clinical definition."

3. On the basis of the first clinical definition the original group is reselected. Some of the original group is retained, some not; other new individuals are selected. Again, the group is studied clinically and the first clinical definition is further modified and enriched.

Maslow believed that in this way he could arrive at a more and more scientific, operational, exact definition of self-actualization.[2] He admits to some of the difficulties inherent in his design.

First, the problem of definition (Science, pp. 14-15; Farther, pp. 29,43; Toward, p. 170; "Religion, science," no. 73, p. 11). Who sets the norm for the good human being or for psychological health? Any such concept can only be arrived at against some criterion of humanness, and any criterion of humanness is colored by the value system of the person designing that criterion. (This, of course, would be true of the study of anything that involves a value judgemnt. There will always be a question of basic assumptions and how these influence the principle of selection.) Furthermore, once a definition is issued, each element within it needs

further definition. Maslow confesses that he found himself "skirting on the edge of circularity." Still, he believed that self-actualization could and did become a more objective, testable concept. He refers to Everett Shostrom's Personal Orientation Inventory to illustrate that point.[3]

Maslow used both positive and negative criteria for selection of self-actualizing subjects. Negatively, he looked for the absence of neurosis or psychosis or strong tendencies in these directions. Positively, he sought out people who appeared to be making full use of their potentialities. He also looked for individuals in whom the basic needs for safety, belongingness, love and respect had been or were being met.

Apart from the problems included in selection of subjects, Maslow faced another difficulty. Since he was studying living people, two scientific requirements could not be met: repeatability of the investigation and availability of the data upon which he based his conclusions -- he had to respect the confidential nature of his in-depth studies. These difficulties were partially overcome by Maslow's studying public and historic figures and by his using young people and children who could be used publicly.[4] (Maslow makes a telling comment about the culture we live in. He said that he had hoped that he could include in his study the figures created by novelists and dramatists, "but none were found that were usable in our culture and our time [Motivation, p. 150]." But is it a question of novelists and dramatists failing to illustrate the "farther reaches of human nature," or is it a matter of Maslow

failing to grasp the shadow or evil side of human life?)

Because of the nature of Maslow's task, the presuppositions out of which the above methodology is used become as important as the methodology itself.

Basic Presuppositions

What are the presuppositions which hold up the Maslovian world? Maslow enumerates the basic assumptions which support his philosophy and psychology of the human person (Toward, pp. 3-4;190-214). However, he does not include in that list the assumption behind his assumptions: there is but one realm of being, the natural and human, and the human person need not submit to any law or power beyond the human. In other words, there is no God or Other, in terms of which life and death are to be understood and/or fulfilled. While Maslow does believe in the power of transcendence (he gives thirty-five meanings of the word "transcendence"), he never contends that one transcends the realm of the human. One transcends self-consciousness; the body; one's present; one's past; selfishness; death, pain and illness; basic needs; weaknesses and dependence; one's expectations; space and time; culture; opinions; dichotomies. One even becomes godlike -- but for Maslow there is no God.[5] Transcendence is always for the sake of a larger humanity. Maslow does not put any limits to what a transcending individual might become.

Perhaps the three most basic assumptions which Maslow makes about human nature are these:

1. Our biologically-based inner nature includes a wide gamut of instinctive needs or capacities (none of them evil), which range from the most elementary physiological needs for food, shelter and the like, to the higher growth needs (or Being-needs or metaneeds) for such things as truth, beauty, aliveness, completeness.

2. To understand human nature, one must study the strongest, healthiest, most alive, most fulfilled human beings, people whom Maslow calls self-actualized. That is, psychology is a study of health, not of illness.

3. It is possible to study human nature scientifically and come to a discovery of what it is like. Included in this assumption is the belief that inner state evidence is both available to the individual and is reliably available.

Maslow's many conclusions about human needs and human experiences become an amplification of these basic presuppositions.

Philosophy of Human Nature

The theory of self-actualization is built upon basic assumptions about human nature. Maslow twice lists these assumptions in Toward a Psychology of Being (pp. 3-4; 190-214; cf. Motivation, pp. 269-70). His expanded list includes forty-three propositions which are here condensed into fourteen.[6] (Numbers refer to propositions from the list of forty-three.)

1. Each person has an essential inner nature which is instinctoid and is in part determined by heredity, and which

must be seen as potential yet to be actualized developmentally; this nature is prior to good and evil (nos. 1, 2, 10).

2. While the inner voices of our essential nature are weak and can be drowned out, repressed or forgotten, and therefore made unconscious, the inner nature rarely dies; a frustrated or suppressed inner nature results in neurosis and guilt; while acceptance of the inner nature leads to health and, in an adult, to self-actualization (nos. 3, 6, 7, 9, 11, 14, 28).

3. Basic needs are capacities which clamor to be used; the main path to health and self-fulfillment is via gratification of these needs (nos. 17, 19).

4. Inner nature is both species-wide and idiosyncratic, both given to and created by the individual; human nature and concomitant naturalistic values can be studied both objectively (or scientifically) and subjectively (nos. 4, 5, 8, 27).

5. The unconscious depths of human nature can be good, beautiful and desirable; they are necessary to human-fulfillment: intuitive, ineffable primary process type of cognition contacts aspects of reality that can be cognized in no other way (nos. 13, 33).

6. The healthy person can live in two related and sometimes fused worlds: the physical world of facts and purposeful action which operates according to non-psychic rules, and the psychic world of wishes, hopes, fears, emotions, and expression of being; healthier people are able to regress voluntarily into the psychic world without fear (nos. 20, 34, 41, 42).

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(Maslow uses the word "natural" rather than "physical" to describe the first of these fused worlds. However, since he is so insistent about keeping all needs on a continuum, and all are natural, innate, I have chosen to use "physical" as that which is in tension with the psychic.)

7. Given free choice, the normal child will choose what is good for her/his growth; destructive hostility is reactive, not instinctive (nos. 12, 16). (This assumption rules out the possibility of viewing the shadow, evil side of human life as innate and leads Maslow's readers to conclude that he did not have an understanding of evil adequate or appropriate to the human existential situation.)

8. One main cultural reason why self-actualization rarely happens is the conviction that inner nature is evil or dangerous; another reason is that one needs a healthy femaleness or maleness before general human self-actualization becomes possible -- and this is too often lacking (nos. 24, 37).

9. The human psyche needs a balance between spontaneity and necessary controls; a complete absence of frustration, pain or danger would deprive the individual of frustration-tolerance (nos. 15, 18).

10. Maturity or self-actualization or metamotivation means the transcendence of deficiency-needs; it also means the transcendence of deficiency-cognition and deficiency-love, i.e., selfish cognition or love of the world of objects in terms of gratifiers and frustrators of our needs; the self-actualized person arrives at being-cognition and being-love

which is self-transcending and objective (nos. 21, 22, 23, 30, 31, 32, 40). At the level of self-actualization, dichotomies and trichotomies are resolved: selfishness and unselfishness fuse; work and play tend to be the same thing; conscious, preconscious and unconscious are integrated, as are id, ego and superego.

11. Growth toward self-actualization is painful and difficult and requires both strength in the individual to move away from childish ways, and protection and encouragement from the environment; the advantages of growth must be enhanced and the disadvantages of non-growth diminished in order to lure the individual into growing healthily (nos. 25, 26, 36, 38, 39).

12. Peak-experiences are integrative, life-validating movements toward health (no. 35).

13. A framework of values or philosophy of life or religion is an essential human need (no. 29).

14. Maslow believed that Freud taught us that the past exists now in the person; self-actualization theory teaches that the future exists now in the individual in the form of ideals and goals (no. 43). (Actually, Freud's ego-ideal teaches that the future exists now, but Maslow must not have read Freud that way.)

In the preface to Motivation and Personality Maslow summarized the thesis of that book (which is an assumption concerning human nature): the human person has a higher nature that is "instinctoid"; this nature is profoundly

holistic. The emphases on higher nature and on holism were more implicit than explicit in the assumptions enumerated in Toward a Psychology of Being.

Maslow's major propsoitions contain his whole theory of self-actualization, at least in germ. What follows is an elaboration of the fundamentals of A. H. Maslow's theory of self-actualization.

The Meaning of Instinctoid

When Maslow uses the word "instinctoid" or "instinct-like" as descriptive of inner nature he is doing so in direct relation to the needs (or wants or capacities or values -- he uses these words interchangeably) of the human being. Maslow believed that to talk about human needs was to talk about the essence of human life. "The most profound question we can ask about the human being is: What motivates him? What drives him on? What does he want? What does he struggle for? ("Social theory,"no. 47, p. 347)." To discuss Maslow's understanding of the instinctoid nature of needs, then, is to delve into an explanation of the very heart of his theory. Here, however, the effort is simply to explain why he coined the word "instinctoid," and how he judged a need to be instinctoid. Further explanation of his method of arriving at a list of instinctoid higher needs will be dealt with in a subsequent section of this chapter.

In describing human potentialities or needs as "instinctoid" Maslow is distinguishing them from animal instincts. He explains, "man has no instincts at all in the pure lower

animal sense. All he has are certain tags and remnants which remind us enough of the instincts to be called 'instinct-like' or 'instinctoid' ("Maligned," no. 44, p. 275)." The animal instinct signals to the animal when to feel a craving, what to seek as satisfaction, and how to behave in the process. There is no doubt about what the animal wants when it wants it, and no doubt about how to get it.[7] The basic human needs are seldom as clearly felt nor as explicitly, directly attended to. And when it comes to higher level needs, clarity diminishes even further. Maslow calls the instinctoid human needs weak impulse voices, constitutional pushes "easily overbalanced and overwhelmed and drowned out altogether by cultural pressures and by learning ("Critique," no. 109. pp. 138-39)." For example,

> sometimes the good impulse itself...the impulse toward love, is so weak and so difficult to perceive that people in their blind search for love make mistakes...For instance, patriotism, which arises in part out of desire for brotherhood and gregariousness and friendliness and love has made much trouble for mankind ("Maligned," no. 44, p. 277).

It is not always clear when one is seeking the right thing for the wrong reason or the wrong thing for the right reason (or the right thing for the right reason or the wrong thing for the wrong reason).[8]

In three of his major works Maslow addresses himself to the question of criteria for judging needs to be instinctoid. A need is instinctoid if: (1) its absence produces pathology; (2) its presence produces health; (3) its restoration restores health; (4) under free conditions, it will be chosen

by deprived persons; (5) it is relatively inactive in the healthy person (Toward, p. 22; Motivation, 273-74; Farther, pp. 382-88).

There is some lack of clarity in Maslow with regard to the fifth criterion. When he is talking about a lower-level need he says: "it is found to be inactive, at a low ebb, or functionally absent in the healthy person (Motivation, p. 274). The level of the need, then, determines its presence or absence in the healthy person. In other words, according to Maslow, the self-actualized person does not experience a need for safety or security (except in unexpected circumstances). That need has become an environmental satisfaction in the person's life and the individual is then operating at a higher level of need. (Maslow does not use the expression "environmental satisfaction." He simply says that the needs have been met. The expression "environmental satisfaction" implies that the need will resurface and will be continuously met in the person's environment, a more accurate description of the existential situation.) The need or quest for truth or goodness or justice might be the dominant need in such a person's life. Such higher needs, then, are the needs to be directly studied in the lives of healthy individuals.

The Meaning of Needs

Maslow views needs as built-in values or capacities, "the deepest known layers of the human character ("Maligned," no. 44, p. 276)." They are relatively unlearned. In a sense one can say that basic needs are social in nature, i.e., they

can only be satisfied by and through others. Needs arrange themselves hierarchically, and within that hierarchy there are two major divisions. The basic needs include four levels of the hierarchy: physiological needs, safety needs, love and belongingness needs, esteem needs. The fifth level of the hierarchy constitutes the growth needs and second major division: the need for truth, beauty, etc.. The lower needs are prepotent: unless they are met higher needs will not be felt. (Maslow recognized exceptions to the rule. Some especially talented people may have a more pressing need for truth or goodness than for some basic need, such as food [Farther, p. 323].) Maslow believed that perhaps the most important single principle underlying healthy human development is the fact that when a basic need is satiated it is submerged as a need (becomes an environmental satisfaction) and a new and higher need emerges (Toward, p. 55). Need gratification results in a higher discontent. The beauty of this dynamic is that while lower needs can be satiated, the growth needs cannot. Therefore, there ought to be no possible complacency for the "on-growing" person. And since we function best when we strive for what we lack, the principle of higher need emergence "guarantees" us the possibility of always reaching for something we lack, namely, for growth needs (Motivation, p. xv). That is not to say that the lower-level or basic needs will not resurface in changed circumstances, but a person can move into a higher realm of need or value and "live" there, giving minimal attention to lower needs.

In fact, the person can develop a disdain for old satisfiers and an overestimation of the satisfiers of the more powerful, ungratified needs. Maslow calls the process a "postgratification forgetting and devaluation (Motivation, p. 61)" that is potentially pathological. For example, a person can come to devalue or mock or even destroy the gratifications that have never been wanting: food, security, love, freedom.

However, pathological devaluation is not the normal process of development. Generally, it is the individuals who have always been satisfied who are best equipped to handle deprivation. They are not operating under a craving for an unmet need, as is the deprived person (Motivation, p. 38). Maslow also recognized that higher needs may occasionally emerge after a forced deprivation or renunciation or suppression of lower needs, but that such a path is for extraordinary individuals rather than for the masses (Motivation, p. 59). He concludes, "we must expect that the hope for a healthier mankind lies along the path of gratification-health rather than of asceticism-health, although both are possible ("Higher," no. 49, p. 259)." Another dynamic principle under which the needs operate is this: "The higher the need the less imperative it is for sheer survival, the longer gratification can be postponed, and the easier it is for the need to disappear permanently (Motivation, p. 98)." Consequently, many people are never motivated by higher needs. Maslow had believed that self-actualization necessarily develops once the basic needs are fulfilled. Toward the end of his life he modified

this view. He decided that self-esteem might well be the summit of development for the "Babbitts" of the world. He was interested in discovering what deficit might result in such a resignation or abortion of a full life, but did not live to follow through on his research.[9]

While Maslow looked long and hard at deficiency pathology demonstrated by the fact that Being-values were not operative in the lives of people so deprived, he did not attend to the possibility of Being-pathology "from above." What about the person who seeks a meta-value for the sake of an unconscious basic need? If a person does not feel secure, might she or he not displace that need into a need for justice, or some other Being-value? Beneath a life-long crusading spirit might lurk a deep insecurity. Or, might a person not seek beauty or goodness as a cover-up for a deep-seated fear of death? "I will perpetuate something immortal."

Maslow's revolutionary position was that the higher needs are as instinctive as the lower needs: one's need for love, for spontaneity, for self-determination is on a continuum with one's need for calcium and sunlight. By this he seems to mean that human beings will inevitably seek the higher needs once lower needs have been met in some measure. Maslow implies that there will be something inadequate about a biological organism if higher needs are not met.

> The value-life (spiritual, religious, philosophical, axiological, etc.) is an aspect of human biology and is on the same continuum with the "lower" animal life (rather than being in separated, dichotomized, or mutually exclusive realms....That is, the spiritual life is part

of our biological life. It is the "highest" part of it, but yet part of it (Farther, pp. 324-25).[10]

Needs, then, are to be seen as essential values, wants, capacities of human life, as means of growth and enjoyment. Maslow thought it was a mistake to speak of needs as annoying, irritating, unpleasant. He did not like the expressions "need reduction," "tension reduction," "drive reduction." He believed that if needs are viewed as disturbances to an individual's equilibrium, which are therefore to be eliminated, one can wind up with Freud's death-instinct (Toward, pp. 27, 29).

Deficiency Needs and Growth Needs

One of the most important and helpful concepts which Maslow presents in his writings is his distinction between deficiency and growth motivation, between what he calls D-needs and B-needs (being or growth needs). The deficiency needs are more localized and tangible; they are also more egocentric: "I want food." "I need security from you and from this world." "I need to be esteemed so that I can esteem myself." D-needs must be filled from without by human beings other than the subject. People whose basic needs have not been met tend to become fixated at a deficiency level; their behavior is coping behavior, a purposeful striving for satisfaction of unmet basic needs. On the other hand, if basic needs have been met the person is able to live at a higher level of needs or values. Her or his needs become more social, turned outward. The growth-motivated person operates out of

fullness rather than out of need, or out of need in a "needy" sense. The need of the growth or B-motivated person is to express her or his inner nature or inner passion. Such expression may take the form of seeking truth or goodness or beauty; it may issue in a passion for justice or a sense of aliveness and spontaneity. Insofar as one's behavior is expressive and not purposeful, Maslow calls it unmotivated or metamotivated. (The difficulty may be a semantic one, but can you call a continued passion for justice that is enacted in a person's life unmotivated, non-purposeful striving? Is it really all expression and no coping? Might it not be a search for justice tainted by a metapathology "from above," a search for justice that is also a displaced need for safety and security? Secondly, is it not possible that for some people living at the growth level, the enticement to continue a motivation or "metamotivation" is the actual satisfaction of the growth need? The motivation would then be continual and the satisfaction continual.)

Maslow illustrates the tension between safety and growth by means of a diagram (Toward, p. 47).

Enhance the dangers — Enhance the attractions

SAFETY ⟵ PERSON ⟶ GROWTH

Minimize the attractions — Minimize the dangers

When a person's basic needs are not met, the ungratified deficiency needs have a fixative and regressive power. Safety and security are powerful attractions to such insecure people. If a person yields to the appeal of safety, she or he will

avoid the growth process. In order to overcome the inertia or regressive pull, one needs to see growth as more attractive than safety, and see safety as more "dangerous" to one's well-being than growth.

Maslow understands evil and illness in terms of unmet basic needs, which can become neuroticized needs. A person becomes sick when basic needs are not met. This is by nature a social problem, because the thwarting of needs happens by forces outside the individual. He says, "sickness in the individual must come ultimately from a sickness in a society. The good or healthy society would then be defined as one that permitted man's higher purposes to emerge by satisfying all his basic needs (Motivation, p. 58)." People with satiated basic needs are obviously less dependent upon the environment to meet those needs than are individuals with thwarted needs. An anxious dependence upon the environment breeds hostility. One thinks of Karen Horney's "vicious circle": anxiety breeds hostility; hostility results in increased anxiety.

One of the unresolved questions which haunted Maslow and was uppermost in his mind at the end of his life was whether aggression, sadism, masochism and other negative, destructive attitudes are instinctive. He tended to believe that they are all reactions to frustration of basic needs. In 1951 he claimed that such things as greed, hostility, cowardice are not basic to human nature. They are

> neurotic reactions to frustration of the truly basic needs, particularly for safety, love and self-respect. Frustration of the cognitive needs, it appears to me

> so far, tend to breed value psychopathology rather than neurosis, e.g., loss of any system, cynicism, universal suspiciousness, desperate need for certainty, boredom, loss of initiative, loss of zest, etc. ("Higher," no. 29, p. 258).

In the first edition of "Psychological data and value theory" (New Knowledge in Human Values, 1959), Maslow raises the question of whether aggression, hostility, hatred and destructiveness are instinctive, or whether they are a reaction to frustration of basic needs. He said the question had not yet been resolved. Freudians believe that aggression is instinctive; others, that it is reactive. "The truth is that we don't really know (Knowledge, p. 132)." He alters his position somewhat in a revised edition of that paper, which became Chapter Eleven of Toward a Psychology of Being (1968). "The truth is that we really don't know" is replaced by:

> Another possible interpretation...stresses rather the change in the quality of anger as psychological health improves or worsens. In the healthier person, anger is reactive (to a present situation) rather than a characterological reservoir from the past. That is, it is a realistic effective response to something real and present, for instance to injustice or exploitation or attack, rather than a cathartic overflow of misdirected and ineffective revenge upon innocent bystanders for sins that someone else had committed long ago. Anger does not disappear with psychological health; rather it takes the form of decisiveness, self-affirmation, self protection, justified indignation, fighting against evil, and the like. And such a person is apt to be a more effective fighter, for justice, for example, than the average person (Toward, p. 162).

Frustration of basic needs, then, can be seen as the cause of illness and neurosis, and the cause of destructive behavior. It can also result in the neuroticizing of the basic needs. Maslow makes fairly frequent reference to Karen Horney in his writings. He seems to have taken from her her understanding

of neurotic needs. Basic needs are "inherent and universal"; neurotic needs are "accidental and local." Both neurotic and inherent or healthy needs may feel alike; both press for gratification. But while gratification of basic needs brings health, the gratification of neurotic needs -- which is impossible because neurotic needs are insatiable -- does not bring health (Motivation, pp. 274-75; cf. p. 198; Science, p. 30). Maslow has a particularly apt and enjoyable description of the person immediately after the satiation of basic needs. The organism lets itself give up pressure, tension, urgency, necessity. It relaxes -- loafs, lazes, putters, enjoys the sun, polishes pots and pans, plays and has fun, is casual and aimless, learns incidentally rather than with purpose. The organism, in short, learns to be relatively unmotivated (Motivation, pp. 70-71). This might be seen as an illustration of what Maslow calls being rather than becoming. We are all in a process of becoming, or of being-becoming; within this process there are glimpses of a "pure" state of being. These moments are what Maslow describes as peak-experiences (to be explored later in this chapter). The loafing, lazing, aimlessness is obviously not a peak-experience. It might be what Maslow calls a plateau experience. But in any case it is a moment of just expressively being oneself. Maslow recognized the danger that his "being-psychology" could be seen as static. He added to his recognition of moments of being as just being the fact that such moments can promote further becoming. His is essentially a

processive, becoming understanding of human life.[11]

While frustration of basic needs produces a basic illness or destructiveness, frustration of the metaneeds results in metapathologies. For example, a deprivation of the need for beauty can issue in vulgarity, accompanied by a loss of taste, by tension and fatigue. Maslow calls these metapathologies. He charts the pathogenic deprivation and the specific metapathologies related to each of the fifteen (or eighteen, depending upon the breakdown) Being-values (Farther, pp. 318-19).

The Evolution of the Hierarchy of Needs

The notion of a hierarchical order to aspects of human life antedates Abraham Maslow. It is at least as old as Plato. In The Republic Plato draws an analogy between the state and the individual: the individual (or soul) has three parts -- reason, appetite and spirit. The state provides for the material, rational and spiritual needs of its members.[12] In Phaedrus he likens the individual to a winged charioteer and his team of horses: one horse of good and noble stock; the other, crooked and lumbering. The former, white with black eyes, holds his neck high; the latter, black with bloodshot grey eyes, is stiff-necked, short-throated, hairy-eared and deaf. When perfect, said Plato, the soul is winged and moves on high, but when the wings have been shed, he encounters solid matter.[13] Of course, Maslow would have serious disagreement with Plato's description of material or physiological

nature as inherently degrading.

Closer to Maslow's world, William James posits a hierarchy of selves: the material, the social and the spiritual self. The material self consists of body, clothes, family, property; the social self includes one's recognition, fame, honor -- "a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind."[14] The spiritual self is "the result of our abandoning the outward looking point of view, and of our having become able to think of subjectivity as such, to think ourselves as thinkers."[15] The spiritual self refers to one's inner being, to psychic faculties or dispositions. James believed that

> A tolerably unanimous opinion ranges the different selves of which a man may be "seized and possessed," and the consequent different orders of his self-regard, in an hierarchical scale, with the bodily Self at the bottom, the spiritual Self at the top, and the extra-corporeal material selves and the various social selves between.[16]

James optimistically held that an individual will seek some bodily selfishness, not too much sensuality; she or he will have more concern for honor and friends than for wealth or health. And he believed that one would be willing to give up everything else for the sake of the spiritual self.[17]

Undoubtedly, parallels to Maslow's hierarchy of needs could be multiplied.[18] Maslow evidently believed that he arrived at his own hierarchical arrangement, independent of the world of philosophical thought. As has been seen, first his primate studies and subsequently his security-insecurity studies led to his enumeration of basic needs, from the physiological needs through the need for self-esteem and esteem

by others. He arrived at a fifth level which he called meta-needs by studying the lives of the self-actualized people he had isolated through a process of iteration. Iteration, as was seen, involves an empirical, depth study, in this case of both fulfilled and crippled individuals, aimed at arriving at a scientific, operationsl, exact definition of self-actualization. Maslow found that the values operative in the lives of these people are the characteristics of Being itself. The difficulties inherent in this assumption will be dealt with in a subsequent section on the Being-values.

While Maslow lists five levels of needs,[19] he makes it clear that he does not consider it possible to completely isolate or localize a drive somatically. The typical need or drive is more a need or drive of the whole person and it is complex. For example, hunger may be relatively independent of other needs, but it may also represent a need for comfort, dependence or love. (And obviously, a person is hungry, not just a stomach.) In certain unusual circumstances extreme hunger may be an overwhelming, pure hunger drive, but in our culture and in most cultures, that is more the exception than the rule (Motivation, pp. 20-21; 35-38). But it would be true to say that the physiological needs are more independent of each other than are the higher-level needs.

Maslow concluded that all of the needs or capacities must be used and well used if the individual is to be healthy.

> An organ system presses to express itself...The muscular person likes to use his muscles...People with intelligence must use their intelligence, people with eyes must use

> their eyes, people with the capacity to love have the impulse to love and the need to love in order to feel healthy. Capacities clamor to be used, and cease their clamor only when they are used sufficiently. That is to say, capacities are needs, and therefore are intrinsic values as well. To the extent that capacities differ, so will values also differ (Toward, p. 152; cf. p. 201).

The Hierarchy of Needs

The physiological needs include material values which are essential for the maintenance of healthy physical life. The list could be broken down so far as to include minerals, hormones, proteins and vitamins by name. The obvious physiological needs are for air, food, water, shelter, clothing, sex[20], sleep, rest and exercise. Less obvious, perhaps, are sensory pleasures which Maslow believed could probably be included as physiological needs: tastes, smells, tickling, stroking. He was also considering the tendency to inertia and laziness alongside the need for activity, stimulation and excitement to be among the physiological needs (Motivation, p. 36).

Once the physiological needs are met, the need for safety and security emerge. These include the need for stability, dependency, protection; freedom from fear, anxiety, chaos; the need for structure, order, law, limits; and strength in the protector (Motivation, p. 39). Maslow does not include here the assurance of being wanted, a need he would probably combine with the need for belongingness. As has already been explored in this dissertation, a person reading through one of Maslow's books might well think that she or he can reflect on

her or his personal experience and determine whether or not safety needs have been met. Even though Maslow does advise that basic needs are largely unconscious, and only with suitable techniques and with sophisticated people do they become conscious, the writer is only aware of that fact being clearly presented in Motivation and Personality (p. 54), and not in his other books.

Yet in working with individuals in a counseling relationship one often enough encounters a person who consciously thinks and feels that her or his safety needs are met and have been well met since early childhood, and yet suffers from a deep insecurity with regard to work, feelings of well-being, ability to relate -- her or his assurance of being wanted. (The case of Grace, pp. 96-99, illustrates this point.) Certainly this situation represents esteem needs as well, but it does include root aspects of safety and security. Maslow does not sufficiently attend to unconscious needs and how they are related to conscious needs, at least in his writings.

Maslow explains that the neurosis connected with a search for safety is the compulsive-obsessive syndrome. The compulsive-obsessive person can stand for nothing unmanageable, nothing unexpected or unfamiliar (Motivation, p. 42). Maslow also sees that the insecurity cycle has even more devastating effects, as we have already seen. He notes,

> Nasty behavior there is obviously. The only question is, why does such behavior occur? Most people think vicious behavior comes from vicious people. This is

> untrue. Others think that people are mean because they themselves expect meanness from others. This is more true. Why is it that people behave badly? Why are they cruel and bad? In a word, it is because they are not liked. The insecurity cycle -- from this flows everything. First of all, suspicion and mistrust, loss of self-esteem with attempts to compensate. If you don't like me, you may and probably will hurt me even more than you have already merely by not liking me. If you hurt me, I'll hurt you first. The person who behaves badly behaves so because of hurt, actual and expected, and lashes out in self-defense, as a cornered animal might.[21]

Maslow recognized that the need for safety varies among individuals. At Brandeis he found that his graduate students flourished best in a permissive, unstructured atmosphere, that such an atmosphere encouraged "the deepest psychic strengths, self-actualizing tendencies to emerge in the open." At the same time such lack of structure surfaced all the weaknesses, lack of talent, blocks and inhibitions, in other individuals. The lack of structure issued in a "make or break" situation.[22]

When Maslow revised Motivation and Personality (1970) after the social upheavals of the sixties, he added a paragraph to the section on safety and security needs, reflecting that these needs can become urgently felt socially when there are serious threats to law, order or the authority of society. When most human beings are so threatened, they regress from higher needs to prepotent safety needs and prepare to defend themselves (p. 43).

When the physiological and safety needs are satisfactorily met, the love and belongingness needs emerge. Everyone so satisfied will long for friends or a spouse or children.

Everyone will hunger for affectionate relationships and for a place in the group.

Love has to be seen in Maslow in light of what has been said of his distinction between deficiency and growth needs. At the D- or third level, love describes affective (and some would say sexual) needs. Until these needs are met there is no possibility that B-love will emerge. The love and affection-hungry person may only be able to see people as need-gratifiers, i.e., seen from the point of view of usefulness. This is deficiency-love, the deficiency being in the perceiver. It is only when the object of our love is not needed, when nothing is needed from her or him, that the person loved is seen as a whole, unique individual and is loved in a disinterested, desireless, objective and holistic way. This kind of loving is the characteristic of a self-actualized, gratified person. To the deficient person, need gratifying-people are interchangeable; to the healthy person, unique individuals are not (Toward pp. 36-37). It is not difficult to keep the horse before the cart in this case. Unless a person has been loved, unless affective needs have been met, that person cannot love in a free, unselfish way.

Maslow does not pretend that love needs are ever met once-and-for-all. Even the healthiest, well-loved and loving person needs "steady, small maintenance doses" of love; such love has become an environmental satisfaction. Maslow reports that clinical study of the healthier people shows that because they have been love-need-satisfied, they are more able to give

love and need less to receive love (Toward, p. 42).

Since Maslow does not include love among the Being values (and for reasons which will be discussed), it might be well to include here some of the ways he speaks of mature or Being-love. He defines love-identification as

> a merging into a single hierarchy of prepotency of the needs of two or more people. Two people who love each other well react to each other's needs and their own indiscriminately. Indeed the other's need is his own need (Motivation, p. 99).

When a person really loves another (and in this case Maslow is speaking about loving a thing or a person), she or he perceives the other in a non-interfering way.

> This in turn means that you will be able to see it as it is, uncontaminated by your selfish wishes, hopes, demands, anxieties, or preconceptions. Since you love it as it is in itself, neither will you be prone to judge it, use it, improve it, or in any other way to project your own values onto it (Science, p. 116).

In distinguishing D-love and B-love Maslow points out that B-love can never be sated (while deficiency-love can), that B-love has profound therapeutic effects on its object; and that B-lovers are far more independent of each other than are people bound by a deficiency love need. B-lovers are less jealous, less threatened, less needful; they are also more eager to help the other reach self-actualization. B-lovers can completely enjoy one another (Toward, pp. 42-43). "When two people love each other fully, then each one knows what it feels like to be magnet and what it feels like to be iron filings, and what it feels like to be both simultaneously (Farther, p. 303)."

Maslow suggests one of the reasons why so many people

suffer a deficiency of love and affection. Only in three relationships are we encouraged to demonstrate an open expression of affection: the parent-child; the grandparent-grandchild; and the married people or "sweetheart" relationship (Motivation, p. 250). He also states that "if a mother kisses her child often, the drive itself disappears and the child learns not to crave kisses (Motivation, p. 63)." If mothers were genuinely affectionate, then, and if all of us were generally more demonstrably affectionate, people might grow up love-need-satiated, and as a result be more spontaneously affectionate out of expansiveness rather than out of need. Maslow makes a devastating projection with regard to the related need for friendship. He says, "the average American citizen does not have a real friend in the world. Very few people have what a psychologist would call real friendships (Farther, p. 229)."[23]

In addition to the inability to love that results from not having been loved, Maslow also notes the inability to love that might be caused by "censoriousness, moralism, disapproving of a person and trying to make him over, to remodel him, and remold him (Eupsychian, p. 173)." The inter-connection of being and deficiency-love is evident in this example. Love received must be being-love for a person's love and belongness needs to be met. It is because of this kind of ambiguity in the hierarchy of needs that Maslow's deficiency/growth distinction is a more helpful concept of levels. In any case, perhaps it would be clarifying to refer to the third level

need for love and affection as a need to give and receive affection, the fifth level need for expansive love as the need to love, to give love.

The need to belong is at the same need level. We are not islands. Maslow did not feel that enough attention has been given to the benefits and pleasures that come with belonging to a love community with which one can identify. He wanted more study done on esprit de corps, whether the group be family, club, college, basketball team (Eupsychian, p. 24). Such identification is necessary for self-fulfillment. In his revised edition of Motivation and Personality he made a reflective comment on our mobile society and belongingness needs:

> we know in a general way the destructive effects on children of moving too often; of disorientation; of the general over-mobility that is forced by industrialization; of being without roots, or of despising one's roots, one's origins, one's group; of being torn from one's home and family, and friends and neighbors; of being a transient or a newcomer rather than a native (p. 43).

I would include here, rather than among the physiological needs, Maslow's note on celibacy, applicable to people following a religious vocation or to an individual choosing a single life. He believed that sexual deprivation becomes severely pathological only when an individual feels inferior, lacking in respect, rejected by the opposite sex, isolated, or in some other way thwarted (Motivation, p. 107). Still he felt that sexual fulfillment rather than self-imposed deprivation was clearly the more common path toward self-actualization.

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The stress in recent years on self-revelation and revelation by others through open, clear communication can be seen as a manifestation of a felt need for more meaningful relationships. So too the encounter group movement -- it speaks of an enormous unsatisfied hunger for intimacy. Maslow even believed that rebelliousness was a cry for belonging, even if only to attack a commonly projected enemy (Motivation, p. 44).

The need for self-esteem and esteem by others will only emerge after the individual has received adequate love and affection and a feeling of belonging. At this fourth level of need, Maslow distinguishes two types of esteem needs. On the one hand there is a need for strength, achievement, adequacy, mastery, competence, confidence, independence and freedom: all of which can be seen as coming from within the person. On the other hand, there is a need for reputation, status, dominance, recognition, dignity, appreciation: these can be seen as coming from the community (Motivation, p. 45). (However, Maslow does not make the "from within - from without" distinction.)[24]

One might have the same difficulty with Maslow's treatment of the esteem needs as with the safety-security needs. There is a great difference between conscious and unconscious self-esteem. In his earlier work Maslow placed heavy emphasis on conscious self-confidence or self-esteem as a determinant of behavior ("Self-esteem," no. 28, p. 265). Later he wrote that "most people on unconscious levels do not have

enough feelings of self-love, self-respect (Eupsychian, p. 15)." As was illustrated in the previous chapter, self-esteem is complex and often largely unconscious. Maslow recognized that "one has to deserve applause, prestige, medals, and fame, or at very deep unconscious levels they can actually be hurtful and produce guilt (Eupsychian, p. 45)." It would be interesting to explore whether it is easier to be aware of unconscious self-hatred, and perhaps easier to trace its genesis, than it is to be aware of unconscious insecurity and its causes.

Instances where a person uses some other need -- material or spiritual in nature -- in order to build his or her self-esteem are easy to imagine. Maslow gives as an illustration the person who continues to accumulate wealth long after his material needs are satisfied because he is looking for something else -- power or respect or loveableness or attractiveness. Maslow calls this either neurotic or ignorant.

In a Maslovian study of "Need satisfaction and rehabilitation progress of psychotic patients," R. T. Goldberg concluded that a significant number of chronic schizophrenics continue to function on the safety/security level even when physical safety has been reached. He felt that before these patients could make progress, their need to belong and to be esteemed would have to be aroused, built, and maintained.[25]

Another interesting problematic with respect to self-esteem needs is that self-actualized people, or people we

might label "great" or "extraordinary" can make us aware of our lesser worth, consciously or unconsciously. When the operation is unconscious, we will not know why we feel inferior or unattractive in the presence of the superior person. Consequently we are apt to respond by projecting the blame for our self-critical feelings onto the other, as if she or he was intending to make us feel inferior (Farther, p. 37).

The most problematic level of the hierarchy of needs is the fifth and highest -- the growth needs or metaneeds, paths to and symbols of self-actualization. Maslow enumerates eighteen such values, proclaiming these to be objective (but non-hierarchical) human values, all of which would be held as values by healthy human beings.

As has been explained, Maslow began his search out of a passion to better understand, deeply understand, two teachers he greatly admired: Ruth Benedict and Max Wertheimer (see pp. 51-60). After studying them carefully and then studying other models of a full life, both living and deceased, Maslow found that their patterns of personality could be generalized. He published the results of his study and found that other psychologists drew the same conclusions (among them Carl Rogers and J. F. Bugental) (Farther, pp. 41-42). As has been mentioned, because he had to respect the confidential nature of his in-depth studies, Maslow decided to choose as subjects public and historic figures and young people and children. His public figures included: Jane Addams, Ludwig van Beethoven, G. W. Carver, Eugene Debs, Thomas Eakins,

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Albert Einstein, Sigmund Freud, Johan Wolfgang von Goethe, William James, Thomas Jefferson, Fritz Kreisler, Abraham Lincoln, Eleanor Roosevelt, F. D. Roosevelt, Albert Schweitzer, Baruch Spinoza, Henry Thoreau, Walt Whitman (and others). These people are divided among categories: cases of self-actualization, partial cases and potential cases.[26]

It is one thing to discover similar patterns of behavior among healthy, fulfilled individuals. These behavior patterns will naturally point to the value system of the persons involved: behavior illustrates value. Furthermore, without a whole lot of study, relatively healthy, relatively happy people could more than likely come up with a list of observable characteristics of a happy, healthy life. Honesty, goodness, liveliness, humor, meaningfulness, and the like would undoubtedly appear on the list. However, Maslow claims to have discovered that the values of the self-actualized person are one and the same as the characteristics of being itself. He believed that self-actualized people see the world as it actually is, without projecting their own values onto it.[27] Therefore, Maslow concluded, the values they see are the values that truly characterize what they see. Self-actualized people perceive the values of being: fact and value fuse in their perception.[28] As characteristics of being itself, these values are species-wide and supracultural, although they are always rooted in a culture.

One might agree that the values of self-actualized people are the characteristics of being itself, but find a

lack of transition in Maslow's moving from the realm of the social-psychological to the realm of the metaphysical. His use of the word "Being" is highly ambiguous. Apparently Maslow was made aware of this. In his "Notes on Being-psychology" he includes a section, "Collation of the various ways in which the word 'being' has been used in Toward a Psychology of Being (Farther, pp. 131-33)." Maslow claims to be using "being" in five distinguishable ways: (1) to refer to all of reality; (2) to refer to the irreducible nature of the individual; (3) to refer to the act of expressing one's nature; (4) to define the characteristics of a specific class of being; and (5) to refer to the end product of becoming.

When Maslow speaks of Being-values, he is apparently using "being" in a multi-dimensional way. These are the characteristics of being itself -- of all reality (meaning no. 1). They are the characteristics of the self in the peak-experience, when one is most irreducibly one's self (meaning no. 2). In pursuit of the values of being (no. 1), one can most completely express one's nature (nos. 2, 3). Being-values are human-being values (no. 4). And Being-values describe the ideal or goals of becoming (no. 5).

The ambiguity is increased by Maslow's calling these being-values needs, albeit "metaneeds." He does not lay a solid enough foundation to his discussion for his reader to know whether he is speaking of metaphorical or of determinate needs. He only makes statements such as "the lower needs are

far more localized, more tangible, and more limited than the higher needs (Motivation, p. 100)." Perhaps if Maslow had included more of his worksheets, showing specifically how he moved through his material and arrived at his conclusions, his list of values might become more grounded. While he claims that there is no objective order among the higher values (Farther, pp. 323-24), he consistently puts the "truth and beauty and goodness of the ancients (Farther, p. 44)" at the top of the list. His contention is that there will be a subjective hierarchical arrangement according to the talent and disposition of the individual. The difference would be the result of life task or vocation which might issue in one person's passion being the search for truth, another's the search for justice, another's the pursuit of beauty, and so on. But if the Being-values are not grounded in an object, just what does satisfaction of a being value "look like"? Granted, the Being-values are insatiable; what does partial satisfaction look like? It is hard for a theist to begin to comprehend Maslow's passion for truth that is not grounded in an object of truth which or who can satisfy the need. Another question -- this one with regard to Maslow's list of Being-values: why goodness and not love? why playfulness and not friendship? There are many qualities Maslow uses in describing self-actualizing people which do not appear among the Being-values. His explanation of why certain values are not included is that he distinguishes between the Being-values or characteristics of reality, and attitudes or emotions of

the B-cognizer toward reality: love, worship, humility, wonder, gratitude, dedication, rapture, and many others (Religions, p. 94). In separating these attitudes, he is saying that they are responses to being rather than characteristics of being. But if Maslow's claim is to structure a hierarchy representative of the broad range of human needs, then privacy, relfection, wonder, friendship, mission and most importantly, B-love, need to be included somewhere. He starts off by studying the values of the healthiest of people. Then he gains the insight that such individuals have a clearer perception of reality than less healthy people, that they, in fact, see reality as it truly is (and that shifts the discussion into a philosophical one). Maslow then constituted (or re-constituted?) his list as a list of the characteristics of being. At that point the hierarchy is no longer as complete a listing as possible of human capacities, needs and values.

Given the fact that Maslow is now describing being, it is still unacceptable that he does not include love among his listing. According to both the metaphysical tradition and Christian revelation, being has been equated with God, and God has been most adequately defined or described as love. Maslow describes love in terms of an attitude toward being or an emotional response to being when he is explaining why love does not appear among the Being-values. Yet in other places in his writings he describes love as creative of a response, not only as a response. For example, he says

"not only does love perceive potentialities but it also actualizes them (Toward, p. 98)." Love is not merely responsive. It is creative. It adheres in being. I would propose that the primary Being-value is love. Love is at the core of being; it is responsible for being and responsive to being. If Maslow can call being "playful," why is he reluctant to call it "loving"?

Maslow's list of Being-values (with less than interesting overlap) is as follows: (Apart from parenthetical notes, the following is taken directly from Maslow's writings [Farther, pp. 133-35; 319; cf. Toward, p. 83; cf. Religions, pp. 92-94].)

1. Truth: honesty; reality; (nakedness: simplicity; richness; essentiality; oughtness; beauty; pure; clean and unadulterated completeness).

[Maslow believed that truth was the dominant operative value in his own life.[29]]

2. Goodness: (rightness; desirability; oughtness; justice; benevolence; honesty; (we love it, are attracted to it, approve of it).

3. Beauty: (rightness; form; aliveness; simplicity; richness; wholeness, perfection; completion; uniqueness; honesty).[30]

4. Wholeness: (unity; integration; tendency to oneness; interconnectedness; simplicity; organization; structure; order, not dissociated; synergy; hormonious and integrative tendencies).

4a. Dichotomy-transcendence: (acceptance, resolution, integration, or transcendence of dichotomies, polarities, opposites, contradictions;) synergy (i.e., transformation of oppositions into unities, of antagonists into collaborating or mutually enhancing partners).

5. Aliveness: (process, not-deadness; spontaneity; self-regulation; full-functioning; changing and yet remaining the same; expressing itself).

6. Uniqueness: (idiosyncrasy; individuality; noncomparability; novelty; quale; suchness; nothing else like it).

7. Perfection: (nothing superfluous; nothing lacking; everything in its right place, unimprovable; just-rightness; just-so-ness; suitability; justice, completeness; nothing beyond; oughtness).

7a. Necessity: (inevitability; it must be just that way; not changed in any slightest way; and it is good that it is that way).

8. Completion: (ending; finality; justice; it's finished; no more changing of the Gestalt; fulfillment; finis and telos; nothing missing or lacking; totality; fulfillment of destiny; cessation; climax; consummation closure; death before rebirth; cessation and completion of growth and development).

9. Justice: (fairness; oughtness; suitability; architectonic quality; necessity; inevitability; disinterestedness; nonpartiality).

9a. Order: (lawfulness; rightness; nothing superfluous; perfectly arranged).

10. Simplicity: (honesty; nakedness; essentiality; abstract, unmistakability; essential skeletal structure; the heart of the matter; bluntness; only that which is necessary; without ornament; nothing extra or superfluous).

[Maslow says of simplicity:

Mystics and transcenders have throughout history seemed spontaneously to prefer simplicity and to avoid luxury, privilege, honors, and possessions. My impression is that "common people" have therefore mostly tended to love and revere them rather than to fear and hate them (Farther, p. 294).]

11. Richness: (differentiation; complexity; intricacy; totality; nothing missing or hidden; all there; "nonimportance"; i.e., everything is equally important; nothing is unimportant; everything left the way it is, without improving, simplifying, abstracting, rearranging).

12. Effortlessness: (ease; lack of strain, striving, or difficulty; grace; perfect and beautiful functioning).

13. Playfulness: (fun; joy; amusement; gaiety; humor; exuberance; effortlessness).

[Maslow believed that the most mature people are those who can have most fun (Farther, p. 92).]

14. Self-sufficiency: (autonomy; independence; not-needing-anything-other-than-itself-in-order-to-be-itself; self-determining; environment-transcendence; separateness; living by its own laws; identity).

Later in the same volume Maslow adds a fifteenth Being-value, that of meaningfulness.

A Concluding Note About the Hierarchy

In his book The Third Force, Frank Goble includes a sixth and seventh rung to the hierarchy of needs:[31] (6) the desire to know and understand or curiosity; and (7) aesthetic needs. Apparently he is basing his listing on Maslow's paper "A theory of human motivation" (Chapter Four, Motivation and Personality). In that paper Maslow outlines the five levels of needs, then in parallel paragraphs adds "the desire to know and to understand" and "the aesthetic needs." Actually both of those needs can be located in the Being-values or needs for truth and for beauty. If one were to add a sixth level of need in Maslow, it would be the need for self-transcendence, the outgrowth of self-actualization.[32]

Self-Actualization and Self-Transcendence

Self-actualization is primarily a desire or motive; it is also an episodic state of being. It is a desire for self-fulfillment, a tendency toward the actualization of potentiality. Maslow believed that Kurt Goldstein coined the word to designate the one master motive of the organism to achieve optimal performance (Motivation, p. 46). More

specifically, Goldstein referred to self-actualization when he tried to explain the reorganization of an individual's capacities after brain injury. He saw how the tendency to actualize the self undergoes a characteristic change in the sick person. The patient's scope of life is reduced and she or he is driven to utilize preserved capacities as best as is possible, while at the same time maintaining an undisturbed state of living. In other words, the injured organism strives to achieve ordered behavior by shrinking its environment in porportion to its defect.[33]

Maslow wants to redefine the word "self-actualization" to describe[34]

> an episode, or a spurt in which the powers of the person come together in a particularly efficient and intensely enjoyable way, and in which he is more integrated and less split, more open for experience, more idiosyncratic, more perfectly expressive or spontaneous, or fully functioning, more creative, more humorous, more ego-transcending, more independent of his lower needs, etc.. He becomes in these episodes more truly himself, more perfectly actualizing his potentialities, closer to the core of his Being, more fully human (Toward, p. 97, emphasis added).[35]

But Maslow preferred an operational definition of self-actualization. This he gives in Motivation and Personality (and more briefly in Toward a Psychology of Being) when he defines the healthy person by describing certain clinically observed characteristics (Motivation, pp. 153-80; Toward, pp. 25-26):

1. More efficient perception of reality and more comfortable relations with it. Self-actualized people are better judges of other people, as well as of things intellectual,

scientific, political and aesthetic.

2. Increased acceptance of self, of others, and of nature. "We find in our subjects a healthy selfishness, a great self-respect, a disinclination to make sacrifices without good reason (Motivation, p. 199)." Maslow also found that self-actualized people demonstrate a relative lack of guilt or shame or extreme anxiety -- they accept themselves with their frailties and sins, without chagrin. They also accept their appetities, which are large: appetites for food, for sex, for enjoyment. While they experience hostility less often, when they are angry, they are less afraid of expressing it. Such expression becomes indignation, self-affirmation, resistance against being exploited, anger against injustice (Motivation, p. 127). They also feel regret about discrepancies between what is and what might be, whether it be shortcomings they are aware of in their own behavior, or shortcomings in the group or in the culture.

3. Increased spontaneity, simplicity, naturalness. Self-actualizing people have an essential or internal unconventionality about them. Maslow says that they live rather than prepare to live. They develop naturally, without striving. He has a lovely description of such childlike abandon.

> The most desirable way to dance, at least for the amateur, is to be spontaneous, fluid, automatically responsive to the rhythm of the music and the unconscious wishes of the partner. A good dancer can let himself go, becoming a passive instrument fashioned by the music and played upon by it. He need have no wish, no criticism, no direction, no will. In a very real and useful sense of the word, he may become passive, even as he dances to the point of exhaustion. Such passive spontaneity or

> willing abandon can yield some of life's pleasures, as in allowing the surf to tumble one about, or allowing oneself to be cared for and nursed, massaged, barbered, as in being made love to, or as in the mother who passively allows her baby to suckle, to bite, and to crawl over her. But few people can dance as well as this. Most will try, will be directed, self-controlled, and purppseful, will listen carefully to the rhythm of the music, and by a conscious act of choice, fall in with it. They will be poor dancers from the point of view of the onlooker and from the subjective point of view as well, for they will never enjoy dancing as a profound experience of self-forgetfulness, and voluntary renunciation of control unless they finally transcend trying and become spontaneous (Motivation, pp. 133-34).

4. Increase in problem centering. Maslow repeatedly makes the point that self-actualized people, and in fact all of the happy people he knew, were devoted to a cause, a mission, a purpose larger than their own personal interests or well-being (Motivation, p. 159; Farther, p. 192; Eupsychian, p. 6). He agrees with Viktor Frankl that the primary or highest concern for the human person is the will to meaning ("On Frankl's paper," no. 117, p. 108). In the Maslovian world this can be interpreted as the will to self-actualization which necessarily includes a mission, and which ideally eventuates in self-transcendence. Maslow believed that, again ideally speaking, the mission or task is an "I want to" which coincides with "I must" (Farther, pp. 302-03). The task is loved and identified with and "becomes a defining characteristic of the self....In the best instance, one's self and one's work discover each other, fall in love with each other, and fuse ("On Frankl's paper," no. 117, p. 109)." When Maslow speaks of problem centering, he is also describing the person of vision, of large horizons, the person involved

in philosophical and ethical issues.

5. Increased detachment and desire for privacy. The self-actualized person has a high degree of autonomy and strong decision-making powers. She or he is self-determined. Self-actualized people "do not need others in the ordinary sense (Motivation, p. 161)." They are more detached. Maslow knew that this could easily be misinterpreted as coldness. The truth is that self-actualized people have deep ties, but with rather few individuals. The friendships of self-actualizing people are less clinging and less demanding and less desirous of reassurance.

6. Increased autonomy; independence of culture and environment; will. This characteristic is closely linked with the preceding one. The self-actualized person can stand apart. Self-actualized people do not get confused just because 95% of the population disagrees with them (Farther, p. 9).

7. Greater freshness of appreciation, and richness of emotional reaction. Self-actualized people do not take their blessings for granted.

> In a word, they are capable of "gratitude." The blessedness of their blessings remains conscious. Miracles remain miracles even though occurring again and again. The awareness of undeserved good luck, of gratuitous grace, guarantees for them that life remains precious and never grows stale (Motivation, p. xxi).

8. Higher frequency of peak-experiences. Mystic or peak-experience, involving the loss or transcendence of self, are more common to self-actualized people. Peak-experiences will be explored in greater detail in the next section of

this chapter.

9. Increased identification with the human species. Maslow used the German word Gemeinschaftsgefühl, invented by Alfred Adler, which describes feelings of affection and sympathy for and with humankind. Self-actualized people have a deep feeling of identification with the whole human species.

10. Improved interpersonal relations. Self-actualized people are capable of greater love and more fusion with others. As has been said, they form deeper ties with a few individuals, deeper than the ties of the non-self-actualized. At the same time, they attract a number of admirers.

11. More democratic character structure. Self-actualized people are accepting of all kinds of persons, regardless of class, race, or political or religious belief. They can learn from anyone with something to teach. They judge people according to character rather than according to some superficial cultural classification.

With regard to these last two characteristics, Maslow felt that his studies contradicted two theories about the choice of a marriage partner: homogamy, or like marries like, and the theory that opposites attract. The homogamous traits that he did find among self-actualized couples were honesty, sincerity, kindliness, courage. But other factors were less important: income, class, education, religion, national background, appearance. He concluded that:

> Self-actualizing people are not threatened by differences nor by strangeness. Indeed, they are rather intrigued than otherwise. They need familiar accents, clothes,

food, customs, and ceremonies much less than do average people (Motivation, p. 201).

Maslow also found that self-actualized people are attracted by skills and talents they do not possess.

12. Greater discrimination between means and ends, between good and evil. Maslow describes self-actualized people as godly, but he is using the word "god" in a metaphysical way. They are religious, but religion understood in terms of social behavior. While they follow definite moral standards, theirs are often not the conventional ones. Self-actualized people are ethical: "they do right." While they distinguish means from ends, and are fixed on ends rather than on means, they often consider something or some process an end which others would only call means. For example, the process of accomplishing a task or of taking a trip can be enjoyed as an end in itself, rather than be considered only the means of accomplishment or of arrival at a destination.

13. Philosophical, unhostile sense of humor. In other words, their humor is not at the next person's expense. They do poke fun at people in general -- not in particular, at foolishness, at the human situation, at seriousness and busy-ness.

14. Greatly increased creativeness. Self-actualized people are inventive, original, less inhibited in their approach to life. Maslow is not speaking of "special talent creativeness." Self-actualizing creativeness refers to the "ability to express ideas and impulses without strangulation and without fear of ridicule (Toward, pp. 137-38)." The stress

is on personality rather than on achievement. At one point, Maslow suggested that creativeness may turn out to be the same thing as self-actualization (Farther, p. 57). The characterological qualities of such creativeness are boldness, freedom, spontaneity, self-acceptance (Toward, p. 145). Maslow believes that "we can learn from the T-group experiences that creativeness is correlated with the ability to withstand the lack of structure, the lack of future, lack of predictability, of control, the tolerance for ambiguity, for planlessness (Eupsychian, p. 188)."

15. Resistance to enculturation: the transcendence of any particular culture. Self-actualized people are ruled by laws of their own character, not by social laws. While Freud saw culture as binding aggression, Maslow believed that culture binds expression. Speaking of the healthy person's detachment from cultural identification, Maslow said that their health is not ideal. The subjects were inhibited and restrained by society.

> To the extent that they had to maintain their little secrecies, to that extent was their spontaneity lessened and...some of their potential not actualized. And since only few people can attain health in our culture, those who do attain it are lonely for their kind and therefore again less spontaneous and less actualized ("Resistance," no. 50, p. 29).

16. Certain changes in the value system. Self-actualized people are motivated by the Being values. The "seem to do what they do for the sake of ultimate, final values, which is for the sake of principles which seem intrinsically worthwhile ("Goals," no. 132, p. 10)." In other words, they have

appropriated Being values into their own, owned, value system.

17. Ability to resolve dichotomies. Certain dichotomies disappear in healthy people: heart and head; reason and instinct; cognition and conation; selfishness and unselfishness; spiritual and pagan or sensual; duty and pleasure; work and play; social identification and individual identification; mature and childlike -- and Maslow enumerates many more. He believes that "at the highest level of living, i.e., of Being, duty is pleasure, one's 'work' is loved, and there is no difference between working and vacationing (Motivation, p. 102)."

Maslow frequently mentions that work and play are the same thing for self-actualized people. Is this really the case? There is at least and importantly a rhythmical difference between work and play, at least a variety difference. There are moments of work when things click -- it might be a moment of breakthrough for the therapist, or of satisfied achievement for the artist, an exciting class for the teacher. These moments are indeed playful and ecstatic. But the human condition is such that the daily chore requires "sweat on the brow"; for the most part work is not the same thing as leisure, nor is it play.

If the above are the characteristics of self-actualizing people, who and where are the people? There were those whom Maslow studied, and who came out on a continuum of self-actualization (with Ruth Benedict coming out on the upper end!). What about the rest of humankind? Maslow believed that less

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than 1% of the adult population is self-actualized (Toward, p. 204). And only adults have had the time to become self-actualized -- Maslow came to confine the concept "very definitely to older people."

> In our culture at least, youngsters have not yet achieved identity, or autonomy, nor have they had time enough to experience an enduring, loyal, post-romantic love relationship, nor have they generally found their calling, the altar upon which to offer themselves. Nor have they worked out their own system of values; nor have they had experience enough (responsibility for others, tragedy, failure, achievement, success) to shed perfectionistic illusions and become realistic; nor have they generally made their peace with death; nor have they learned how to be patient; nor have they learned enough about evil in themselves and others to be compassionate; nor have they had time to become post-ambivalent about parents and elders, power and authority; nor have they generally become knowledgeable and educated enough to open the possibility of becoming wise; nor have they generally acquired enough courage to be unpopular, to be unashamed about being openly virtuous, etc. (Motivation, p. xx).

Therefore, only adults can possibly achieve self-actualization. But some adults do not even seek self-actualization. Others seek it selfishly, "as a form of private and subjective salvation ("On Frankl's paper," no. 117, p. 109)," and never find it. The reason why self-actualization rarely happens can be either in the individual or in the culture, or both. Maslow believed that self-actualization is partly created by the individual, partly given by the culture, partly discovered within oneself (Toward, p. 176). As has been seen, it presupposes that basic needs have been met, and these can only be met through others and within a culture. But even with all needs met, self-actualization requires that the person listen carefully to the often weak impulse voices in order to make growth choices. There will still be dis-

content unless the individual is doing what she or he is fitted for: "A musician must make music, an artist must paint, a poet must write, if he is to be ultimately at peace with himself. What a man can be, he must be...(Motivation, p. 46)."

Maslow believed that too many people misinterpreted the concept of self-actualization, deluding themselves with a "Big Bang" theory. He felt that an antidote to this would be to communicate better with young people, help them come to appreciate patience and to appreciate the miraculous element of everyday existence.[36]

As aids to the process of self-discovery, Maslow suggests "eight ways in which one self-actualizes"(Farther, pp. 45-49):

1. Learn to experience fully, vividly, selflessly, with full concentration and total absorption. (As we shall see, Colin Wilson believes that concentration in itself can trigger a peak-experience.)

2. Make each choice as a growth choice.

3. Listen to your impulse voices in order to let the self emerge. (This is one of those instances where Maslow is not very clear about what the self that emerges really is. He says:

> to talk of self-actualization implies that there is a self to be actualized. A human being is not a tabula rasa, not a lump of clay or Plasticine. He is something which is already there, at least a "cartilaginous" structure of some kind. A human being is, at minimum, his temperament, his biochemical balances, and so on. There is a self, and what I have sometimes referred to as "listening to the impulse voices" means letting the self

emerge [Farther, pp. 45-46] .)

4. Be honest. Take responsibility for yourself.

5. Listen to your own self at each moment.

6. Use your intelligence. Work hard at what you want to achieve.

7. Set up conditions so that peak-experiences are likely. Maslow means by this breaking up false illusions about oneself, learning what one is not good at -- all a part of discovering what one really is.

8. Identify your defenses and give them up.

Even for the healthiest people these steps would be impossible to follow: each choice a growth choice; listen to your own self at each moment. And for less healthy people they would possibly be disastrous. How does a disturbed person discern healthy impulse voices? or identify her or his defenses and give them up? Maslow might just as "realistically" have said, "stop being sad and be happy."

There is a social irony about those rare people who do reach self-actualization. While they are characterized by a feeling of affection for and identification with humankind, devoted to causes larger than their own interests, and are in general good and caring people, they do not always have a positive effect on others. For example, the competence and giftedness of parents may discourage rather than enrich their own children. Maslow advises very beautiful mothers to stay out of the scene when male visitors come to call on their less beautiful daughters. The problem is broader than the experi-

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ence within family of origin. Goodness and talent can have a negative effect on anyone in the good person's immediate world. Maslow says that "excellence may be loved and admired, but it is also hated and feared (Eupsychian, p. 149)." This is related to the problem Maslow addressed himself to with regard to leadership. Superior people often make inferior people doubt their own worth. But it is only that society which prefers and elects its superior people that can be efficient, that can be the kind of society which it has the potential to become (Eupsychian, p. 153). (One is reminded of Jung's remarks: "The odour of sanctity may be far reaching, but to live with a saint might well cause an inferiority complex or even a wild burst of immorality in individuals less morally gifted."[37])

Maslow distinguishes between two kinds of self-actualizing people: those who experience transcendence and those with little or no such experience. (He has a full article [no. 136] on the meaning off transcendence. Maslow lists thirty-five meanings of the word! In brief, he means by transcendence the highest levels of consciousness, beyond self-consciousness. One transcends ego, body; time, space, culture, one's past; death, pain, sickness and evil; the natural world; basic needs; dichotomies; one's will; one's expectations. Transcendence means becoming godlike [Farther, pp. 269-79].) But all transcenders are not self-actualizing. Maslow knew that non-healthy non-self-actualized people also had important transcendent experiences. (The

Charles Manson "family" would report transcendent experience.) In typical fashion, Maslow goes on to list twenty-four characteristics of transcending self-actualizers -- which pretty much come down to the qualities or characteristics of peakers: efficient perception, metamotivation, ways of relating, responsiveness to beauty, innovativeness. On the liability side, transcending self-actualizers are more prone to cosmic sadness over the stupidity of people (Farther, p. 288). At the same time, they are more reconciled with evil. They understand its occasional inevitability, and as a result have "both a greater compassion with it and a less ambivalent and a more unyielding fight against it (Farther, p. 291)."

One of Maslow's statements with regard to transcenders seems particularly incredible: "Any transcender could sit down and in five minutes write a recipe for peace, brotherhood, and happiness, a recipe absolutely within the bounds of practicality, absolutely attainable (Farther, p. 288)."

In summary, self-actualization describes a state of well-being in which the individual has successfully emerged with pretty thorough self-understanding, deep self-acceptance, the understanding and acceptance of others, emerged as a responsible, effective, happy person. That Maslow's concept of the self which emerges is both incomplete and unclear will be dealt with in the next chapter. Here, suffice it to say that while the reasonableness and attractiveness of a concept like self-actualization, of the actualization of potential, can hardly be argued with, the intricacies of what Maslow

means by the term can. The pre-requisites of or steps toward self-actualization are so impossible to attain that the concept self-actualization becomes an ego-ideal rather than a live possibility. These steps are also inconsistent with the characteristics of the state toward which they lead. The "eight ways in which to self-actualize"demand concentration, control, vigilance: learn to experience fully, vividly, selflessly, with full concentration and total absorption; make each choice a growth choice; listen to your impulse voices -- your own self -- at each moment; identify your defenses and give them up. Self-actualization, on the other hand, is characterized by spontaneity, simplicity, naturalness, freedom of expression. Perhaps Maslow would respond that the eight ways are necessarily rigorous -- they amount to a training program. By the time the person has self-actualized, these steps have beomce habitual patterns of behavior. But is there anyone -- even 1% of the adult population -- who could habitually perform according to Maslow's directions?

Peak-Experience

If a word association were done in a large group of people with some awareness of humanistic psychology, and the name "Abraham Maslow" called out, the single most common concept associated with Maslow's name would most likely be "peak-experience." Initially when Maslow studied his group of the healthiest people he could find, he discovered that they tended to report things resembling mystical experiences. Maslow

called them peak-experiences. The concept appeared in his vocabulary around 1956; it became widespread with his publication of Toward a Psychology of Being in 1962.[38] (In his first edition of Motivation and Personality Maslow speaks of "mystical and oceanic feeling"; in the 1970 edition, of "peak-experiences.") Maslow accounts for the research which led to the development of the peak-experience concept. It included personal interviews with about eighty individuals and written responses by 190 college students to the following insturctions:

> I would like you to think of the most wonderful experience or experiences of your life; happiest moments, ecstatic moments, moments of rapture, perhaps from being in love, or from listening to music or suddenly "being hit" by a book or a painting, or from some great creative moment. First list these. And then try to tell me how you feel in such acute moments, how you feel differently from the way you feel at other times, how you are at the moment a different person in some ways (Toward, p. 71).

The term "peak-experience" is a generalization for the moments a person would describe in responding to such instructions (Farther, p. 105).

There are two components to the peak experience: an emotional one of ecstasy; an intellectual one of illumination. The peak-experience, then, is a mood or state of mind one enters into; it is also a revelation of reality-- "seeing the absolute concreteness of a thing and the wonder of its existence (Farther, p. 191)." Maslow distinguishes two kinds of peak-experience: one involves an expansion of consciousness; the other, a narrowing of consciousness. In the former,

the person experiences herself or himself as part of a while, with the emphasis on whole; in the latter, someone or something is seen intensely, the ego and the rest of the world are forgotten (Farther, pp. 252-53). Maslow believed that the simplest version of a peak-experience is fascination, concentration, absorption in anything which holds complete attention (Farther, p. 63). Of his own peak-experiences he said:

> I had lots of them. I remember. I think I used to call it "exultation" to myself, with lump in throat, tears in eyes, chills, prickles, slight feeling of (pleasant) nausea, and all sorts of other autonomic reactions plus impulse to shout and yell.[39]

In addition to peaks, Maslow said, there are also "foothill-experiences" -- "little glimpses of absolute, self-validative delights, little moments of Being (Toward, p. 154)."

Maslow changed his mind from believing that the world is divided into peakers and non-peakers, to believing that the world is divided into peakers and weak-peakers (Religions, p. 86). Weak-peakers are afraid of peak-experience. They suppress, deny, turn away from, or forget peak-experiences. They can be healthy, but "they lack poetry and soaring flights of the imagination ("Conversation," no. 129, p. 55)." Maslow thought that such deprivation was the result of a character structure that forced people so deprived into being extremely practical, rational, "ultra-scientific" -- people driven by a compulsive-obsessive denial of emotion (Religions, pp. 22-23). They might have a Marxian attitude and view peak-experience as weakness or sickness. Or they might be pessimistic

and not believe in the soaring possibilities of human life. Another reason for weak-peakers is the inevitable aging process. Maslow admitted that he was personally afraid that his body could not take peak-experiences after his second heart attack.[40]

In any case, peak moments are experienced according to the capacity and openness and readiness of the receiver. There was some change in Maslow's thinking as to whether or not peaks can be triggered at will. He seemed to consistently believe that peaks are relatively unsought. They are purposeless and unneeded. The peak-experience "is emergent and newly created, and doesn't come out of prior time (Toward, p. 108)." Peaks come as surprises. For the most part it is useless to grasp for them -- it is useless to strive, strain or use will power ("Lessons," no. 88, p. 17). Prior to Maslow's learning that peak-experiences can be deliberately brought about by drugs, especially psychedelic drugs, he would only go so far as to say that one can prepare for a peak by setting up the conditions in which peak-experience would be most likely to occur. This might be a matter of placing oneself in the company of the person(s) with whom one feels the most profound sense of well-being; it might be a matter of calling upon the things in one's world toward which one feels a magnetic attraction -- natural beauty, objects of art, music, a hobby. On the other hand, preparing for a peak might mean removing those things or ideas which make peak-experience less likely: getting rid of illusions, recognizing both

potentialities and limitations of a situation (Farther, p. 58; Religions, p. 27).

The question as to what triggers a peak-experience seems to have been an intriguing one to Maslow. He believed that the biggest source of the peak-experience is the experience of perfection -- perfection of any kind. Liberated women might not like his illustration, but most everyone would perhaps agree that there is some truth in it: "A woman may explode into happiness from scrubbing her kitchen, then standing back and seeing that her work is perfect ("Goals," no. 132, p. 7)." The two easiest ways to have a peak-experience, Maslow reported, are sex and music. His understanding of music is uniquely inclusive. It includes dancing, rhythm, athletics, "love for the body, awareness of the body, and a reverence for the body -- these are clearly good paths to peak-experience (Farther, p. 715)."

Maslow's biographer, Colin Wilson, disagreed with Maslow on the question of creating peak-experiences at will. Wilson believes that each of the series of mental acts which culminates in the peak-experience can be clearly defined, that the peak-experience has a structure that can be duplicated. One pre-condition is energy, a kind of concentration of psychic energy that summons the person to do something. Such energy creates a state of vigilance, preparedness, which Wilson believed is the basis of the peak-experience. He says, "'Peakers' are people with large quantities of energy in the ready-energy tanks. Bored or miserable people are people

who keep only small amounts of energy for immediate use."[41] When energy has been mobilized for any purpose, the person has located a meaning in that very purpose. Meaning, Wilson believes, depends upon the power of focusing, and focusing is a way of overcoming boredom. Wilson refers to focusing as a muscle that can be strengthened through usage. By using the muscle, one can choose meaning; meaning is a by-product of effort.

> I discovered that a mild peak experience could easily be induced merely by concentrating hard on a pencil, then relaxing the attention, then concentrating again...After doing this a dozen or so times, the attention becomes fatigued -- if you are doing it with the right degree of concentration -- and a few more efforts -- deliberately ignoring the fatigue -- trigger the peak experience.[42]

Wilson, then, did not agree with Maslow's saying that one has to be surprised by the peak-experience.

Wilson introduced Maslow to what he called the "indifference threshold" or "St. Neot margin,"[43] a recognition that

> crises or difficulties can often produce a sense of meaning when more pleasant stimuli have failed...danger can make you feel free when peace and serenity fail to arouse any response. It does this by forcing you to concentrate. ..there is a borderline or threshold of the mind that can be stimulated by pain or inconvenience, but not pleasure.[44]

If self-actualization comes down to full-functioning, to the realization of potentiality, and if the peak-experience is a moment of full being, of intense realization of human possibility in terms of intense liveliness, then it is not surprising that Maslow's list of the effects of the peak-experience reads much like the list of characteristics of self-actualization. Maslow explains that

> any person in any of the peak experiences takes on temporarily many of the characteristics which I found in self-actualizing individuals...We may think of it as a passing characterological change if we wish, and not just as an emotional-cognitive-expressive state. Not only are these happiest and most thrilling moments, but they are also moments of greatest maturity, individuation, fulfillment -- in a word, his healthiest moments (Toward, p. 97).

In the peak-experience, then, the person is most herself or himself. In peak-experiences people are "most their identities, closest to their real selves, most idiosyncratic." For this reason Maslow felt that the peak-experience was "an especially important source of clean and uncontaminated data: i.e., invention is reduced to a minimum, and discovery increased to a maximum (Toward, p. 103)."[45]

Maslow lists these effects of the peak-experience on the one undergoing the experience (Toward, pp. 104-14):

1. The person looks more integrated and feels more integrated than at other times, "less split or dissociated, less fighting against himself...less split between an experiencing-self and an observing-self (p. 104)."

2. The person is more able to fuse with another and/or with the world. "The greatest attainment of identity, autonomy, or selfhood is itself simultaneously a transcending of itself, a going beyond and above selfhood. The person can then become relatively egoless (p. 105)."

3. The person feels more "fully-functioning."

4. The person experiences effortlessness and ease of functioning.

5. The person feels herself or himself to be the respon-

sible, active, creating center of her or his activities and perceptions.

6. The individual is free of blocks, inhibitions, cautions, fears.

7. She or he is more spontaneous and expressive.

8. The individual is more creative in the sense of being more improvised, less prepared.

9. The person experiences the "acme of uniqueness, individuality or idiosyncracy (p. 108)."

10. The person is most "all there" -- better able to listen, beyond desire.

11. The person becomes more "pure psyche," less a "thing-of-the-world"; more determined by intra-psychic laws than by laws of non-psychic reality. As an illustration of the obscurity of Maslow's thought at certain points, I quote the entire two paragraphs where he tries to explain this effect of the peak-experience.

> The person now becomes more a pure psyche and less a thing-of-the-world living under the laws of the world. That is, he becomes more determined by intra-psychic laws rather than by the laws of non-psychic reality insofar as they are different. This sounds like a contradiction or a paradox but it is not, and even if it were, would have to be accepted anyway as having a certain kind of meaning. B-cognition of the other is most possible when there is simultaneously a letting-be of the self and of the other; respecting-loving myself and respecting-loving the other each permit, support, and strengthen each other. I can grasp the non-self best by non-grasping, i.e., by letting it be itself, by letting it go, by permitting it to live by its own laws rather than by mine, just as I become most purely myself when I emancipate myself from the non-me, refusing to let it dominate me, refusing to live by its rules, and insisting on living only by the laws and rules intrinsic to me. When this has happened, it turns out that the intra-psychic (me) and the extra-psychic (other)

> are not so terribly different after all, and certainly are not really antagonistic. It turns out that both sets of laws are very interesting and enjoyable and can even be integrated and fused.
>
> The easiest paradigm to help the reader to understand this maze of words is the relationship of B-love between two people but any other of the peak-experiences can also be used. Obviously at this level of ideal discourse (what I call the B-realm) the words freedom, independence, grasping, letting go, trust, will, dependence, reality, the other person, separateness, etc., all take on very complex and rich meanings which they don't have in the D-realm of everyday life, of deficiencies, wants, needs, self-preservation and of dichotomies, polarities and splits (p. 109).

The maze of words does not help clarify what Maslow means by becoming more "pure psyche," less "a thing-of-the-world."

12. The individual is characterized by non-striving, non-needing. "Joy has been attained which means a temporary end to the striving for joy (p. 110)."

13. Expression becomes poetic, mythical, rhapsodic.

14. The person has an experience of perfection in terms of completion-of-the-act.

15. The person often reports an experience of playfulness, gaiety, exuberance, delight.

16. The individual feels lucky, fortunate, graced.[46]

In addition to his list of the effects of the peak-experience, Maslow details two related lists: one he calls "the characteristics of the cognition found in the generalized peak-experience (Toward pp. 74-96)" -- there are nineteen such characteristics. The second, expanded to a listing of twenty-five traits, but for the most part the same as the above in content, he calls "religious aspects of peak-experiences (Religions, pp. 59-68)." It is hard to find in these

particular lists any thought that has not been included in other related lists with regard to self-actualized people. Maslow's strong tendencies to repeat himself and to catalogue drove the writer to catalogue the listings found in five of his books (making the most of the situation by pulling out any enumeration or listing in the text and including it in the inventory). (See Appendix A.)

Apart from the stylistic problem involved in Maslow's writing, the point that needs to be made here is that Maslow wants to demonstrate that spiritual values are rooted in natural, human life and do not need supernatural concepts or reference to validate them. Peak-experience is religious experience, and peak-experience is available to the atheist as well as to the believer. As was seen in the discussion of Abraham Maslow's religion, Maslow's attempt was to reteach the lesson of the true mystics that the sacred is in the ordinary. (Yet clearly he did not start with their premise that the sacred is of God.) The true cognition of being made possible in the peak-experience is what constitutes the religious experience -- at least that was enough to constitute a religious experience for Abraham Maslow. The problems of an atheistic religion were dealt with in Chapter Three.

In order to complete the discussion of peak-experience, mention must be made of two related experiences -- the plateau experience and the nadir experience. Maslow realized that there are experiences which are far less intense than the peak-experience, which endure longer than a peak-experi-

ence could possibly endure, yet which bring with them many of the cognitive and emotional effects of the peak-experience. He came to call such a state the plateau experience, and distinguished it from the peak-experience in these ways. The plateau is more voluntary than the peak; it is more often pure enjoyment, happiness, "a witnessing, an appreciating, what one might call a serene, cognitive blissfulness." The plateau can be achieved by long hard work. One can learn how to attend to one's world, learn how to see, learn how to discover the sacred in the ordinary. To live on a high plateau, Maslow explained, "is to live at a constantly high level in the sense of illumination or awakening or in Zen, in the easy or miraculous." The plateau experience is essentially cognitive (Religions, pp. xiv-xvi; cf. Farther, p. 348).[47] Examples he gives of plateau experience include the mother watching her child; anyone looking at anything "miraculous" for an extended period of time; calmly listening to music.

Finally, there is the nadir experience or desolation experience, "painful and crushing insights into the inevitability of aging and death, of ultimate aloneness and responsibility of the individual, of the impersonality of nature, of the nature of the unconscious, etc. (Toward, p. 84, note 1)." The nadir experience is the antithesis of the peak-experience. In Toward a Psychology of Being, Maslow simply recognizes such experience, remarking that he had not made the effort to explore the nadir experience. Yet Maslow came to explore

his own nadir experience, a confrontation with death in his second heart attack. He spoke of having moved beyond the fear of death and reached a plateau which he called his "post-mortem life." Experiences of both the heights and the depths, then, can issue in life on a plateau.[48]

Being-Cognition

As has been alluded to, Maslow used the term Being-cognition to describe the perception of the healthy, self-actualized person. Being-cognition is opposed to deficiency-cognition. The former is holistic, non-interfering, accurate; the latter is manipulative, partial and inaccurate. The former sees people and things as ends in themselves; the latter, as means, as need-satisfiers. While the object of perception becomes richer through repeated experience for the Being-cognizer, familiarization leads to boredom for the deficiency-cognizer (Farther, pp. 260ff). Maslow believed that self-actualizing people are more capable of Being-cognition. Ordinary people might experience Being-cognition in the peak-experience, but ordinary people have few peak-experiences.[49] The consistent and important point to be made is that Being-cognition is a total, accepting perception: the object is seen both in its particularity and in its universality. The cognition is characterized by its unity: the B-cognizer understands, sees, the interrelationship between this one object of perception and all of reality.

However, Being-cognition is not all positive. There are dangers inherent in the stance of the B-cognizer. Maslow

enumerates eight such dangers (Toward, pp. 116-24).

1. B-cognition can make action impossible; it is non-active, non-interfering, non-judging.

2. B-cognition could therefore make one less responsible in helping others: "If we admire the flood, we don't build the dam (p. 118)."

3. These two conditions can lead to fatalism: "What will be, will be (p. 119)."

4. Inactive contemplation will be misunderstood by others.

5. Pure contemplation means not writing, helping, teaching, and this can be in conflict with the unselfishness of the self-actualizing person.

6. Being-cognition can lead to undiscriminating acceptance, a too great tolerance.

7. Seeing another as perfect can create an intolerable demand on the person to live up to unreal expectations.

8. Being-cognition can result in over-estheticism.

This completes a presentation of the major aspects of Abraham Maslow's theory of self-actualization. Some inadequacies, unwarranted assumptions and inconsistencies have been pointed out. These have been in the areas of Maslow's inadequate discussion of the unconscious component of all needs; with regard to his derivation of what he calls the Being-values; with regard to the subjective nature of his selection of subjects, particularly Ruth Benedict; and concerning his steps toward self-actualization and all that the

concept self-actualization demands. In truth, the writer has even greater difficulty with one consistency essentially important to Maslow. He is consistently true to his basic presupposition: there is but one realm of being, the natural and human. Maslow is thoroughly humanistic, both in the sense of stressing human potential and insisting on a depth study of human life, and in the sense of adhering to a humanism. Fortunately one does not have to subscribe to Maslow's humanism in order to appreciate and make use of his humanistic approach to the study of men and women. The next question is, does Maslow have a concept of the self adequate to his theory of self-actualization?

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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER V

[1]Lowry, pp. 81, 34.

[2]Sociologists Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss have codified this methodology, calling it "grounded theory." They advocate the discovery of theory from the data, i.e., an inductive, phenomenological as opposed to a deductive, logical methodology. The emphasis is on generation of novel theory as opposed to verification of existing theory. Theory is seen as tentative, as an emergent in process; it is not seen as a perfect product (Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research [Chicago: Adline Publ. Co.], 1971.).

[3]Yet while Maslow often claimed that a pre-requisite for self-actualization was dedication to a cause or task outside oneself, which he sometimes called vocation or mission, only one of the 150 itesm (no. 100) on Shostrom's inventory refers to dedication beyond the individual. See Everett Shostrom, Personal Orientation Inventory (San Diego: Educational and Industrial Testing Service, 1963). I am indebted to Walter Phillips et al. for pointing this out (Walter M. Phillips, John T. Watkins, and Gary Noll, "Self-actualization, self-transcendence and personal philosophy," Jour. Humanistic Psychol., XIV, No. 3 [Summer, 1974], p. 61).

[4]Goble, Third, pp. 24-25.

[5]In Ernest Becker's book, The Denial of Death, the author comments on Freud's reluctance to submit to higher laws or powers, to shift his center beyond himself. Becker sees this as not wanting to abandon the causi-sui project of radical self-sufficiency. Yielding to the "other" comes down to:

> "the deepest, completest, total emotional admission that there is no strength within oneself, no power to bear the superfluity of experience. To yield is to admit that support has to come from outside oneself and that justification for one's life has to come totally from some self-transcending web in which one consents to be suspended (Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death [New York: The Free Press, 1973], p. 107)."

Might not a similar dynamic be operative in Maslow? He has to de-power God or the other in order to build up human possibil-

ities.

[6]Because most of the chapters in Maslow's books first appeared as individual articles, it is not unusual for similar material to be repeated within the same volume. Maslow also repeats a considerable amount of material in different volumes. Both practices reduce the effectiveness of his work as a whole.

[7]Lowry, p. 93.

[8]Karl Menninger sees the role of the psychiatrist in part as helping the patient see that "he expects the wrong things from the right people and the right things from the wrong people" -- and that the patient does not want to see this (Karl Menninger, Theory of Psychoanalytic Technique [New York: Harper & Row, Pblrs., 1958], pp. 135-36). In Maslovian terms, the patient fights against recognizing his or her real needs and wants. The weak impulse voices have either been misunderstood or drowned out.

[9]Wilson, p. 149.

[10]Colin Wilson believes that Maslow's revolutionary understanding of the higher needs being as instinctive as lower needs is a poing "which Maslow did not state in so many words (Wilson, p. 150)." Yet as the above citation shows, Maslow was in fact explicit. Also, in Motivation and Personality he says, "Recognizing the higher needs to be instinctoid and biological, precisely as biological as the need for food, has many repercussions (p. 101)." And he writes:

> "If our noblest impulses are seen not as checkreins on the horses, but as themselves horses, and contrariwise, if our animal needs are seen to be of the same nature as our highest needs, how can a sharp dichotomy between them be sustained? ("Higher," no. 49, p. 261)"

And, finally,

> "Rationality is itself instinctive in nature; the impulse to curiosity and to religion and philosophical theorizing is no more and no less part of man's animal nature than is the need to love and the desire for security ("Maligned," no. 44, pp. 277-78)."

[11]Maslow writes: "Being a human being -- in the sense of being born to the human species -- must be defined also in terms of becoming a human being. In this sense a baby is only potentially a human being, and must grow into humanness

in a society and the culture, the family (Motivation, p. xviii)."

[12]Plato, The Republic,(trans.) Francis Macdonald Conrford (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1945), XIII, pars. 129-38.

[13]Plato, Phaedrus and Letters VII and VIII, (trans.) Walter Hamilton (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1973), pars. 246-57.

[14]William James, The Principles of Psychology (2d ed.; Dover Publication, 1950), p. 294.

[15]Ibid, p. 296. [16]Ibid., p. 313. [17]Ibid., pp. 314-15.

[18]Studies in group dynamics trace an evolution of group needs that can be arranged hierarchically from structure (safety/security, belongingness) to role relationship (esteem) to the achievement of goals (growth needs/actualization). See, for example, Theodore M. Newcomb, Ralph H. Turner, and Philip E. Converse, Social Psychology: The Study of Human Interaction (New York: Holt, Rinehard and Winston, Inc., 1965), Pts. 3-4.

[19]Commenting on Maslow, Ledford Bischof distinguishes six degrees of need priority. He separates (3) the need for belongingness and (4) the need for love, whereas Maslow combines these as third-level needs. Bischof notes that Maslow reviewed the section and supplied additional comments, so apparently the distinction was acceptable to him (Ledford J. Bischof, Interpreting Personality Theories [2d. ed.; New York: Harper & Row, 1970], pp. 546-61; note p. 548).

[20]Ross Stagner more appropriately includes sex and its derivative among the third-level affection and belongingness needs (Ross Stagner, Psychology of Personality [3d ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1961], p. 303).

[21]Lowry, p.17. [22]Goble, Third, p. 88.

[23]Friendship is not among Maslow's Being-values, and for unacceptable reasons. This will be discussed in the section on the Being-values.

[24]This is related to Karen Horney's interpretation of neurotic needs. She links power, prestige, and possessions as one "set" of neurotic needs -- recognizing that in healthy people these can be sought in moderation. Is not the need to possess more than an adequacy of physiological values

to sustain and enhance life a distorted form of the need for self-esteem and esteem by others? While Maslow does address himself to the problem of non-basic or neurotic needs and makes some reference to this question, I am not aware of his fully discussing the need to acquire, to possess, to "build barns."

[25]Goldberg, p. 257.

[26]This listing combines names included in Motivation, p. 152 with those appearing in Henry Clay Smith, Personality Development (San Francisco: McGraw-Hill, 1961), p. 348.

[27]Such perception accompanies what Maslow calls peak-experience. It is in their best moments that healthy people are able to perceive reality as it truly is.

[28]Maslow knew that his understanding of the fusion of fact and value was a contradictory one. He knew that he was flying in the face of one of the basic scientific axioms, that the more objective and impersonal the perception, the more detached from value; he knew that "fact and value have almost always (by intellectuals) been considered to be antonyms and mutually exclusive (Toward, p. 84)." But he also knew that the effort to exclude values originated as an effort to exclude theological and other authoritarian dogmas from the facts (Motivation, p. 6).

[29]Undated tape recording.

[30]Maslow pointed out that some people get depressed, uncomfortable, even sick in ugly surroundings, and are cured by beautiful surroundings. Such individuals crave beauty with a craving that can be satisfied only by beauty. He reports that this is seen almost universally in healthy children, and that evidence of such an impulse is found in every culture in every age ("Goals," no. 132, p. 10). As an experiment, Maslow exposed a group of people to the same ten photographs. However, some of the people were placed in a beautiful room; some in an ugly room; some in an average room. Each photograph was to be rated by each person on two scales: an energy scale ranging from fatigue to energy; a well-being scale ranging from displeasure to a feeling of well-being. The results confirmed his conviction that perception is conditioned by the pleasantness of surroundings. Those in the beautiful room rated the photographs significantly higher than the others; those in the average room rated the photographs higher than those in the ugly room. As for his own valuing, on the same tape recording referred to in the previous footnote, Maslow says that his wife's central Being-value is beauty, and that through her he had come to value

beauty much more highly than he might without her influence.

[31]Goble, Third, pp. 43-44. S. R. Maddi also refers to a need for cognitive understanding beyond the need for self-actualization (S. R. Maddi, Personality Theories: A Comparative Analysis [Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press 1968], p. 85).

[32]Viktor Frankl believes that self-actualization is the "unintentional by-product of self-transcendence" (Viktor Frankl, The Unconscious God [New York: Simon & Shuster, 1975], p. 78).

[33]Goldstein, pp. 46, 196-97.

[34]Maslow's use of the word was never entirely acceptable to Kurt Goldstein (Lowry, p. 31, note 1). Maslow made first public mention of self-actualization in his 1943 paper on motivation, although at that time the concept was not fully formed (Richard J. Lowry [ed.], Dominance, Self-Esteem, Self-Actualization: Germinal Papers of A. H. Maslow [Monterey: Brooks/Cole, 1972], p. 151). The more complete understanding was published in 1954 in Motivation and Personality.

[35]In reporting some of the criticisms Maslow was aware of with regard to the term self-actualization, he implies that "full-humanness" might be the better word because it avoids some of the misunderstanding that self-actualization is selfish in nature (Toward, p. vii).

[36]Krippner, p. 120.

[37]C. G. Jung, Psychology and Religion: West and East, Vol.XI of Collected Works, Herbert Read, Michael Fordham, and Gerhard Adler (eds.), trans. R.F. C. Hull. Bollinger Series XX (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958), p. 76.

[38]Lowry, Intellectual, pp. 51-52. [39]Ibid., p. 53

[40]Krippner, p. 112. [41]Wilson, p. 8. [42]Ibid., p. 15.

[43]St. Neot is the name of the town in England toward which Wilson was traveling when he came to some of his insights about concentration and boredom. He named his discovery the "St. Neot Margin" (Wilson, p. 13).

[44]Ibid., pp. 12-13.

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[45]This is an especially rich and helpful insight. Because I am a person who experiences many highs, ecstatic highs, and, conversely, lows that are very low, I sometimes find it hard to know where "reality" is in the midst of either experience. Often enough I have been advised to wait until the peak passes and then evaluate a situation or make a decision, as if the real person is the one who is left behind after the moment of fullness. Perhaps this comes out of a history of placing reason -- cool, calculating reason -- over the powerful emotions. One cannot really trust intense emotion, or so I have been taught. But Maslow is showing us that the peak-experience is a matter of intellectual enlightenment accompanied by ecstasy. The feelings follow the truth that has been glimpsed. (When Maslow wrote "Cognition of Being in the peak experiences" [no. 72], he was of the opinion that there is cognitive content to every peak-experience. In one of his last public conversations, published posthumously, he says that he changed his mind. He realized that there are peaks that are empty of cognitive content Krippner, p. 115 .) Maslow has helped me believe that my best self, my real self, is the self who is able to experience life in its fullness, the self I discover (or temporarily lose by becoming one with a larger Self, whom I call God) in the peak-experience.

[46]See bibliographical entries on peak-experience research: R. M. Allen et al.; R. E. Klaveller and R. E. Mogar; W. J. Mathis and E. W. McClain; F. C. Thorne. Related to the peak-experience is Herbert Otto's "Minerva experience." Otto defines the Minerva experience as a network of formative experiences playing a significant role in personality development. Otto believed that Maslow's research adds to and deepens the understanding of the Minerva experience, but that the latter is more inclusive (Bugental, p. 119).

[47]cf. Krippner, p. 113.

[48]Colin Wilson approaches the opposite of the peak-experience from a different point of view. He says:

> "The opposite of the peak experience -- sudden depression, fatigue, even the 'panic fear' that swept William James to the edge of insanity -- is the outcome of passivity. This cannot be over-emphasized. Depression -- or neurosis -- need not have a positive cause (childhood traumas, etc.). It is the outcome of negative passivity (Wilson, p. 179)."

[49]There is some confusion in Maslow with regard to the three-way relationship between Being-cognition/peak-experience and self-actualization. He often used the terms peak-experience and Being-cognition interchangeably (Lowry, Intellectual,

CHAPTER VI

ABRAHAM MASLOW'S CONCEPT OF THE SELF

Introduction

This chapter addresses itself to the problem posed by the dissertation: Is Abraham Maslow's concept of the self adequate to his theory of self-actualization? In order to better answer that question, we will look at Maslow's self alongside that of two other theorists: George Herbert Mead, a social psychologist, and Carl Jung, a depth psychologist; the former apparently unknown to Maslow, the latter, little known to him. In each case the theorist's use of the word "self" will be studied. While the self is a concept which implies the integration of the person -- the self is one -- there are distinguishable characteristics of the self which make it possible to focus on its various aspects. The implication is not that one can clearly differentiate any one aspect of the self from the others. Each concept of the self will be evaluated in light of the following criteria.

1. Is sufficient attention paid to these four aspects of the self:

   a) the physiological or biological self
   b) the psychological self or self-image
   c) the social self
   d) the spiritual self

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"Sufficient attention" includes some explanation of how the various aspects of the self arise, develop, change; how the self is known.

2. Maslow established criteria for judging the value of a religion. He says, "any religion...must be not only intellectually credible and morally worthy of respect, but it must also be emotionally satisfying (Religions, p. 43)." These criteria could appropriately be applied to any theory concerning human life. My second criterion, then, is an adaptation of Maslow. I ask: Is what the theorist says about the four aspects of the self intellectually and experientially credible and is it emotionally satisfying? By intellectual credibility is meant both clarity of conceptualization and coherence of thought.

Conclusions will be drawn in a subsequent chapter.

Maslow's Concept of the Self

If the fundamental or controlling idea of a psychologist is self-actualization, it seems reasonable to expect a carefully developed concept of the self underlying the theory of self-actualization. What self is being actualized? This expectation seems as logical as expecting the adherent of mind-control to be specific about how the word "mind" is being used, or the instructor in health education to be clear about the dimensions of health under consideration. However, there is no place in Maslow's writing where he at any length explicitly sets forth his understanding of self; at the same time, he goes into great length detailing character-

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istics of self-actualized people. His focus is more on actualization than on the self to be actualized. Yet Maslow claims to be an essentialist, that is, to be in search of and attentive to intrinsic human nature. Maslow uses the word self, if not equivocally, at least ambiguously.[1] To clarify his meaning of the word, as well as to discern whether or not Maslow has a developmental psychology of the self, I have studied the use of the word in his major works. There are these ten distinguishable yet related usages of the word "self" in Maslow, listed here in a rough order of importance. The most consistent concept of the self is the first listed below, that of inner core or essence.[2]

1. Maslow is basically an essentialist, calling the self the inner core or essence. He believes that he is speaking "for the first time in centuries of an essence, of an intrinsic nature, of specieshood, of a kind of animal nature (Farther, p. 186)." There is some shift in his essentialist description of the self -- from "pure psyche" (first edition of Toward a Psychology of Being) to "physiology" (revised edition of same). In the latter, Maslow says

> the looking within for the real self is a kind of "subjective biology," for it must include an effort to become conscious of one's own constitutional, temperamental, anatomical, physiological and biochemical needs, capacities and reactions, i.e., one's biological individuality...it is also simultaneously the path to experiencing one's specieshood, one's commonness with all other members of the human species (Toward, p. 185).

As an essentialist, Maslow understood the inner core or essence that he called the self to be both species-wide and individual.

2. On the individual side, the self is one's identity, uniqueness, idiosyncracy -- or to use a word which Maslow does not use, one's spirit. In his emphasis on the expressive component of behavior (see Motivation, chaps. 10, 14), Maslow links one's self or identity with expressive behavior, rather than with coping behavior. Expression is the unmotivated, unlearned, uninhibited, free presentation of oneself. Expressive behavior reveals the spirit of the personality. Coping, on the other hand, is designed; it is effortful; it involves distancing oneself from the real self through roles or defensive devices. Coping behavior conceals the spirit of the person, and weaknes it.

This notion of self as identity is what one best knows of one's real person in the peak experience. "Whatever [people] are at bottom, whatever the word 'unique self' means, they are more than in peak-experiences (Toward, p. 108)." Paradoxically, at the same time that the person in the peak-experience becomes more one with the real self, she or he also becomes more one with the non-self, one with the world -- so much so that "it becomes impossible to differentiate sharply between the self and the non-self (Farther, p. 165)."

Maslow tells us that he found his own self, his identity, through psychoanalysis. This, he called a "profound learning experience that I value far more highly than any particular course or any degree that I have ever had...discovering my own identity, my own self (Farther, p. 170)."

3. The self is the deeper personality over against the ego (Farther, pp. 89, 269). Maslow distinguishes between

the ego or surface personality and the character structure or real self (Motivation, p. 147). He refers to the conscious self and the deeper self. Perhaps using "deeper" rather than the negative "un-conscious" allows the unconscious to be seen as a positive force, which Maslow came to emphasize.

4. Alongside his essentialism -- which focuses on the constitutional, core aspects of the self -- Maslow has a notion of self that is more social in nature. But, as with other aspects of his thinking, this one is difficult to nail down.

Maslow gives two basic messages. The self is individual, unique, develops itself from the inside out -- admittedly, requiring others in order to have its needs met. The ground rule here is trust the inner nature. Trust the wisdom of the body. Trust the child's choices. Let the acorn become the oak.

On the other hand, Maslow takes some writers to task for not attending sufficiently to social and environmental determinants of personality, criticizing them for "over psychologizing and under-sociologizing." He believed that neither Sartre's "self as a project" nor Freud's and Rogers' focus on uncovering therapy laid sufficient stress on the external forces that shape a self, such as economic, social and political factors (Toward, pp. 12-13). Did Maslow live with this insight long enough? Would not a thoroughgoing recognition of "the great power of autonomous social and environmental determinants, of such forces outside the indi-

vidual as poverty, exploitation, nationalism, war and social structure (Toward, p. 13)," alter a person's belief in the fate of the acorn? Maslow apparently held to his conviction that

> growth takes place when the next step forward is subjectively more delightful, more joyous, more intrinsically satisfying than the previous gratification with which we have become familiar and even bored; that the only way we can ever know what is right for us is that it feels better subjectively than any alternative (Toward, p. 45; emphasis added).

But what kind of social ethic undergirds such a stance? While Maslow admits that his "formulation of growth-through-delight" rests on faith in both the health and the free will of the chooser, he does not include in his chapter on growth (Toward, chap. 4) any criteria by which one is to trust or evaluate delight or satisfaction. He does not address himself to the fact that one's subjective delight must be seen against a background of social needs and demands. How does responsibility for others affect one's subjective delights? No one who reads Maslow's complete corpus can doubt his interest in the common good, his commitment to help establish the Good Person for the Good Society. The point here is that Maslow (typically) does not sufficiently or clearly express the social nature of the self.

He says, parenthetically, in notes on self-actualization: "one can recognize that what appear to be one's determinants out there in the world are really one's self which seems to be out there, which appear to be different from the self because of imperfect perception and imperfect fusion

(Eupsychian, p. 11)." (The context in which this passage appears does not really help clarify its meaning.) While this statement is ambiguous, especially with regard to Maslow's use of the word "self," the gist of it is somewhat obvious. Maslow recignizes a deep, core interrelationship betwen myself and my world. (I use the word self to refer to total personality, psyche and soma, tending toward integration.)

It is possible to distinguish five references to the self (nos. 5 - 9) which all share one characteristic: the nature of the human self is to be self-transcending -- into Being-needs or values, into other persons, into work or mission.

5. Maslow describes the self as the locus of values (Toward, p. 10). It is not clear whether he means by "locus of values" that the self is defined by B-values or that the self is the quasi-hierophony of the B-values.

> If we then try to define the deepest, most authentic, most constitutionally based aspects of the real self, of the identity, or of the authentic person, we find that in order to be comprehensive we must include not only the person's constitution and temperament...anatomy, physiology, neurology, and endocrinology...capacities... biological style...basic instinctoid needs, but also the B-values, which are his B-Values (Farther, p. 315).

"His B-Values" implies the possession of Being-values, and one might well speak as if that is the case. For example, expressions such as "I am what I value" implies that interests, passions, the focii of one's thought and heart "become" the psyche as much as food becomes the body. But Being-values cannot really be possessed. The B-values are lures, and while the value can be seen in the individual even to the

point that an individual might become the personification of the value to others, the value exists beyond the individual. The value is an attribute of Being itself.

Maslow takes the implications of this kind of thinking further in raising the question: "If the B-Values are identified with and become defining characteristics of one's self, does this mean that reality, the world, the cosmos are therefore identified with and become defining characteristics of the self? (Farther, p. 332)" Granted, Maslow is only raising a question, as he goes on to say, for the purpose of leaving doors open. It is not clear whether he is speculating in monistic thought, which would be compatible with his essentialism, or if he is leaning toward process modes of thought, recognizing the interrelationality of all that exists, i.e., in Whitehead's terminology, the organic connections among all actual entities. However, Maslow would be unable to persist in process modes of thought unless he allowed value to ultimately reside in a primordial way in some actual entity or actual occasion. This is precisely the function of God in Whitehead: God lures individuals (who constitute the process which is reality) into the pursuit of value, value which is primordially present in God.

6. Maslow is less decisive about including in his concept of the self such acquisitions as defense or coping mechanisms, "style of life," and characterological traits emerging in the first few years of life. Whether such traits are to be included as part of the inner core, he stated, "is still

a matter of discussion (Toward, p. 190)." Another door is left open. He gives no criteria for determining what will be included in the self, what excluded. If Maslow excludes accretions such as defense mechanisms and coping devices, "style of life," he is presenting an unreachable, metaphorical concept of the self such as Karen Horney's idealized self, abstracting from the self as constitutional, temperamental, anatomical equipment -- which is a determinate concept.

7. Maslow also refers to the extended self or those values and people outside oneself with whom one becomes identified, or by whom one becomes defined. He calls these accretions the non-self. (At this point Maslow sounds like Gordon Allport, who refers to the "extended self" in his writings.[3])

> To identify one's highest self with the highest values of the world out there means, to some extent at least, a fusion with the non-self. But this is true not only for the world of nature. It is also true for other human beings. This is to say that the most highly valued part of such a person's self, then, is the same as the most highly valued part of the self of other self-actualizing people. Such selves overlap (Farther, pp. 312-13).

Statements like this do not help clarify what Maslow means by the self. Is he really saying that once individuals become self-actualized they share a common inner core or essence? This is an example of Maslow's tendency to move from the determinate to the metaphorical without signalling his turn. The overlapping of selves is either a philosophical statement worthy of ontological exploration, or it is imagin-

ative projection. In either case, it is not of the same genre as the concept of the self as anatomical makeup, the concrete, specific self. (Maslow makes profound and often poetic reflections on human relationships, such as descriptions of one indivudual fusing with another in a synergistic situation. But when one is trying to take his theory of self-actualization seriously and at face value, shifts from prose to poetry, from the definitive to the metaphorical, do not help clarify his thinking.)

8. Another aspect of the extended self which incorporates values and people with whom one is identified, is Maslow's expanded personality which includes the introjection of one's work or mission. Maslow often repeated his conviction that one can so identify with her or his mission in life that it becomes a defining characteristic of the self, "as much a part of the worker as his liver or lungs (Eupsychian, p. 29)." Furthermore, he felt that such introjection and incorporation had significant therapeutic effects. The self becomes more important when it "includes" an important cause or job. Maslow saw such a dynamic as "a way of overcoming...actual existential human shortcomings, e.g., shortcomings in I.Q., in talent, in skill, etc. (Eupsychian, p. 9)." This will only happen, however, when the work is self-fulfilling and therefore self-actualizing, i.e., when the job or task matches the capacities and value system of the person. Maslow describes what happens when the conditions are right.

At the point where the S-A job is assimilated into the

> identity or into the self by introjection, then such work can be therapeutic or self-therapeutic. This is because the work or the task out there which has become part of the self can be worked on, attacked, struggled with, improved, corrected in a way that the person cannot do directly with his own inner self. That is to say, his inner problems can be projected out into the world as outer problems where he can then work with them far more easily and with less anxiety, less repression than he could by direct introspection (Eupsychian, p. 14).4

9. Paradoxically, the self is that which transcends and that which is transcended. The fully self-actualized, meta-motivated person has transcended the selfish self, transcended the ego or conscious self; transcended identity (Farther, pp. 269-71). In other words, identity or self-actualization is both an end-goal and a transitional goal,

> a rite of passage, a step along the path to the transcendence of identity. This is like saying its function is to erase itself. Put the other way about, if our goal is the Eastern one of ego-transcendence and obliteration, of leaving behind self-consciousness and self-observation, of fusion with the world and identification with it...then it looks as if the best path to this goal for most people is via achieving identity, a strong real self (Toward, p. 114).

The self also transcends itself in transcending death. Maslow felt no need to refer to a supernatural realm in order to posit belief in immortality. His belief in immortality has nothing to do with God. But his belief in immortality is inconsistent with his own theory. He writes, "the values incorporated into the person as defining characteristics of the self live on after his death, i.e., in a certain real sense, his self transcends death (Farther, p. 340)." But the Being-values are not possessed by the individual-- they do not need to refer to an individual in order to exist!

According to Maslow's own presuppositions, it is not the self which transcends death because the value lives on; it is the value that transcends the death of any person who might have been lured by that value. Because according to Maslow's presuppositions, the value is descriptive of Being.

10. The self and non-self (cf. no. 7 above) are only one of the several polarities which Maslow uses to refer to the self as a dialectic. The self is also:

a) ego or conscious self, and unconscious; or in Maslow's words, there is the deeper self and the conscious self (Toward, p. 37; Farther, pp. 89, 269).

b) ideal and actual (Farther, pp. 113-14).

c) present and future (Farther, p. 112).

d) the experiencing self and the observing self (Toward, pp. 104-05).

e) self-fulfilled and selfless (Eupsychian, p. 7).

f) idiosyncratic and species-wide.

Maslow consistently presents the self-actualized person as the one who resolves these dichotomies by transcending them. The self is a dialectic, yet the self transcends the dialectic.

These, then, are the various meanings that Maslow gives to the word "self." Assuming that the first notion of the self is the one that best fits the theory of self-actualization, and at the same time is the most consistently used in Maslow's writings -- i.e., that the self to be actualized is the inner core or essence of the individual, what does Maslow say about

how this self arises, how it is known, how it develops? That is, does Maslow have a developmental psychology of the self?

Growth and Development of the Self

Maslow is not a developmental psychologist. He is neither thorough nor systematic in his explanation of the emergence and development of the self (although he begins the chapter in which he does more adequately deal with personal development: "This chapter is an effort to be a little more systematic in the area of growth theory [Toward, p. 44].")

The few statements which Maslow makes about self-awareness in infanc appear in his earliest book, Principles of Abnormal Psychology, co-authored with Bela Mittelmann (1941). The authors suggest that it is probably during the first few weeks of life that the concept of "I" is formed. This happens as the infant begins to differentiate between herself or himself and the external world. Without really explaining themselves, the authors go on to say, "This 'I' includes the image of his body and of his psychological processes. It includes many goals, both those he himself has chosen and those he has accepted from the adult on whom he is dependent (p. 52)." However, they do say that "it is a long time before the infant has a clear concept of the 'I' and of the external world (p. 228)."

Maslow and Mittelmann state that they will not discuss in detail the formation of the concept of the self; they will only say that

> it involves the child's intellectual development, such

> experiences as having two sensations simultaneously when he touches his own body, the fact that parts of the body are always near him...other objects may be near or far or completely absent...The child's differentiation between animate and inanimate and between dream and reality, and his theories of the world and events are part of this process.
>
> What we wish to emphasize is that the development of the concept and image of the "self" is not an unemotional, detached process. It is concerned with needs, urges, and drives, and has throughout a strong emotional coloring (p. 241).

The self, then, emerges in a very primitive way when the child differentiates between herself or himself and the other. Maslow briefly addresses himself to child growth and development in Toward a Psychology of Being (chap. 4). In essence he says that it is through growth choices that the real self is discovered. One's preferences, judgments, capacities, desires, are all indicators of one's inner nature -- indicators and also invitations to actualize that self. In the previous chapter of this dissertation Maslow's safety-growth dialectic was explained. If adequate safety is assured, the child can make growth choices. If such safety is endangered, the child regresses. Growth is the more pleasurable experience. Maslow was convinced that growth, which is the same thing as self-development, takes place when one chooses what is subjectively more delightful than the previous gratification. However, subjective delight has as its contrary the opinion of other people. The child is naturally afraid of losing the approval of her or his providers. Therefore, if the child has to choose between subjective delight and the approval of others, the latter will prove to be

the prepotent need. "The primal choice, the fork in the road, then, is between others' and one's own self. If the only way to maintain the self is to lose others, then the ordinary child will give up the self (Toward, p. 52)."

Growth will always be in the direction of higher level needs. The hierarchical scheme is as close as Maslow comes to providing a developmental psychology -- but the hierarchy provides only a pattern of human needs, very loosely chronological. Maslow does not predict, for example, ages at which needs will be prepotent; he does not link physiological and psychological and social development. Furthermore, because Maslow does not sufficiently explore the unconscious aspects of the deficiency needs, his developmental scheme is of questionable value to anyone who does not have extensive self-knowledge. It does little good to know whether one's safety and security needs are met on a conscious level if one is not in touch with unconscious deprivation of these needs.

Finally, Maslow does say that self-actualization is confined "very definitely to older people (Motivation, p. xx)" and for reasons already given.

Yet while he does not provide a detailed concept of the development of the self, Maslow does give two helpful insights into self-realization. The first, his distinction between operating at a deficiency level and operating at a growth level: the developed or actualized self is able to live beyond sheer need and does not (consciously) make choices

or relate to people in a needy sort of way. Growth choices are made out of a sense of self-possession and self-expression. And that leads to a second insight, this one perhaps obvious but overlooked by many: the self is known through expressive as opposed to coping behavior and transcends itself through expressive behavior. The self is both discovered and created through expressive behavior. Maslow believed that the most geniune expressive behavior transcends the dichotomy between selfish and unselfish. The best self is the self that makes the greatest contribution to the community.

While these insights are hardly substance for an adequate "developmental psychology," they can be enormously helpful to people in reaching their full (or more full) stature.

Maslow suggests the key to knowing the real self or inner core, which, once known, can develop, grow, and find expression.

> What do we mean by the discovery of identity? We mean finding out what your real desires and characteristics are, and being able to live in a way that expresses them. You learn to be authentic, to be honest in the sense of allowing your behavior and your speech to be the true and spontaneous expression of your inner feelings (Farther, p. 183).

But how does one learn what her or his real desires and characteristics are? The section on "self-actualization and self-transcendence" in the previous chapter included Maslow's "eight ways in which one self-actualizes," steps which seem both simplistic and impossible to follow. What I elaborate on here (because Maslow does not) are possible ways to help children learn from early childhood to listen

to their inner voices.

If children were encouraged to make choices as soon as they are capable of making choices, and if they were slowly given more and more responsibility for their own lives -- what they will eat, what they will wear, how they will spend their free time, their allowance, their vacation -- by the time they reach adulthood, listening to their inner voices would have become second nature. ("Inner voices" includes inclinations, aspirations, desires, fears.) These earliest choices would only be made with the conversation and support of an adult. In fact, initially it would be the adult's provision of options that makes the choice possible -- but the choice would belong to the child. From the beginning the adult would have to train the child to discern among inner voices. Some inner voices conflict with one another; certainly not every impulse voice can or ought to be heeded. What are the pros and cons, then, of making this choice as opposed to that? An adapted form of the discernment process of Ignatius' Spiritual Exercises[5] could be used in helping a child learn to evaluate her or his desires.

If the inner voices are heard consistently enough, the individual does not lose touch with the unconscious, out of which the inner voices are heard or surface to consciousness. Maslow believes, with Freudians, that the true self can be discovered only by uncovering its unconscious aspects which have been repressed (Farther, p. 52). Helping the child learn her or his inner voices would mean less repression.

How are the inner voices heard? Perhaps for children who have not yet tuned them out, it would be simply a matter of listening, slowing down, thinking, expressing what is "heard" through some form of play or body language, or in conversation with another. For adults the process demands withdrawal of attention from the outer world to the inner world, through meditation, contemplation, various forms of mind control -- as well as discernment of the voices one hears through such exercises. Maslow suggests a simple method which he calls "introspective biology." It reads very much like the first steps of meditation or contemplation as practised for centuries by Christians, a coming to the presence of God that begins by quieting oneself.

> One of the necessary methods in the search for identity, the search for self, the search for spontaneity and for naturalness is a matter of closing your eyes, cutting down the noise, turning off the thoughts, putting away all busyness, just relaxing in a kind of Taoistic and receptive fashion. The technique here is to just wait to see what happens, what comes to mind. This is what Freud called free association, free-floating attention rather than task orientation, and if you are successful in this effort and learn how to do it, you can forget about the outside world and its noises and begin to hear these small, delicate impulse voices from within, the hints from your animal nature, not only from your common species-nature, but also from your own uniqueness (Farther, pp. 186-87).[6]

Another ridiculously obvious way to discover one's own preferences is to really enjoy what you enjoy: music, flavors, beauty in the form one most finds beauty.[7]

Making friends with the inner voices would mean a number of things: learning what one is good at (and conversely, learning one's limitations); inviting the silly, foolish,

irrational impulses to surface; facing one's fears, ultimately the fear of death; learning to balance the playful, irresponsible urges with other voices of responsibility and demands of living in society. These are basically intrapersonal tasks (weighted by interpersonal experience) aimed at discovering or uncovering the self. As a result of such intrapsychic experience an individual can begin to construct a life-outlook, make plans, select potentialities to be developed (Toward, p. 38). The other side of the coin bears the parallel interpersonal tasks of establishing and living in community. We can discover ourselves by attending to our inner voices; we must at the same time discover ourselves by paying attention to the messages or reflections about ourselves which we receive from significant others. In both cases, we must discern whether the messages received are for our enrichment or diminishment, whether they are expansive or repressive, whether they bring peace or anxiety, whether they encourage expressive or coping behavior.

With regard to the messages received from others, Maslow makes an interesting if somewhat simplistic suggestion. If a movie were taken of us going through a typical day, Maslow suggests, we would learn not only about our looks and physical presence, but "what we really, deeply are, what our identity is, what our real self is (Eupsychian, p. 159)." At the same time, Maslow warns against making the mistake of thinking that we are nothing but what is reflected back to us (a mistake which he believed Harry Stack Sullivan made)

(Eupsychian, p. 159). The point is that in viewing ourselves we would see more precisely what others see; we would also know what goes on in our imagination.

The self, then, can be discovered basically through listening and by discerning about what we hear -- listening to ourselves and listening to those around us who tell us who we are. But Maslow implies that many people never get to a self or real identity. One reason is that the weak impulse voices are drowned out -- by habit, cultural attitudes, trauma, erroneous education. A second reason is that if the instinctive needs are considered evil, they are therefore to be controlled, inhibited, suppressed rather than expressed. A third reason is that there are two sets of impulse voices. As has been said, there are voices which move us toward health and growth, and voices which pressure us backward toward sickness and weakness. Maslow calls the latter "fearful-regressive pressures (Toward, p. 164)." Elsewhere in his writing Maslow points out that the greatest cause of alienation from the real self is the neurotic involvements with people, hangovers from childhood, irrational transfers, in which the adult acts like a child (Farther, p. 65). Finally, playing roles, too, can mean a loss of self. Maslow writes, "in certain types of neurosis the individual is an actor who has no self at all in the ordinary sense, but only a repertoire of roles from which to choose (Motivation, p. 133)."

When Maslow lists his Being-pathologies as deprivation

of the Being-values, the specific metapathology he includes as a pathogenic deprivation of the value of uniqueness is "loss of feeling of self and of individuality. Feeling one-self to be interchangeable, anonymous, not really needed (Farther, p. 318)."

But not all loss of self is pathological. Maslow described the mystic experience as "a tremendous intensification of any of the experiences in which there is loss of self or transcendence of it (Motivation, p. 165)." Transcendence, yes, but would Maslow really claim that the mystic, in the mystic experience, undergoes an intensification of the experience of "feeling oneself to be interchangeable, anonymous, not really needed"?

As was seen in the discussion of self-actualization, the final stage in the development of the person is self-transcendence (see categories five through nine in Maslow's use of self), a thought which apparently filled Maslow's imagination the last years of his life. Perhaps if he had been a different kind of thinker and writer, and had developed his thought more systematically, he would have left an understanding of the self, its development, and its aim at transcending itself, which would be an answer to some of his critics. He receives the same kind of criticism that much of depth psychology receives: too much reflection, self-concern, introversion; forget yourself. To read Maslow closely is indeed to see that he did aim at self-forgetfulness, selflessness, self-transcendence. But it could only be achieved through

self-actualization; the person whose self has not been actualized is living at a level of need that prohibits self-forgetfulness. One can forget hunger when one is filled, or when she or he can rise to a higher level need, having known satiation in the past and trusting that these physiological needs will be met in time. Genuine self-forgetfulness is expressive behavior -- not coping behavior. It expresses a self which need not, would not choose to, focus on itself; self-forgetfulness is truly expressive of who the person has become. But Maslow did not develop these thoughts.

Self-Image

A last area to be considered is Maslow's understanding of the psychological self or self-image. He addresses himself directly to the question of "image and evaluation of oneself" in Principles of Abnormal Psychology, listing these as four important considerations:

1. The individual has a strong need and desire for a positive self-evaluation on the basis of achievement, which Maslow (and Mittelmann) parenthetically calls "self-esteem," and on the basis of moral standards. This evaluation is desired from others as well -- Maslow parenthetically calls the evaluation coming from others "prestige and approval."

2. There will be partial approval and partial disapproval of the body by the individual herself or himself. Large scale rejection on the one hand, or over-valuation and aggrandizement of the body on the other, are both pathological.

3. Relationships with parents, siblings and playmates

are all significant in one's self-evaluation. Positive evaluation from these others will be reflected in the child's evaluation of herself or himself. A negative evaluation can lead to feelings of worthlessness and helplessness.

4. Self-evaluation is not purely introspective; it manifests itself in thoughts, emotions, motives, actions -- in the whole organism (pp. 141-42).

Chapter Two traced Maslow's self-esteem studies as an outgrowth of his dominance work with infrahuman primates. He moved from there to a study of dominance and sexuality in human beings; this led to his concepts of dominance status, dominance feeling and dominance behavior. Dominance feeling is what Maslow means by self-esteem.

In the fifth chapter the esteem needs were explored in greater detail. The two-sided need for a positive evaluation recognized in Principles of Abnormal Psychology reappears. One needs esteem coming from within, through a feeling of strength and competency; and a feeling of esteem bestowed from without in the form of recognition or status. But in Maslow's presentation of the esteem needs, the powerful unconscious aspects of self-esteem are not sufficiently recognized. One's self-image is a vastly complex "collage," conscious and unconscious, including inherited and social, historical elements, and constantly being shaped by relational and environmental factors.

This, the, completes the exploration of Maslow's concept of the self. The question is, is that concept adequate?

A Test of the Adequacy of Abraham Maslow's Concept of the Self

Does Maslow pay sufficient attention to the various aspects of the self: physiological or biological; psychological and self-image; social; spiritual? Second, is Maslow's theory of the self intellectually and experientially credible and is it emotionally satisfying? (By intellectual credibility is meant both clarity of conceptualization and coherence of thought.)

The physiological or biological self: There is hardly a question about whether or not Maslow attends to the physiological self -- he makes it clear that he is interested in biological individuality: in anatomy, physiology, biochemical needs. In fact, one of his critics, M. Brewster Smith, believes that Maslow's theory is so heavily biological that he tries to make our biology carry our ethics -- an impossible task.[8] However, while Maslow does indeed include the physiological in his understanding of the self, he does not explore enough the relationship between physical disposition and self-actualization, or to be more Freudian than Maslovian for a moment, he does not consider closely enough how physiology shapes destiny. Physiology here refers to physical appearance: size, features, gait, one's manner of being bodily present; one's coordination, gracefulness or awkwardness; also one's brain capacity and other gifts conditioned by one's unique bodiliness. And actually, the question is more complicated still. It might better be expressed

as a consideration of how the appropriation of one's body in all its dimensions and complexities, an on-going event highly influenced by the assumed acceptability of one's bodiliness by significant others, shapes one's own self-concept. Physical appearance, broadly understood, becomes a symbol of the self. "They think I'm inadequate" or "they think I'm ugly" is translated into "I'm unacceptable...they reject me." And actually it may be an unconscious rejection by the other that resulted in the message "you're inadequate" in the first place. Remember Abraham Maslow's own physical inheritance: skinny, peculiar looking -- according to his own assessment. And remember his father's painful remark at table, "have you ever seen anyone uglier than Abe?"[9] Maslow was able to speculate on how his own rejection of his physical body lowered his self-esteem and heightened his loneliness and friendlessness. He thought that no woman could possibly be interested in him. It is important to see this in light of the fact that apart from an uncle, whom Maslow remembers as a savior, there is no indication of much acceptance or affection in his early life. We can speculate on how his isolation affected his experience of belongingness. Perhaps he only knew that he had experienced belongingness by its negation when he moved from a Jewish slum to a gentile suburb. In Maslow's case, then, it was not poor body-image apart from other unmet needs. Rather, poor body-image in a context of rejection and lack of affection that issued in low self-esteem. Body-image thus became a key ingredient

of self-image. But why did Maslow not pay more attention to physical disposition as an important ingredient of self-esteem when he worked out his hierarchy of needs? Could it be that he was unwilling (consciously or unconsciously) to believe that physical appearance is a strong determinant of self-esteem because he felt he had mastered his own feelings of unattractiveness and rejection? If Abraham Maslow can achieve self-actualization, he becomes living proof that physical unattractiveness (personally described as such) does not in fact result in unmet self-esteem needs. Maslow designed a hierarchy of needs that can be seen as a reaction-formation to his own experience.

Stanley Coopersmith's study of self-esteem, The Antecedents of Self-Esteem, is an in-depth study of eighty-five boys, ages ten to twelve, designed to arrive at the antecedent conditions that contribute to the development of either positive or negative attitudes toward oneself.[10] He concludes that "self-esteem is not related to height and physical attractiveness, two widely respected attributes in middle-class American society, and it is only rather weakly related to social status and academic performance."[11] Self-esteem is related to one's actions and relative position within an "immediate, effective interpersonal environment." Within that environment, out of which one comes to believe that she or he is a success or a failure, the most notable bases for such judgments are acceptance, possibilities for individual expression and dissent, and academic performance. Other

"antecedents of self-esteem" which Coopersmith explores are value system, inherited and self-chosen; aspirations; and an effective, flexible defense system.[12]

But would the same conclusions be drawn from a study of adolescent girls? Physical attractiveness does considerably influence a girl's self-esteem. In any case, the point is that physical disposition is discovered and evaluated within a context. While Coopersmith's conclusions are hard to believe, I would agree that appearance as such makes much less a difference than the reaction of significant others to the person's appearance. In other words, the context of acceptance or rejection is more important than the appearance; this is what most acutely shapes the way one will see herself or himself. Maslow must have received messages from those significant others not only that he was physically ugly but that he was insignificant. He believed it and lived his rejection for many years. "I was certainly neurotic, extremely neurotic, during all my first twenty years -- depressed, terribly unhappy, lonely, isolated, self-rejecting."[13] Yet apart from the considerations about the various degrees of one's body which Maslow made in Principles of Abnormal Psychology, he does not say much about physical disposition and self-actualization. What he does not attend to is that physical disposition affects all levels of the self because it affects the various levels of the need hierarchy -- affects needs essential to the actualization of one's inner nature, core, or essence. Maslow liked to turn over new ground and

then let someone else do the plowing. It is surprising that he did not turn over more ground with regard to the physiological, biological self and self-actualization. Besides appearance and the self, other areas within the physiological would be intelligence and the self; left brain, right brain dominance and the self; personality type (although this would have more to do with the psychological self). (It would be interesting to explore how an introvert as opposed to an extravert feels about the very concept of self-actualization.)

The psychological self or self-image: Obviously there is considerable overlap between the physiological and the psychological concepts of the self. The appropriation of one's physiological givens is a function of the psychological self. Such appropriation, within a context of acceptance or rejection by significant others (parents, playmates, teachers, classmates) issues in a self-concept (as distinct from concept of the self) and determines the level of one's self-esteem. Maslow does not attend closely enough to these dynamics. He also neglects important unconscious components of self-esteem. (See conclusions of Chapter Four and pp. 133-34.) The same criticism holds with regard to the psychological self or self-image. While one can be conscious of one's self-concept to a certain extent, one has to attend to unconscious memories, myths, fears, as well as to unconscious desires, impulses, and needs. Maslow urges such attention, but with the emphasis on impulses and needs -- not on memories

myths, fears. (Myths here refer to the "formulas" one has written as ways of handling one's social world in order to maintain oneself. "I will be the perfect daughter of the perfect parents in order to secure their love and my identity.") We saw the shifts in Maslow's thinking with regard to the unconscious, from (1) a concept of the unconscious in terms of conflict, repression, danger and darkness to (2) a conviction that unconscious motivation is operative mostly in neurotic people and can be ignored in healthy people, to (3) a concept of the unconscious as the source of creativity, joy, play, humor. But Maslow did not satisfactorily combine the first and third aspects of the unconscious -- i.e., the "area" of the repressed, and the source of creativity. A contributing factor to Maslow's focus on the creative unconscious may be the fact that he believed he was studying the healthiest 1% of the population, people who might have learned in their childhoods not to need to repress or distort reality. But for most people, self-image is heavily shaped by repressed fears and by myths and rituals devised early in life as ways of protecting one's identity (certainly including Ruth Benedict). These myths are important components of one's self-image and need to be understood before the self can become more fully actualized.

A last comment with regard to the psychological self -- and that has to do, once again, with the givens of an individual's life. There is a difference in the ways that Abraham Maslow and Carl Jung view the presence and development of

natural endowments.

Maslow found that gifts, capacities, endowments, correlate positively; that is, the healthiest specimens are gifted all the way down the line: intelligence, creativity, spontaneity. He related his predictions to the conclusions drawn by Lewis Terman in his long-term study of high I.Q. children in California: "All desirable traits in the human being correlate positively (Farther, p. 6)."[14] The implication is that both the capacities and the realization of the capacities correlate positively.

Jung has a different point of view. He believed that the gifted child would show an imbalance, at least in developed capacities. He says:

> The psychic disposition of the gifted child always moves in violent contrasts. That is to say, it is extremely rare for the gift to affect all regions of the psyche uniformly. The general rule is that one or the other region will be so little developed as to entitle us to speak of a defect...In the region of the gift abnormal precocity may prevail, while outside that region the mental attainment may be below normal for a child of that age.[15]

And speaking of the gifts of intelligence and heart, he says:

> As a rule, where one is present the other is lacking, and where one capacity is present in perfection it is generally at the cost of all the others.[16]

Jung believed that a gift brought with it a "greater capacity. ..to adapt in one way and not in another."[17] He viewed intellect and feeling and their related capacities and functions as part of the psyche or psychological make-up of every individual. Yet because of the finite nature of the individual and because of the need for focus in order for any capacity

to be developed, normally an individual will accentuate one side of her or his personality or one gift at the relative expense of another. Speaking of the genius, Jung says,

> Great gifts...hang on the weakest branches, which easily break. In most cases...the gift develops in inverse ratio to the maturation of the personality as a whole, and often one has the impression that a creative personality grows at the expense of the human being. Sometimes, indeed, there is such a discrepancy between the genius and his human qualities that one has to ask oneself whether a little less talent might not have been better. What after all is great intellect beside moral inferiority?...Not only is the gift almost invariably compensated by some inferiority in another sphere, but occasionally it is coupled with a morbid defect.[18]

Jung believed that it was during the second half of life that an individual attended to what had been neglected during the first. He thought that such compensation followed a law of enantiodromia or the conversion of opposites (an expression he drew from Heraclitus[19]).

Undoubtedly both Maslow's and Jung's positions could be demonstrated -- out of the work of the two clinicians and that of their followers. My purpose here was simply to highlight a difference in their perspectives.

The social self: While Maslow is attentive to social dimensions or extensions of the self, he does not give sufficient recognition either to the process or the strength of social influence on the shaping of the self.

Maslow set out to accentuate individual possibilities which each person has to shape herself or himself and to demonstrate that such capacities are instictive needs which gently pressure a person in the direction of self-actualization. Maslow is intent on showing the inadequacy of both the Freudian

deterministic model and the behaviorist stimulus-response model for understanding the whole of the human person. Therefore the stress is on individual potentiality, on inner voices, on choice, on self-actualization.

Yet throughout his writings, Maslow recognizes the social dimension of life. Basic human needs can only be met from outside the individual. Maslow saw the interdependence of all things and all people in what he called a holistically integrated world. He thought he could start with Kurt Goldstein's organismic theory and end with the social psychology of one world (Eupsychian, pp. 115-16). Another societal dimension of Maslow's thought was his belief that one can only achieve self-actualization by involving herself or himself in a work or mission or cause which transcends the individual's personal needs.

Eupsychian Management is the book which best illustrates Maslow's thinking on the social aspects of the self. Eupsychian Management stresses interdependence, synergy, the importance of mission, the significance of the group. Maslow believed that psychotherapy tended to focus too exclusively on the individual's development, and that creative education and creative management could develop the individual by way of community, team, group, organization (p. 3).

Still, Maslow does not attend to the processes of socialization which begin at birth and which are largely responsible for the self which emerges. The George Herbert Mead emphasis on the power of the attitudes and responses of signifi-

cant others over the emergence of the self of any individual is absent in Maslow.

As if to deny a strict behaviorism and to preserve individuality, will, and self-direction, Maslow pointed to his own experience of fatherhood which brought a recognition of the uniqueness of every child. The first chapter of the dissertation included Maslow's reflections on how his children made some of his psychological training look ridiculous. Becoming aware of the differences between his children, he said, made the John Watson theory, "give me two babies and I will make one into this and one into the other" seem as if they were writeen by a man who had no children at all. Maslow goes on to say that "a parent cannot make his children into anything. Children make themselves into something (Farther, p. 169)." But is there not partial truth in both statements: Parents do make their children into something. Children make themselves into something, too. A parent's acceptance of, expectations of, attitudes toward, responses to a child are creative of that child's personality and self-image, and a good indication of the kind of life the child will live. As will be seen in the following chapter on George Herbert Mead's concept of the self, the self emerges out of community and is social in nature. At the same time each self has an individual and unique standpoint or way of appropriating expectations, attitudes, responses, as well as capacities and experiences. The social self is far more than inner core or essence and is shaped by a more complex

social process than listening to one's inner voices and having one's basic needs met from outside. Maslow's analogy of the acorn becoming the oak is not sufficient to the social process of self-emergence and development. George Herbert Mead's theory holds greater adequacy (at least potentially) at this point. Rather than include the dynamics of his theory here, I will explore them in the next chapter.

The spiritual self: The reason for distinguishing the spiritual self from the psychological (or social or physiological) is to consider whether the theorist in question includes in his concept of the self an appreciation of the spiritual values which inform a person's life. Spiritual here means things unseen, meanings, religious orientation; it does not refer to the spirit or distinguishing characteristics of a person's life.

Maslow made it abundantly clear that his aim was to include all human possibilities in his psychology of the person: the farther reaches, the best, the highest, the most noble. God alone had no place in Maslow's scheme of things; religion and spiritual values had a key place.

The answer is "yes," Maslow attended, perhaps more than any other phychologist besides Carl Jung, to the spiritual aspects of life -- the Maslovian expression would be the Being-values of life. The growth needs are spiritual needs, and they are as real as the need for calcium and sunlight. The self, inner core or essence, cannot be realized or actualized apart from a pursuit of Being-values. We might say that

the spiritual self emerges as the growth needs emerge, and the latter happens when basic needs have been met. The spiritual self develops as growth needs become more and more actively important in an individual's life. Just as such needs are insatiable, so there is no end point of final development for the spiritual self.

The difficulty is that Maslow affirms of no one or no thing, not even of the "ground of being," the attributes that have traditionally been affirmed of God. Granted, there were personal factors which relate to Maslow's extremely negative evaluation of institutional religion and which illuminate his rejection of the possibility of the existence of God. But is it not incomprehensible to affirm the existence of Being-values without the existence of God or some supra-ordinate reality? Being-values require, imply, are only possible on the condition of the existence of some object in which they are primordially present.

Experientially, it is neither intellectually nor emotionally satisfying to be informed by a religious faith which does not point to a God within and beyond human life. Maslow's religion does not affirm, legitimate, appreciate the mediated experience, repeatedly recorded in human history, of the God within and the God who is Other.

The final step in evaluating Maslow's concept of the self: Is what he says about the four aspects of the self intellectually and experientially credible and is it emotionally satisfying? Without repeating what has been said in the

last ten pages, here are a few concluding remarks:

There is inconsistency in Maslow's use of the word self (as well as the word being). He is not always clear in his conceptualization. He is not always coherent in his thought. Besides his ambiguous use of key words, he did not stay true to his belief that the Being-values are values of Being. For example, he says that the self transcends death because the Being-values incorporated by that person transcend death. But Being cannot really be incorporated; the Being-values reside in Being.

Because of the close connection between self and Being-value in Maslow's thinking, it is important to add here that Maslow's list of growth or Being-values are intellectually and experientially incredible and emotionally dissatisfying. Why humor and not love? Why not freedom? Why not privacy or solitude? Why not friendship?

However, the most dissatisfying aspect of Maslow's self, emotionally speaking, is his exclusion of God or the Other from the inner core or essence of the person, as well as the lure beyond the person.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER VI

[1]In a passage on Freud's use of the terms sexual instinct, drive, and libido, Rollo May says, in Love and Will: "As in any thinker with such richness of mind, we find Freud boldly ambiguous in employing these terms, cheerfully changing their meaning from stage to stage in the development of his thought"(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969) p. 82. If Freud can be ambiguous, why can't Maslow? The answer seems to lie in the fact that Freud is staying on the same level of discourse. He is talking about human biology. And he has discernible stages in the development of his thought, stages in which he explains how he is using a term. Maslow, on the other hand, moves from the philosophical to the psychological to the biological, without warning. And he does not often clarify his use of the term "self."

[2]Another complicating factor is that Maslow used the word "self" and its derivatives with marked frequency. For example, in five pages of The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, "self" or compound words including "self" appear some twenty-seven times (pp. 269-73).

[3]Gordon W. Allport, Pattern and Growth in Personality (New York: Holt, Rinehard & Winston, Inc., 1937), pp. 122, 137, 283-85.

[4]This picture of a person struggling through anxiety, trying to reduce repression, yet also apparently moving toward self-actualization, feels more like the description of a human being "with feet of clay" than do some of Maslow's statements about self-actualization which is achieved by less than 1% of the population.

[5]See Louis J. Puhl (ed.), The Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius: Based on Studies in the Language of the Autograph (Chicago: Loyola Univ. Press, 1950).

[6]Other places where Maslow speaks of the impulse voices: Toward, p. 182; Farther, pp. 30, 33, 46, 50, 184-87.

[7]I am reminded of advice given me once by a friend's grandmother, an octogenarian. The woman had suffered many disappointments in her life, yet never lost her amazing spirit. She loved life. She listened to me, through her hearing aid,

explain some of the changes in my own life, then looked at me intently and said, "I want to give you some advice. Find out what you really like to do, and do a hell of a lot of it."

[8]M. Brewster Smith, "On self-actualization: A transambivalent examination of a focal theme in Maslow's psychology," Jour. Humanistic Psychol., XIII, No. 2 (Spring, 1973), p. 25.

[9]Wilson, p. 111; Lowry, Intellectual, p. 18.

[10]Stanley Coopersmith was a student of Maslow's at Brandeis (Goble, Third, p. 165).

[11]Stanley Coopersmith, The Antecedents of Self-Esteem (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1967), p. 242.

[12]Ibid., pp. 242-49. [13]Wilson, p. 117.

[14]Lewis M. Terman and Melita H. Oden, The Gifted Group at Mid-life: Thirty-five Years' Follow-up of the Superior Child, Vol. V of Genetic Studies of Genius (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1959).

[15]C. G. Jung, The Development of Personality, Vol. XVII of Collected Works (1954), pp. 138-39.

[16]C. G. Jung, Civilization in Transition, Vol. X of Collected Works (2d ed., 1970), p. 295.

[17]C. G. Jung, Psychological Types, Vol. VI of Collected Works (1971), p. 333.

[18]Jung, Development, Vol. XVII, p. 141.

[19]C. G. Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, Vol. VII of Collected Works (1953), p. 72.

CHAPTER VII

GEORGE HERBERT MEAD'S CONCEPT OF THE SELF

Introduction

In this and the following chapter I leave the work of Abraham Maslow and explore to a limited degree the theories of George Herbert Mead and Carl G. Jung. The concepts of the self of these two theorists in part correct and contribute to that of Maslow -- Jung's in the area of the depth, psychological self as well as the self as religious, Mead's in the area of the social self. I have chosen a straightforward exposition of what each theorist says about the self, parallel to the work done in the previous chapter on the self in Maslow. In each case the concept is then tested for adequacy. Limitations of time, space and purpose do not allow for a thorough study of the writings of either Jung or Mead in this document.

Abraham Maslow's concept of the self begins with the individual -- with her or his needs, gifts, choices -- and includes some consideration of the social situation in which this individual's needs will be met. George Herbert Mead takes a different starting point and makes different assumptions. In developing his concept of the self, Mead is as attentive to the cognitive and social aspects of the self as Maslow is to the individual and value aspects (and as C. G. Jung is to

its intrapsychic and unconscious components).

Mead (1863-1931) is a social psychologist who studies social experience from the standpoint of society (as opposed to the social psychologist who studies social experience from the standpoint of the individual). He assumes and does not account for the origin of a social process or social order as the precondition for the emergence of the selves of the individuals involved in that process. In order to understand what Mead means by self, it is appropriate to define five Meadian concepts: gesture, mind, consciousness, the generalized other, and the "I"/"me."[1]

Meadian Concepts

1. Gesture: Mead defines gesture as "that part of the social act which serves as a stimulus to other forms involved in the same social act."[2] In a dog fight, to use Mead's example, the act of each dog is a stimulus for the other's response. The gesture is automatic, direct, an unwitting, non-interpretive response. If and when the organism that makes the gesture puts herself or himself in the position of the other organism, an indirect, interpretive dynamic which Mead calls "role-taking," the gesture becomes significant. Significant gestures "implicitly arouse in the individual making them the same response which they explicitly arouse [in]...the individuals to whom they are addressed."[3] Understanding of the other increases with our increasing ability to call out in ourselves the response which our gestures call out in the other. Significance, then, has to do with communication,

with language, with meanings shared by the participants in the act.

2. Mind: Mind is not a native endowment or given; it is a native capacity which emerges with the emergence of significant symbols. Mead calls thinking "internalized or implicit conversation of the individual with himself" by means of significant gestures or significant symbols. While the individual's capacity for mind is a product of the process of biological evolution, the actual development of mind or intelligence must evolve out of the social situation.[4]

3. Consciousness: Mead's definition of consciousness is functional (and not substantive). Consciousness has to do with the quality of the environment that exists in its relationship to the organism, out of which relationship meaning can arise. A further development of consciousness is self-consciousness or the awakening in oneself the attitudes which one is arousing in others. The self-conscious person is the community-minded person, the one who is mindful of the other.

4. Generalized other: The child becomes mindful first of the other, of the attitudes of those immediate others involved in the same process. When the child learns to abstract from the response of the significant other and generalize to a norm operative for all others, she or he has grown to understand the generalized other. Mead defines the generalized other as "the organized community or social group which gives to the individual his unity or self."[5] The generalized other can be expanded to include all other intelligent individuals;

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that is, it is a concept with universal extension.[6]

5. "I" and "me": An individual initially experiences other people as objects, herself or himself as subject. It is only when others react to the individual as an object that that person can experience herself or himself as object. This reaction by others constitutes the societal side of the person and makes the individual able to develop self-consciousness, to react to oneself, to awaken in oneself the group of attitudes which one arouses in another. The "me," then, is the response of the community to me. Mead calls the "me" a conventional, habitual individual. It is always there. The individual constantly reacts to such an "organized community" in the way of expressing herself or himself. That reaction is the task of the "I," the actual response to the situation presented to "me." The "I" is momentary, fleeting. By the time one can reflect on the "I," the response of the "I" has become part of the "me." The "I" gets into one's experience only after the act has been carried out. The "I" is at the cutting edge; it is the living act which "never gets directly into reflective experience."[7] The "I" is generative, creative, active; it will be judged by the "me" after the individual acts. There will be some difference, slight or marked, between the societal "me" that others reflect to me, and the "me" that emerges as a result of the activity of my "I." In every conversation of gestures there is some change of attitude. There is some adjustment or reaction to the stimulus of another, something new that emerges which in turn has

to be taken into account: a new stimulus for a new response. Neither the sender nor the receiver of the gesture is precisely the same after an interaction. In its momentary but constant freedom, then, the "I" affirms or repudiates but always affects the "me" with which it is presented. This ability for the "I" to choose its response to the "me" is a function of the power of transcendence, which to Mead is the same thing as freedom. The self is not bound; the self that emerges with the emergence of the "I" and "me" is empowered with self-transcendence. "I" transcends "me."

"I" can fuse with "me" in what Mead calls the religious and patriotic attitudes. To illustrate: in the case of emergency, there need be no adjustment to the "me" presented. Large need is met by immediate response. I am the me called: call and response fuse. Or in teamwork: All doing the same thing brings a sense of common effort; one stimulates the next to do likewise. There is a sense of identification with all. The case might be that all are, in fact, doing the same thing: helping hurricane victims, for example. On the other hand, it might be a matter of teamwork wherein all are doing different things, but what one does determines what the other will do in response. In either case, there is a sense of directed control. The "me" is not presenting itself as a means of controlling the "I." The "I" and the "me" fuse, and the effect is one of exaltation. "The self under these circumstances is the action of the 'I' in harmony with the taking of the role of others in the 'me'."[8] Such situations

involve the completion of the social process, a carrying over of the social attitude to the world at large.

The Self

What, then, is the self in Mead? The dyadic "I"/"me" constitutes the self: the "I" as knower; the "me" as known. Neither the "I"/"me" nor the self are givens -- they are social products which emerge with self-consciousness, mind, meaning in a triadic relationship between individuals, by means of significant symbols or gestures. The triad includes (1) the gesture which is made, (2) the meaning which is indicated or "sent," and (3) the response in the other. To illustrate: a child is made aware (1) through the gesture of another, that (2) she or he is an object, that she or he is or has a "me," to which (3) she or he must respond as an "I."

Mead indicates two general stages in the development of the self. In the first stage, the self is constituted by the organized attitudes of particular other individuals toward her or him and toward one another which are manifest or become manifest in the common social acts in which they participate. In the second stage, the attitudes of the whole group to which the individual belongs become important; in other words, the individual internalizes and responds to the attitudes of the generalized other. Such response gives a person her or his principles or character.

Yet the self is not simply what is common to all. The individual possesses a self only as a member of a group with shared attitudes, only in relationships with other selves.

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But she or he is an individual with a unique perspective of the organized relational pattern of the human social process. Mead refers to two poles of the process of social differentiation and evolution -- the individual or physiological pole and the institutional pole. He adds an interesting footnote:

> The selfish versus the unselfish aspects or sides of the self are to be accounted for in terms of the content versus the structure of the self. We may say, in a sense, that the content of the self is individual (selfish, therefore, or the source of selfishness), whereas the structure of the self is social -- hence unselfish, or the basis of unselfishness.
>
> The relation between the rational or primarily social side of the self and its impulsive or emotional or primarily anti-social and individual side is such that the latter is, for the most part, controlled with respect to its behavioristic expressions by the former; and that the conflicts which occur from time to time among its differend impulses -- or among the various components of its impulsive side -- are settled and reconciled by its rational side.[9]

Mead speaks of ethical ideals and ethical problems in terms of the conflict between the social or impersonal side of the self and the asocial or personal aspect of the self (although he recognizes the social derivation of the latter). It is the asocial side which sets the self apart, over against the other members of the group. And this is a necessary step in the development of a self.

It is the asocial side of the self which strives to gain the recognition of the community. To distinguish oneself, one needs to assert oneself over others in some distinctive way. In fact, this is what self-realization is all about. An individual brings that which distinguishes herself or himself into the community, is recognized, i.e., others take the

individual's attitude in some sense. Such appreciation, felt in emotional terms, allows the individual to be the very self she or he is trying to become.

> The author, the artist, must have his audience; it may be an audience that belongs to posterity, but there must an audience. One has to find one's self in his own individual creation as appreciated by others; what the individual accomplishes must be something that is in itself social. So far as he is a self, he must be an organic part of the life of the community.[10]

Mead calls that which distinguishes the individual, maintaining herself or himself over against others, "functional superiority." "Functional superiority" is recognition of what one person offers to the community. Such recognition might come through economic or social status; through position in various groups, through a sense of things one does better than others. In any case, the community legitimates the prestige. Functional superiority implies inferiors who in turn might be functionally superior to others in their own peculiar ways.

Mead's parallel to Maslow's "farther reaches of human nature" might be called "farther reaches of the social self." The self is not "at home" in the universe in the same way that organisms are "at home," because the self carries with it ideals of a social order which transcends the actual social situation under which, in which, the person lives. The individual looks beyond, then, for a world in which these ideals will be realized, and mistakingly speaks of a need for individual salvation in this world. What is really needed is not so much the salvation of the individual, but the salvation of the social self. That

side of salvation, Mead says, rather than the mystic attitude, is of greatest importance: "Our religious experiences come back to that possibility of the development of society so as to realize those values which belong to social beings."[11] One searches for a moral order in a world beyond this world because one fails to find it in this world. And while the power of the world to come has largely disappeared as a religious concern, as cults disintegrate, yet the demand for the individual to find her or his relation to the universe remains unsatisfied and unmediated.[12] One is mistaken to assume that there is a moral purpose in the universe with which one lines up her or his life. Rather, the moral purpose is society as a hole, striving for a social order that transcends the immediate one. To live a transcendent life is to live toward a social order in which the activity of all individuals would be measured in terms of the generalized other. In such an order all selves would be deeply religious.

To sum up, the self, not initially there at birth, is distinguishable from the body; it is an object to itself, reflexive. The self can function both as subject and as object. It is bi-polar: it emerges out of community and is social in nature; yet each self has an individual and unique standpoint. While Mead held that there are two stages in the development of the self, he goes on to extend the process into what can be seen as two additional phases or stages. (1) An individual emerges within a primary group. (2) The individual expands her or his horizons within an extended group, learning

the attitude of the generalized other. (3) The individual distinguishes herself or himself through the recognition by the community of her or his distinctive gift to that community. Such an individual has acquired functional superiority. (4) The individual transcends her or his unique self or personal interests and lives to realize the salvation of the social self. Such an individual strives to actualize the ideal of a social order governed according to the welfare of the generalized other.

A Test of the Adequacy of George Herbert Mead's Concept of the Self

Does Mead pay sufficient attention to the various aspects of the self: physiological or biological; psychological and self-image; social; spiritual? Is Mead's theory of self intellectually and experientially credible and is it emotionally satisfying?

The physiological or biological self: Mead does not claim to speak as a developmental psychologist, amplifying the stages and/or growth patterns of human life. Consequently, he does not address himself to physiological development -- he uses the word "physiological" interchangeably with "individual," as opposed to institutional or social. Apart from such usage, Mead does not speak of physiology or anatomy; he simply clarifies that he is talking about a self that is distinguishable from the body. However, Mead is talking about self-concept. Since the self cannot be separated from the body, he must account for the effects both of the given physi-

cal disposition of the individual body, and of the biological maturation or changes the body undergoes, on the dyadic "I"/ "me" which constitutes the self. The self is constituted not only by the response of the "I" to the "me" presented to it by the community, but by the response of the "I" to the "me" that is presented by one's own bodily state and status. One's body might have as much to say about oneself as all of those significant others have to say. Granted, the message the body sends is both an immediate and a mediated one. One's bodily being is experienced in a positive or negative way. A person experiences physical well-being or physical discomfort, pain, tension -- immediately. But other people say whether an individual has an acceptable, attractive physical appearance and physical presence, or one that is ugly, unpleasnat, unacceptable. In the section on Maslow's treatment of self-esteem, his inadequately developed study of the importance of physiological givens in shaping one's self-esteem was pointed out. The acceptance or rejection of one's physical appearance by others, and subsequently by oneself, can be symbolic of acceptance or rejection of one's very person -- first by others and then by oneself. The point is that body-image and often self-image will be largely determined by internalized messages one has received from others. This, however, has more to do with the psychological than with the biological self.

Another important physiological/biological/social aspect of the self which Mead does not handle is sexuality, except to refer to the "sex or reproductive impulse" as basic

to social behavior. But one could hardly have an adequate concept of the self without including the development of one's sexuality, both one's dominant sexuality and one's characteristics of the opposite sex. (This becomes a difficult question when cultural understandings of sexual characteristics or dispositions are in a state of re-evaluation and new views on what it is to be a woman or a man are emerging.) When Mead's concept of the self (and to some extent Maslow's) is placed alongside Carl Jung's, the absence of the sexual in the former is highlighted. (As will be seen in the following chapter, Jung's interest is in the principles of sexuality more than in physical, sexual experience.)

The psychological self or self-image: Mead does not sufficiently distinguish between the conscious self which is a response of the individual to social understandings and expectations, and the unconscious aspects of the self, also reactions to social attitudes, behaviors, understandings and expectations. He does not account for the on-going nature of the individual's experiences of self and others, experiences which once conscious become preconscious and/or unconscious factors that continue to constitute the self. The process is far more complex than Mead describes. One does indeed receive explicit and tacit messages from others to which one must respond. These are compounded by one's own evolving expectations of oneself, her or his own self-image. Karen Horney is extremely helpful in illustrating this dynamic, a process which is both individual and social in nature.

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Horney (1885-1952) believes that because of adverse influences in early life the child goes through stages of feeling that she or he does not belong, The child then feels isolated, frustrated, hostile. But hostility is extremely anxiety-provoking, because the anger and hostility are directed toward the very people upon whom the child is almost totally dependent. The child cannot afford to lose the protection and support of these providers. Therefore, she or he represses the hostility. However, because of the feelings of rejection and isolation the child is left with an urgent need to lift herself or himself up, to be in some sense above others. The child therefore creates an idealized image of herself or himself, a fulfilled self, a self with all needs met. This idealized self (which Horney calls a "Frankenstein monster") is the nucleus of a search for glory that will steadily increase as the insatiable search goes on, again and again ending in frustration. It is only if the pattern is recognized and the circle broken that the real self rather than the idealized self can be placed at the center of the search. Horney further distinguishes between the real self, i.e., the self one is capable of realizing, the self that is in the process of becoming; and the actual self, who and what one is in the present.[13]

Now, in Meadian terms, is the self which emerges as a result of the "I"/"me" dyad the real, the idealized or the actual self? It would seem that Mead is attending only to the actual, momentary self. He does not account for the complex psychological processes which are always operative as one both

copes with and more freely expresses one's historical experience. In other words, Mead is more attentive to the present, and specifically to the conscious, cognitive present, than to the past as it is still unconsciously present in memory and in the repressed, or to the "unlived life" or potential that is latent and unconscious.

The social self: Clearly, this is Mead's focus and the strength of his theory. He does attend to the social process into which every individual is born, out of which every self emerges. While Mead believes that the self is thoroughly social, he also understands the self as asocial or individual -- but that side, too, presupposes the social process. One aspect which Mead does not develop is the complexity of the expectations of the "me" which various members of the community might present to an individual. These expectations are in part shaped by the unconscious needs and purposes of those individuals. They say as much about the "me" of the sender of the message as about the "me" being addressed. This implies an unconscious, psychological dimension of anything social.

Another aspect of the social self (relative to the psychological self as well) to which Mead does not address himself has to do with his description of significant gesture. Understanding depends upon and grows when an individual calls out in herself or himself the same response which her or his gesture calls out in another. But what about misunderstanding? What about the case when the person sending the message does not call out in herself or himself the response which

her or his gesture calls out in another? The one receiving the message can truthfully say "you do not know what your words (or actions) are doing to me," "you don't understand." Technically this might not be called significant gesture because it does not meet Mead's criterion for significance: its meaning is not shared. But clearly it plays a very significant part in the shaping of the selves involved.

The spiritual self: Mead stresses what he calls the religious attitude or concern for others, to the exclusion of religion in terms of cult or church, or religion understood as mystical union with God. The religious self lives an attitude of neighborliness, of tender concern for all suffering -- lives under the aegis of the generalized other. She or he is universal in outlook. What Mead saw of insitutional religion meant a particularizing of concern, symbolized in a creed or dogma. In addition, he believed that religions encouraged a looking to another world rather than an effort to transform this world. For similar reasons, Mead also underplayed mystical religion or focus on contemplation of or union with God. The very idea of God, Mead felt, particularizes; the notion of the generalized other, universalizes.

Mead rejected what he rejected for good reasons, but neither God nor institutional religion nor mystical prayer need be rejected in order to acclaim a concern for the realization of a better social order. A "both/and" approach to God and religion is more adequate, more experientially credible and emotionally satisfying. True union with God as the source of

life and goodness, the deeply relational God within, rather than submission to a purely extrinsic God, cannot possibly allow the religious person to avoid concern for the generalized other. Any church which claims to concern itself with the "things of God" as these have been revealed through Scripture and tradition: with living justly; with providing for the widow, the orphan and the homeless; with recognizing the gracefulness of life -- as well as recognizing human sacrilege; with standing in awe before the transcendent, before the burning bush -- any church making such claims must be imbued with what Mead would call the religious attitude. One cannot separate the "things of God" from a religious attitude. Any concept of the self is inadequate which fails to include the possibility of union or communion with the God or Spirit or force within, in fact which fails to understand all aspects of the self as potentially religious.

Finally, is Mead's theory of the self intellectually and experientially credible and is it emotionally satisfying? Mead's concept of the self does not include enough of the physiological or the psychological aspects. He does present a clear, coherent explanation of the development of the social self. He illuminates the process of the emergence of the self. It is out of the communication of expectations that a significant other has of an individual that the self of that individual emerges. Mead highlights the crucial importance that significant others play in the kinds of meanings and attitudes which will shape the self that emerges. He made an important

contribution to social psychology in his distinction between the "me" and the "I," the more determined and the more free aspects of an individual's emergence and evolution. In all of this he provides both a corrective and a contribution to Maslow's concept of the social self. Maslow was more inclined to attribute the emergence and growth of the self to instinctive needs and values than to the communication of possibilities that emerge out of significant relationships and call the self into being. (While he recognized that an uncle may have saved him from psychological death as a child, he writes more as if an instinctive motivational system was what accounted for his own self-actualization -- rather than the power of his relationship with his uncle to communicate value and worth.)

The importance of Mead's contribution ot the understanding of the socialization process might well be emphasized; however, it is also true that Mead did not attend to the unconscious dynamics of such a process. The process of communication between individuals that accounts for the evolution of attitudes toward and of the self is not all conscious. Further work has to be done with the Meadian social self in the area of such unconscious communication. In all, Mead's is a heavily cognitive theory, often abstract. His concept of the self in general is neither experientially credible nor emotionally satisfying, but still provides, as seen above, a corrective and a contribtion to Maslow's concept of the self.

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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER VII

[1]As these are developed in George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1934).

[2]Ibid., p. 42. [3]Ibid., p. 47. [4]Ibid., p. 226, note 27.

[5]Ibid., p. 154. [6]Ibid., p. 155-156n. [7]Ibid., p. 203.

[8]Ibid., p. 277. [9]Ibid., p. 230, note 2. [10]Ibid., p. 162.

[11]George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of Act (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 476.

[12]Ibid., p. 473.

[13]see Karen Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth: A Struggle Toward Self-Realization (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950).

CHAPTER VIII

C. G. JUNG'S CONCEPT OF THE SELF

Grappling with Jung's concept of the self is as difficult as grappling with the reality of one's self. There are layers of meaning; there is both clarity and confusion; there are contrary if not contradictory aspects included; there is a richness and a fascination that lures one into a search for the self. Jung acknowledges the difficulty involved in giving an exact definition or clear, concise information about the self. He says that the self has to be seen in its habitual context, and warns:

> In order to understand its living function, we must let it remain an organic thing in all its complexity and not try to examine the anatomy of its corpse in the manner of the scientist, or the archeology of its ruins in the manner of the historian.[1]

Perhaps we can begin in the manner of the topologist, borrowing Josef Goldbrunner's diagram of the psyche as a starting point; and emphasizing throughout that the self is a dynamic, not a static, concept (see diagram, following page).[2]

Systems of the Self

The whole sphere of the psyche or total personality is enclosed in a circle, within which a number of separate interacting systems are at work.[3] The major distinction is between the conscious and unconscious aspects of the psyche.

At the center of consciousness is the ego or conscious mind, made up of thoughts, feelings, memories, perceptions -- that part of the individual which a person experiences as her or his personality. The ego becomes conscious between the ages



of three and five, when a child first refers to herself or himself as "I." However, it is really only at puberty, Jung believed, that an individual psyche is present. Until then, the psyche of the child is "for the most part the psychic product of the parent."[4]

The systems of the self or of the psyche are dynamic: conscious and unconscious (personal unconscious) contents shift

back and forth. On the one hand, experiences which are forgotten, repressed or deliberately suppressed move from conscious to personal unconscious. On the other hand, the personal unconscious can be contacted through dreams, active imagination, through studying one's projections, in therapy: there are many ways in which the unconscious is brought back into consciousness.

The persona is the mask or face one shows the world. Every profession, every role calls for a persona. With a little exaggeration, Jung says, the persona might be described as "that which in reality one is not, but which oneself as well as others think one is."[5]

The two systems immediately "surrounding" the self are the collective unconscious and the archetype personifying the opposite sexual side of the personality, the animus or masculine principle in the woman and the anima or feminine principle in the man.[6]

The collective unconscious refers to that vast, inherited mass of latent memories of the human person's ancestral past, both animal and human. All of humanity shares the same collective unconscious, itself in evolution as the human race undergoes both repeated and new experiences. The instincts and archetypes that together constitute the collective unconscious predispose one to react to the world in a given way, but the predispositions become actualized in individual ways. For example, everyone is instinctively afraid of the dark, yet reaction to darkness differs from one person to the next.

Or again, everyone is born with an inherited experience of mother and father, but personal contexts greatly determine the way individuals will fill out their archetypal mother and father.

The archetype of the opposite sex, animus and anima, are developed by Jung on the presupposition that human beings are essentially bisexual, both female and male hormones being present in both sexes. The contrasexual hormones produce a contrasexual character. It is only by coming to terms with and integrating the unconscious contrasexual character that a person becomes whole. In the process of individuation (Jung's parallel to Maslow's self-actualization) this integration takes place, the animus and anima forming a bridge to the collective unconscious.

There is an aspect of the Jungian system which is not represented on Goldbrunner's diagram. That is the shadow, which might be illustrated as the line separating the personal and the collective unconscious. The shadow is a dominant archetype, more often described negatively but having a positive side as well. Primarily, the shadow is referred to as the negative side of the personality, made up of the unpleasant qualities which one hides.[7] At the same time, the shadow includes insufficiently developed functions or powers of the personality, the unlived life. Jung describes the shadow as "a living part of the personality...[which] wants to live with it in some form."[8] "The shadow does not consist only of morally reprehensible tendencies, but also displays a number

of good qualities, such as normal instincts, creative impulses, etc.."[9] The shadow is a part of the self and must be integrated if one is to reach individuation or selfhood. When the shadow is not dealt with, is not claimed as one's own, it will be projected onto others. In fact the best way to contact the shadow is to study one's typical projections. But because projections are difficult to recognize, Jung suggests that one can start by doubting the absolute rightness of her or his assumptions and comparing them with objective facts.[10]

The Concept of the Self

All of the above can be understood as sub-systems of the self. One might conclude from Goldbrunner's diagram that the self is the center of the psyche, but it is more. It is also the whole circumference, embracing both the conscious and the unconscious. (The distinction between psyche and self is not always clear in Jung. One difference between them is that the self is an archetype, with its collective and individual components. Because the self is an archetype -- and, in fact, the supraordinate archetype of wholeness -- the implication is that the self includes the body. The psyche does not. The psyche is a more diffuse concept referring to mind or consciousness. It, too, is of both an individual and a collective nature, but is even less definitive or less specific than the self.) Just as the ego is the center of the conscious mind, so the self can be seen as the center of the

totality.[11] Jung calls the self "a psychic totality and at the same time a center, neither of which coincides with the ego but includes it, just as a larger circle encloses a smaller one."[12]

There are innumerable references to the self in Jung's writings, with various emphases. Among them:

1. The self is unlimited and therefore unknowable by nature:

> ...a pure borderline concept similar to Kant's Ding an sich...Since we cannot possibly know the limitations of something unknown to us, it follows that we are not in a position to set any limits to the self.[13]

> ...we can say nothing about the contents of the self. The ego is the only content of the self that we do know. The individuated ego senses itself as the object of an unknown and superordinate subject. It seems to me that our psychological inquiry must come to a stop here, for the idea of a self is itself a transcendental postulate which, although justifiable psychologically, does not allow of scientific proof.[14]

> It transcends our powers of imagination to form a clear picture of what we are as a self, for in this operation the part would have to comprehend the whole...however much we may make conscious there will always exist an indeterminate and indeterminable amount of unconscious material which belongs to the totality of the self.[15]

2. The self has the character of a result or goal. Selfhood or self-realization represents the successful completion of the process of individuation.[16]

3. The self is a complexio oppositorum that can only be described in antinomial terms,[17] an absolute paradox that "represents in every respect thesis and antithesis and synthesis."[18] The antinomies include:

-- male and female, corresponding to "the original, spherical, bisexual being who stands for the mutual integration of

conscious and unconscious."[19]

-- conscious and unconscious (light and dark);

-- past and future,[20] encompassing both experienceable and inexperienceable or not yet experienced;[21]

-- individual and collective:

> As an individual phenomenon, the self is "smaller than small"; as the equivalent of the cosmos, it is "bigger than big." The self, regarded as the counter-pole of the world, its "absolute other" is a sine qua non of all empirical knowledge and consciousness of subject and object. Only because of this psychic "otherness" is consciousness possible; it is only separation, detachment, and agonizing confrontation through opposition that produce consciousness and insight.[22]

-- ego and non-ego;

-- subjective and objective.

4. The self is the unity of the personality, "the hypothetical summation of an indescribably totality."[23]

5. The self is importantly related to the ego and vice-versa.

> The term "self" seemed to be a suitable one for this unconscious substrate, whose actual exponent in consciousness is the ego. The ego stands to the self as the moved to the mover, or as object to subject, because the determining factors which radiate out from the self surround the ego on all sides and are therefore supraordinate to it. The self, like the unconscious, is an a priori existent out of which the ego evolves. It is, so to speak, an unconscious prefiguration of the ego. It is not I who create myself, rather I happen to myself.[24]

While Jung equates the ego with the moved and the object, the self with the mover and subject, one's felt experience of self is the reverse! "The self is felt empirically not as subject but as object, and this by reason of its unconscious component, which can only come to consciousness indirectly,

by way of projection."[25] The self must neither assimilate the ego nor be assimilated by the ego: in the former case, the result would be unconscious possession of the ego; in the latter case, the result would be inflation. One might lose one's ego-identity and live as if she or he were the personification of an archetypal motif: the Christ, a great leader; or one might lose touch with the self and live a totally rational, controlled life. Rather, the two must remain in close relationship, the ego as source of subjective identity; the self, source of objective identity.

6. The self is the "God within."[26] The understanding of Christ as a personification of the self is so important to Jungian psychology that it will be dealt with in detail in a subsequent section of this chapter.

7. The self is dialectically related to and inclusive of our neighbor: "relationship to the self is at once relationship to our fellow man, and no one can be related to the latter until he is related to himself."[27] And at another point Jung says: "The completest expression of that fateful combination we call individuality, the full flowering not only of the single individual, but of the group, in which each adds his portion to the whole."[28] Jung refers to the instinctive urge toward human connection as "the kinship libido."[29] But this aspect of Jung's thinking is perhaps less known than his emphasis on individuation through personal search and personal development. Jung and Jungians have often been accused of advocating excessive introspection, of being asocial in

orientation. The following criticism is common enough. Maurice Friedman says of Jung,

> for him self-realization is the goal and the means toward that goal is turning inward to a larger-than-life "self" to be integrated in the depths of the "Objective Psyche" or "Collective Unconscious." When one focuses on these inward processes, there is the danger that everything else or everyone else consciously or unconsciously becomes the means to the end of your individuation, or integration, the function of your becoming.30

Jung's essay, The Undiscovered Self, written during the cold war in 1956, offers a good response to such criticism. Indeed, his primary concern is the individual, but that concern must be historically located. Science and technology's "machine age man," the "mass man" of the absolute State, the diminished member of the dictating Church -- this negligible individual made Jung cry out in protest, in the name of human dignity and human worth.

> I am neither spurred on by excessive optimism nor in love with high ideals, but am merely concerned with the fate of the individual human being -- that infinitesimal unit on whom a world depends, and in whom, if we read the meaning of the Christian message aright, even God seeks his goal.31

Jung believed that the individual needed deep inner resources, a community, and an extramundane principle or God in order to survive the society of his day.

> The man who looks only outside and quails before the big battalions has no resource with which to combat the evidence of his senses and his reason...we are all fascinated and overawed by statistical truths and large numbers and are daily apprised of the nullity and futility of the individual personality, since it is not represented and personified by any mass organization.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Just as man, as a social being, cannot in the long run exist without a tie to the community, so the individual will never find the real justification for his existence, and his own spiritual and moral autonomy, anywhere except

> in an extramundane principle capable of relativizing the overpowering influence of external factors. The individual who is not anchored in God can offer no resistance on his own resources to the physical and moral blandishments of the world. For this he needs the evidence of inner, transcendent experience which alone can protect him from the otherwise inevitable submersion in the mass.[32]

It is not that Jung is using or advocating the use of others for one's own individuation. He is protesting the use of any individual as a means -- in the hands of science or politics or organized religion.

Another place where Jung's emphasis on the social nature of the self shows up is in correspondence with Miguel Serrano, Chilean writer and diplomat. In a letter (from New Delhi, May 7, 1960) Serrano asked Jung,

> I wonder whether you can tell me, Dr. Jung, whether in your long experience you have ever met someone who has reached the Self by a technique, even by your technique, so that he was able to transform himself and change the center of his consciousness?[33]

And Jung's reply:

> I recognize the fact that I can give only one answer, namely mine, which is certainly not valid universally, but may be sufficient for a restricted number of contemporary individuals. Inasmuch as my main tenet contains nothing more than: Follow that will and that way which experience confirms to be your own, i.e., the true expression of your individuality. As nobody can become aware of his individuality unless he is closely and responsibly related to his fellow beings, he is not withdrawing to an egoistic desert when he tries to find himself. He only can discover himself when he is deeply and unconditionally related to some, and generally related to a great many, individuals with whom he has a chance to compare, and from whom he is able to discriminate himself.[34]

The Realization of the Self

Because the self is an end, a goal, a totality, it cannot be experienced early in life. Present from the begin-

ning, but latent or unconscious, the self only gradually realizes itself, and is experienced, Jung says, with much travail.[35] From what has already been said about owning one's shadow and integrating one's contrasexual character, the travail seems obvious. It is difficult to recognize one's weakness, one's evil, to get in touch with negative emotions, destructive thoughts and impulses, to study and own one's projections -- and to know how to distinguish between the neurotic and normal guilt that such recognition will surface. This, Jung believes, is the task of middle age and mature life.

> For a young person it is almost a sin, or at least a danger, to be too preoccupied with himself; but for the aging person it is a duty and a necessity to devote serious attention to himself. After having lavished its light upon the world, the sun withdraws its rays in order to illuminate itself. Instead of doing likewise, many old people prefer to be hypochrondriacs, niggards, pedants, applauders of the past or else eternal adolescents -- all lamentable substitutes for the illumination of the self, but inevitable consequences of the delusion that the second half of life must be governed by the principles of the first.[36]

Symbols of the Self

Jung consistently made use of symbols to comprehend and describe aspects of the unconscious life -- symbols which he believed are derived from unconscious contents of the psyche. The self, which is the archetype of archetypes, the archetype of totality, wholeness, the goal or end, is symbolized by a circle or mandala, as well as by a square or quaternity. The self is also represented by the cross which holds opposites in tension and by the pole, "the point round which everything turns."[37]

In dreams, myths, and fairy tales, the self often appears in the figure of a "supraordinate personality," such as a king or hero, a prophet or savior.[38] (Jung chooses masculine figures in this regard. Why would not a queen or prophetess surface from the collective unconscious as archetypal representation of the self?)

But the symbol of the self which is or who is the personification of the self, is the Christ-figure. If the self is the archetype of archetypes, Christ is an Arch-archetype (but not the only archetype of the self -- Buddha, for example, is another). The key to understanding Jung's Christ is in the archetype of the self in the collective unconscious of every person. It is out of this archetype that one responds to the Christian message. We await "the true image of God," "the culture hero," the "divine Primordial Man" because that archetype or tendency to respond is with us, in us, part of who we are and will become, and with us from our beginning. The danger involved in such a dynamic is that Jesus of Nazareth vanishes as an historical figure behind the emotion-laden projections of those who surround him. He enfleshes an archetype that is by nature universal, but always moulded by individual and cultural expectations. Religious systems dogmatize the real Jesus. Jung says little about the source of the light that shone in Jesus -- he leaves that question to faith. But he clearly believes in both an historical and an unhistorical Jesus.

He opened men's eyes to revelation precisely because he

> was, from everlasting, God, and therefore unhistorical; and he functioned as such only by virtue of the consensus of unconscious expectation. If nobody had remarked that there was something special about the wonder-working Rabbi from Galilee, the darkness would never have noticed that a light was shining.[39]

Paradoxically, Jung believed that the Christ occurred only once in time and occurs repeatedly as we assimilate the God-image into our being, in the process of self-realization. The psychological self and the dogmatic figure of Christ are both portrayed by the symbol of the cross:[40]



We can only know ourselves as "ego": the self, as a totality, is indescribable and therefore unknowable. The archetype of the self is of an "overpowering, all-embracing, complete or perfect being."[41] As such it is indistinguishable from the God image: God is the overpowering, all-embracing, complete or perfect being. It follows that self-realization amounts to God's incarnation. The psychological self and the dogmatic figure of Christ are both represented by the cross. Jung drew an analogy between the relationship of the self to the ego and that of Christ to humankind.

However, Jung could not understand a Christ figure lacking a dark side. And that is the Christ he heard proclaimed by the Christian churches. The self is by definition a <u>complexio oppositorum</u>; so, too, is the Jungian Christ. Jung found the Old Testament God, with both a bright and a dark side,

"better suited to the facts of religious experience (Rev. 14:7) than the Summum Bonum, based as this is on the precarious foundation of a mere syllogism (the privatio boni)."[42] Jung believed that if the dark side of Christ is neglected, an evil, material Anti-Christ is bound to arise. Jung's Christ, as image of God, unites the "'light' son of God on the one hand and the devil on the other."[43] The shadow side of God in Christ contains more than "the unconscious."[44]

Because it is important to understand God in Jung in order to understand the Self, it is important to look briefly at the presentation of God in Answer to Job. Jung's focus is on a God who makes a pact with Satan, a God who violates his own commandments: he robs, murders, inflicts bodily injury, denies Job a fair trial. Jung's God has a jealous and irritable nature, is subject to "incalculable moods and devastating attacks of wrath" -- but only because "he is everything in its totality; therefore among other things, he is total justice, and also its opposite."[45] This God must become incarnate, must become "man" because he has done "man" wrong.

Jung's Christ and God are difficult if not impossible to comprehend. It would take us far afield to try to analyze Jung's intentions in Answer to Job. If Jung is trying to expose the inadequacies of religion that refuses to integrate the shadow in human beings, that is one thing. If he is trying to expose the inadequacies of the image of God in the churches of his time, the inadequacy, really, of any image of God, then it is pointless to say that Jung's God is inade-

quate. It is important to bear in mind that Jung is talking about the God within and never claims to be making theological statements. But for his readers who believe there is continuity between the God within and the God who is Other, Jung presents a problem of integrating God and evil. That the dark side of life, namely, evil, must somehow be a part of God is hard enough to consent to; how the dark side of God is manifest presents an even greater stumbling block. A believer might readily consent to the fact that any human experience of good, including the experience of God within, is limited, imperfect, tainted in some way. We do not experience absolute good. But if one's faith posits a God whom philosophers and theologians have most closely described as Love, as ultimate and absolute good, how can such Being inflict evil on anyone or anything? An individual informed by faith in a God who is the ultimate locus or ground of value, might find it intolerable to imagine the symbolic expression of God which Jung designs in Answer to Job.

The task at hand is to raise the question of adequacy with regard to Jung's concept of the self.

A Test of the Adequacy of Carl Jung's Concept of the Self

Does Jung pay sufficient attention to the various aspects of the self: physiological or biological; psychological and self-image; social; spiritual?

The physiological or biological self: There are two apparent reasons why Jung chose the study of the psyche as

distinct from the study of the body as his starting point. First, Jung is explicit in his disavowal of physiological psychology and what he called its "rank materialism." He criticized it for being thoroughly empirical, for viewing psychic processes from the outside, for dealing with isolated facts and functions rather than with the total psyche.[46] Second, he felt that typologists and depth psychologists (Freud in particular) tended to overemphasize physical constitution at the expense of psychic constitution. By starting with the more familiar -- the body -- the psychologists worked from the outside in. Jung chose the opposite approach. He wanted to start from the inside, to venture into unexplored country and compile an inventory of the psyche.[47]

While Jung repeatedly affirmed the unity of psyche and body, he believed that a substantiality could be attributed to each for the sake of separate investigation, that the body and the psyche could be treated "as if independent, at least in structure." And he explicitly expressed his faith in the sovereignty of the psyche.[48]

Other than assuming a physiological base as a substrate of the attitudes and functions which constitute Jung's typology (extraversion/introversion; thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition), Jung concerns himself very little with human biology or with physiological givens.[49] His focus is on the psyche: the unconscious (for the sake of an expanded consciousness); the dream world; the spiritual and symbolic; the archetypal. True to his fundamental inclination, when Jung

addresses himself to the question of human sexuality, he transcends physical sexual experience and theorizes about the principles of sexuality -- the feminine and the masculine. He does not write about the psychosexual stages, but about the symbolic or spiritual meanings of the sexual principles.

However, for the sake of accuracy and adequacy, any theory of the self must attend to the strong influences which anatomy and physiology have on the psyche and on the self. It follows that there are gaps in Jung's concept of the self because of his inadequate emphasis on the physiological in his theory.

A felt acceptance as an individual is the most important ingredient in self-image and therefore in self-esteem. Body is also a crucially important determinant of self-image and self-esteem: its appearance, shape, size, coordination, health. It is entirely feasible that two individuals with matching bodies, if raised in different environments, would appropriate their bodiliness in diametrically opposed ways. One may consider herself as attractive, agile, graced, valued, worthwhile. The other may feel unattractive, awkward, deprived, worthless. The causal difference would be the experience of love and acceptance in the former environment, of indifference or rejection in the latter. The physiological becomes psychological as soon as the individual reflects on how she or he is perceived by others. Both the physical and the psychological self in Jung are incomplete because of his anti-physiological psychology.

(I do not have children of my own, but several times parents have said to me that they take great delight and pride in being around and looking at the most beautiful or more beautiful of their children. A few have mentioned guilt feelings about showing strong preferences for the more attractive or more gifted child. In many more cases the uneven treatment of children, often associated with bodily differences, is recognized by outsiders [and at least unconsciously by the less favored child/children] but not by the parents. In all cases, self-image, self-esteem, the course of self-actualization, the very self that will or could become actualized or individuated, is deeply affected by physical appearance and by the way others react to the individual [both imagined and actual reactions] .)

The psychological self or self-image: One could say that just as George Herbert Mead's self is thoroughly social, Carl Jung's self is deeply psychological (and the psychological in Jung is equated with the spiritual) -- the self being more defined than but of the same stuff as the psyche. In a chronological sense, Jung has not provided a developmental psychology. In the first place, he is not addressing himself to physical maturation or biological growth. And even if he were, such development would be steps removed from the self, which only begins to emerge in mid-life, long after such maturational processes have subsided. Another reason why Jung is not a psychologist of childhood is that he believed that "the child is psychologically more or less identical with

its environment, and especially with its parents."[50]

> The child has a special psychology. Just as its body during the embryonic period is part of the mother's body, so its mind is for many years part of the parents' mental atmosphere. That explains why so many neuroses of children are more symptoms of the mental condition of the parents than a genuine illness of the child. Only a very little of the child's psychic life is its own...[51]

While it is tempting to want to take issue with the last sentence in the above statement, the question at hand is whether Jung explains the emergence and development of the psychological self -- not whether Jung really understood the psychic life of children. Jung does address himself to the emergence and development of the psychological self in several ways. He focuses on the development of consciousness -- integral to the development of the self -- from childhood through maturity. Jung explains that because there is hardly any consciousness during the first years of life, and an extensive conscious mind by the end of what he calls psychic puberty (a period normally extending to age nineteen in a girl, twenty-five in a boy), the greatest development of consciousness takes place between birth and ages nineteen to twenty-five.[52] Such consciousness, of course, will affect the emergence of the self at mid-life, as will the whole history of the individual from birth.

At another point in his writings Jung compares the stages of life to the course of the sun, dividing the arc of life into four divisible parts: childhood, youth, mid-life and old age -- the first and fourth stage being times without conscious problems, the two center stages being the periods

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when one struggles with the problems of consciousness or the problems of inner divisiveness.[53] The age or stages for the self in this model would be the afternoon and evening of the arc of life.

In developing his theory of the self, Jung includes both its universal and archetypal components, and the individual or personal components. He attends to how the psychological aspects of the self arise and develop and change: ego, persona, shadow, personal and collective unconscious, anima and animus. Jung does not elaborate on these processes in the child or young adult, but the materials and tools needed to build a developmental psychology of the self are present in Jung's writings.

An extension of the Jungian psychology of the self might include aspects such as: the self and physical maturation; the archetypes of the school-age child; the archetypes and adolescence; the contrasexual personality and the only child versus the contrasexual personality and children with siblings of the opposite sex; fantasy, fairy tale and the child's self concept.

The question of Jung's treatment of the psychological self involves the question of his treatment of the self as social. Jung's strong inner-world direction does indeed effect both his down-playing of the body itself and of the interpersonal and social relations essential to the actualization of the self.

<u>The social self:</u> George Herbert Mead presupposes and

does not account for the origin of a society out of which the individual emerges. The self cannot emerge before the individual faces a significant other or others in some form of successful communication. The self is closely tied to a conscious response to the message of another or others.

In something of a parallel process, Carl Jung presupposes and cannot account for the origin of a heritage or collective human experience (collective unconscious) which the individual in some sort of symbiotic existence is immersed into congenitally, and out of which the self will emerge. The self cannot become individuated before the person enfleshes or incarnates, or experiences the incarnation of, an archaic heritage of the forms of personages and experiences. The self is closely tied to the individuating of the collective.

Perhaps the greatest difference in these two myths or models of emergence lies in the fact that Mead does not believe in instincts or inherited patterns of behavior -- everything is learned in an environment through social interaction. Mead deals, then, with the outer world. He highlights conscious cognition and social interaction; he does not deal with the unconscious. (There are fourteen references to "consciousness" in the index to Mind, Self, and Society; "unconscious" is not even listed!) Mead is talking about the here-and-now context of an individual's life, about the present social situation and present significant others.

Jung, on the other hand, is primarily interested in the inner world of the psyche, a world largely unconscious.

One could say that Jung's self is archetypically inherited as a possibility or pattern of emergence. While the self is both a collective and an individual experience, collective does not necessarily mean social. The collective presupposes a society, and the contents of the collective unconscious are always being affected by what a society represses.[54] Still, an individual could feasibly withdraw from society and enter into a world of the collective unconscious apart from personal social realtions. In terms of time, Jung combines the archaic or perhaps transhistorical with the person's past and present experience. In general, there is a looking to the past in Jung's writing.

Yet Jung is more attentive to the social dimensions of the self than is popularly believed. He lived at a time when the negligible individual was endangered by mass society -- his protest was loud. But Jung recognized not only the dangers of society; he spoke also of a positive urge toward connection, the "kinship libido," and of the importance of the group to the flowering of the individual. However, Jung was an introvert, and the overall direction of his thought is decidedly inward. Certainly there are concepts within his theory which involve the external world -- for example, the persona and projection. But notice that the persona comes between one's truer self, one's inner self, and the external world. And with regard to projection, what one is projecting is one's shadow, one's dark inner side. Jung saw the devastating effects that role-playing and that projection could have on public

life. In this sense he is making serious comments about social, political life.[55]

Jung recognizes the "incalculable importance of parental influence"; he calls the mother the "first bearer of the soul-image" of the child; he speaks of the importance of liberation from parents for the individuation process to be effective.[56] In general, however, Jung does not attend closely enough to the complexities of one's social situation which so strongly influence the development of the self.

Mead has given us an understanding of the dynamic processes which result in consciousness and self-consciousness. His theory could feasibly be applied to Jung's concept of the psyche and self, resulting in a more adequate understanding of the development of the self on both conscious and unconscious levels than either theory alone provides. In other words, how does the triadic gesture, meaning and response between two individuals or within a group affect one's ego, persona, the tendency to repress, the shadow, one's archetypal experiences -- in short, one's latent self? An understanding of the self must include an understanding of the dynamic processes involved in and the importance of social interaction; it must also include an understanding of the simultaneous processes of the inner, less conscious or unconscious world -- unconscious because latent or unlived, and unconscious because repressed.

<u>The spiritual self</u>: No one could deny that Carl Jung's concept of the self includes deep and extensive attention to

the spiritual self. The self is spirit, unlimited; the self is religious; the self is the image of God, or as Jung expresses it, the Self is God within.[57] Jung lures his reader (as he lured his patients and followers) into a search, Jung's own search, in spirit, to know and liberate that God through a process of individuation. Everything that was said about Jung's explanation of how this process develops with regard to the psychological self applies to the process of development of the spiritual self -- in Jung, the two are the same. Jung rooted the spirit, he rooted religion, in the psyche. He leaves it to his believing reader to make the faith connection between the God within and the God who is Other.

There is something inorganic or inappropriate in asking the second question with regard to Jung's concept of the self. Is what he says about the self intellectually and experientially credible and is it emotionally satisfying -- meaning by intellectual credibility clarity of conceptualization and coherence of thought? Jung's was a boundless quest which included an active openness to the unconscious, the archaic, the chaotic, the esoteric. To require that such thinking be clear and coherent is to make an impossible demand. Jung is dealing with that which is not governed by laws of clarity or coherence. Yet one can draw from his writing a concept of the self which is relatively clear and relatively coherent. To measure the experiential credibility of Jung's concept, one has to seriously reflect on one's own inner world. Yes, the shadow; yes, the persona; yes, the animus; yes, pro-

jection; yes, the experience of a deeper Self within; yes, the God within. Jung's self is credible and satisfying. The weakness in his theory is in his overemphasis on the intra-psychic and underemphasis on the inter-personal and the social, and on the physiological factors which often influence both the inter-personal and the social.

Jung illustrates the fact that one's strength is the "flip-side" of one's weakness. It is precisely in the area of the unconscious, intra-psychic processes that he makes his saliant corrective and contribution to Maslow. Jung made it his primary task to explore the unconscious (an exploration that involves a making conscious of the not yet conscious and the repressed). His presentation of its contents, collective and personal, archetypal and individual, is as rich and dramatic as is the dream world we experience as our sure sign of its presence and operation. Maslow, on the other hand, deliberately de-emphasized the unconscious in his earlier writings and pays insufficient attention to its dynamism in his later writings, particularly and importantly in the area of the hierarchy of needs. He says almost nothing about dreams.

Another area where Jung contributes to Maslow is in the understanding of the religious quest of the human person. For Jung, there are inner-connected archetypes, impossible to distinguish in their symbolic dimensions, that are patterns of possible fullness of the Self. These are Self as archetype, Christ as archetype, and God as archetype.[57] But these arche-

types, as possible patterns of experience, seek their concrete referents or incarnation in historical figures. Maslow does not see the necessity for such a religious figure, either on the archetypal level or in the historical world. Perhaps if he had, he might have grounded his values of Being more concretely. He needed no God. It follows that he needed no incarnation of God to undergird his search for the Good Person in the Good Society. (Neither did Mead find it necessary to concretize his generalized other in God. And because he did not attend to the depth psychological side of the religious attitude or the religious quest, he did not need to relate the inner search for wholeness with a God or with the generalized other.)

In the final chapter of the dissertation, an attempt will be made to draw together the contributions of these three theorists into a more adequate way of looking at the self.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER VIII

[1]C. G. Jung, The Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious, Vol. IX, 1 of Collected Works (1959), p. 182.

[2]Josef Goldbrunner, Individuation (Notre Dame: Univ. Notre Dame Press, 1964), p. 134.

[3]Jung calls the psyche "the mother and the maker, the subject and even the possibility of consciousness itself. It reaches so far beyond the boundaries of consciousness that the latter could easily be compared to an island in the ocean" (Psychol. and Religion, Vol. XI, p. 84).

[4]Jung, Development, Vol. XVII, pp. 54-55.

[5]Jung, Archetypes, Vol. IX,1, p. 123.

[6]Jung calls the archetypes forms, patterns, "primordial images"(Two Essays, Vol. VII, p. 76), motifs that recur in almost identical form, or images of a collective nature. The description I found most helpful, because it focuses on the processive and functional rather than the substantive nature of the archetype, is in Man and His Symbols: "The archetype is a tendency to form such representations of a motif -- representations that can vary a great deal in detail without losing their basic pattern" (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1964), p. 67; emphasis added.

Most Jungians do not refer to the fact that Jung admits that Freud "first observed and commented on" these elements, specifically those which occur in dreams and "cannot be derived from the dreamer's personal experience" (Symbols, pp. 47, 67).

Freud called them "archaic remnants," He says that the "archaic heritage of mankind includes not only dispositions, but also ideational contents, memory traces of the experiences of former generations" (Moses and Monotheism, Katherine Jones [trans.], [New York: A. A. Knopf, 1939], p. 157).

[7]Jung, Two Essays, Vol. VII, p. 65n.

[8]C. G. Jung, Freud and Psychoanalysis, Vol. IV of Collected

Works (1961), p. 20.

[9]C. G. Jung, Aion, Vol. IX, 2 of Collected Works (1959), p. 266.

[10]Jung, Civilization, Vol. X, p. 300.

[11]C. G. Jung, Psychology and Alchemy, Vol. XII of Collected Works (1953), pp. 41, 195.

[12]Jung, Archetypes, Vol. IX, 1, p. 142.

[13]Jung, Alchemy, Vol. XII, p. 174.

[14]Jung, Two Essays, Vol. VII, p. 238; cf. C. G. Jung, The Practice of Psychotherapy, Vol. XVI of Collected Works (1954), p. 312.

[15]Jung, Two Essays, Vol. VII, p. 175; cf. Psych. and Religion, Vo. XI, p. 157; cf. Aion, IX, 2, p. 5; cf. Two Essays, Vol. VII, p. 236.

[16]Jung, Two Essays, Vol. VII, pp. 237-38.

[17]Jung, Psychol. and Religion, Vol. XI, p. 443; Aion, Vol. IX, 2, p. 63.

[18]Jung, Alchemy, Vol. XII, p. 19.

[19]Jung, Psychotherapy, Vol. XVI, p. 311.

[20]Jung, Two Essays, Vol. VII, p. 19.

[21]Jung, Types, Vol. VI, p. 460.

[22]Jung, Archetypes, Vol. IX, 1, p. 171.

[23]C. G. Jung, Mysterium Conjunctionis, 2d. ed., Vol. XIV of Collected Works (1970), p. 108; cf. Types, Vol. VI, p. 460.

[24]Jung, Psychol. and Religion, Vol. XI, p. 259.

[25]Jung, Archetypes, Vol. IX, 1, p. 187.

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[26]Jung, Two Essays, Vol. VII, p. 236.

[27]Jung, Psychotherapy, Vol. XVI, p. 233.

[28]Jung, Two Essays, Vol. VII, pp. 237-38.

[29]Jung, Psychotherapy, Vol. XVI, p. 233.

[30]Maurice Friedman, "Aiming at the self: The paradox of encounter and human potential movement," Jour. Humanistic Psychol., XVI, No. 2 (Spring, 1976), p. 9.

[31]Jung, Civilization, Vol. X, p. 305.

[32]Ibid., pp. 254, 258.

[33]Miguel Serrano, C. G. Jung and Hermann Hesse: A Record of Two Friendships, 2d ed., Frank MacShane (trans.) (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), p. 83.

[34]Ibid., pp. 83-84.

[35]Jung, Two Essays, Vol. VII, p. 237.

[36]C. G. Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, Vol. VIII of Collected Works (1960), p. 399.

[37]Jung, Alchemy, Vol. XII, pp. 103, 172, 178, 208.

[38]Jung, Types, Vol. VI, p. 460.

[39]Jung, Psychol. and Religion, Vol. XI, p. 154.

[40]Jung, Aion, Vol. IX, 2, p. 63.

[41]Jung, Psychol. and Religion, Vol. XI, p. 155.

[42]Jung, Civilization, Vol. X, pp. 337-38.

[43]C. G. Jung, Symbols of Transformation, Vol. V of Collected Works (1956), p. 368.

[44]Jung, Psychol. and Religion, Vol. XI, pp. 152-57;

Mysterium, Vol. XIV, p. 349; Aion, Vol. IX, 2, pp. 36-63; Transformation, Vol. V, p. 303.

[45]Jung, Psychol. and Religion, Vol. XI, pp. 369, 372.

[46]Jung, Development, Vol. XVII, pp. 66, 81.

[47]Jung, Types, Vol. VI, p. 524. [48]Ibid., p. 547.

[49]Ibid., p. 331.

[50]Jung, Development, Vol. XVII, p. 149.

[51]Ibid., pp. 74-75; cf. pp. 126ff. [52]Ibid., p. 52.

[53]Jung, Structure, Vol. VIII, pp. 382-403.

[54]Jung, Two Essays, Vol. VII, p. 314.

[55]Jung, Civilization, Vol. X, pp. 245-305.

[56]Jung, Types, Vol. VI, pp. 332, 235.

[57]Jung, Two Essays, Vol. VII, p. 236.

CHAPTER IX

TOWARD A MORE ADEQUATE CONCEPT OF THE SELF

The primary effort of this dissertation has been to study as fully as possible Abraham Maslow's concept of the self. Because of a conviction that the central themes of any theorist, and particularly personality theorists and theologians, grow out of an individual's personal experience and are deeply colored by that experience, the study began with an examination of biographical materials. It became clear that Maslow's theory of need fulfillment leading to self-actualization stood in dramatic contrast to his own personal deprivation during the first twenty years of his life, and in some ways in contrast to the experience of his whole life. One could point to his shyness, his experience of prejudice, fear of rejection by members of his profession, his health, his lack of fulfillment in his teaching, fear of intense emotional experience, illusions of grandeur about what he could accomplish, a drivenness which made him preclude the pursuit of other personal interests and forms of relaxation. These deprivations must be balanced by the personal satisfactions of a deeply compatible, loving marriage; satisfaction in fathering and grandfathering; a passion for his research and writing; the success of his books; warmth and charm in his personality which drew others to him; the satisfaction he knew in the admiration he had for

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others; recognition by colleagues; on-going excitement in his pursuit of value -- particularly the value of truth; intense personal experience -- his peak and plateau experiences. Maslow's life can be read in two ways: the hierarchy does not stand, i.e., Maslow reached self-actualization without knowing the satisfaction of some of the basic needs, particularly safety and security and belongingness needs, and especially on the unconscious level. Or, having known minimal satisfaction of the basic needs, Maslow reached the level of growth motivation, at which point the relatively unmet lower needs were satisfied from above. That is, a deep love relationship filled an unmet need for safety and security. In the latter case, Maslow's theory proves more optimistic than its optimistic designer!

The study of biographical roots included a separate look at Maslow's intellectual biography. (Maslow was a great collector of thought which he found to be compatible with his own. The books in his private library are frequently marked with notations connecting the materials he read with his own concepts. There is indication that he kept extensive files in which he collected citations from his reading.) Biographical sources, coupled with his own writings, and with materials in his private library, give ample evidence of the minds that influenced his: Sumner (although Folkways is not among Maslow's books), Freud, Watson, Adler, Goldstein, Benedict, Wertheimer, Fromm, Horney. Specific ways in which this influence became manifest was reviewed.

An examination of the biographical and intellectual roots of self-actualization was followed by a thorough review of the theory of self-actualization and a study of the concept of the self which undergirds that theory. The concepts of the self of George Herbert Mead and Carl Jung were studied in a more limited, less ambitious way. Each concept was evaluated according to specific criteria.

The aim of the present chapter is modest. Taking advantage of the strengths of the concepts of the self of the three theorists under study, and using a process of assemblage, an attempt will be made to draw together a morphology of a more adequate concept of the self. This includes: factors to be considered in a concept of the self; bi-polar aspects of the self to be highlighted; areas in the experience or development of the self to be attended to, particularly in the light of Maslow's hierarchy of needs.

First, and perhaps most importantly, the very concept of the self must be seen as tentative, relative, in process. The self (like the archetype) is best imaged as a tendency toward integration, identity, individuation, actualization. The starting point, then, is not so much that of the essentialist-constitutionalist who primarily attempts to describe what inner nature is like, but that of the social psychologist who attempts to describe the socialization process of this individual: the combination of this <u>content</u> (which, of course, is not static) with this <u>process</u>. One begins more from a Meadian than from a Maslovian starting point. The process of

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self-formation or self-actualization in each case has from its inception some physiological and sociological givens, and from its inception the self-in-formation develops a history out of which the individual continually emerges. Both the givens and the history provide continuity to the process. The important point here is that the self is not fixed: it is always subject to new possibilities; it will emerge for better or for worse as a result of the context in which the process or tendency toward integration is lived out. The self is more than the director (ego) of the process. As Mead emphasized, the self has a dual subject-object nature -- a who and a what in interaction. The conscious, present self or ego or "I" (and there is also an unconscious, present self) reflects on its past, its "me," on its present "me" as suggested to it by the community, and can plan the direction of its future "me." Further, this subject-object nature of the self is realized in an objective world that is shaped in part by one's subjective perception. The same "I" is in co-creative relationship with a world of people and objects which are also in process, tending toward integration. An adequate concept of the self must be attentive to these interacting systems of emergence and integration of one's self and the objects of one's world.

The concept of the self is a large concept. It must include all that is possible of human attainment, all that comes packaged as human potential. It must be adequate to what Maslow called "the farther reaches of human nature."

While the physiological and sociological givens inevitably and irreversibly mark the life-journey or self-formation of an individual, they are or do not have the last word. The self, as Jung so often emphasized, is also psyche or spirit. Its limits are unknown to us; the self has the power to transcend (but never leave) one's individual bodily being in one's limited and limiting social context. As spirit the self can choose its response, can create its response to its human situation.

A concept of the self, then, must be descriptive of a dynamic, processive reality; it must also be adequate to the heights and depths of human experience.

In every aspect, the self is bi-polar. As we have seen in this dissertation, Abraham Maslow, George Herbert Mead and Carl Jung all recognize the bi-polar nature of the self (Maslow, p. 188; Mead, p. 223; Jung, pp. 238-39). Specifically, each of the theorists refers to the subject/object and to the individual/collective or communal antimonies (Maslow calls the former the experiencing/observing self; the latter, the idiosyncratic/species-wide self). Both Maslow and Jung highlight the ego and non-ego and the conscious and unconscious or deeper nature of the self. While Maslow refers to the self as present and future, Jung speaks of it as past and future. In addition, Maslow points to the ideal/actual self and to the self-fulfilled/selfless duality. Jung, in a central way, describes the masculine/feminine nature of the self. My own summation of the bi-polar nature of the self

incorporates and expands the polarities included in Maslow, Mead and Jung.

The self is created by and creative of its process of formation; the self is relational and yet solitary; spontaneous and reflective; the self is conscious and unconscious; it experiences itself with both love and hate; the self is living and dying; finally, the self is both feminine and masculine.

1. As stressed in the initial statement about the self, the self is in process: it is both created by that process and is creative of that process. (Perhaps this is a more satisfying description of the self than that of subject/object. Included in this first bi-polarity is the fact that the self is both present -- a present which carries with it a past -- and future, or as Maslow says, an actual self and an ideal self.) This is another way of saying that the self is partially determined, partially free: relatively determined by physiological givens and a sociological context, relatively free in its response toward those givens. Or in Meadian terms, the self includes an "I" and a "me." The self grows out of a set of givens: this body with its size, shape, features; this skin color; these eyes, this voice; this blood, these bones; this energy level, this metabolism; this brain capacity; these bio-rhythms. Yet these givens are discovered and appropriated (or non-appropriated) in a context.

Initially the child is in many ways a reflection of the relationship between its parents (although it is always

more than this reflection), and indeed the health or pathology of their relationship will have a strong influence on the health or pathology of the child's self-image. In other words, the child is either beneficiary or victim of the parents' circumstances. Still and all, the child is distinct from its parents: she or he is hormonally, genetically, idiosyncratically, chromosomally, distinct and individual. In all its uniqueness, the child develops its capacity to react to these circumstances. (It is not clear that Jung recognized the psychic distinctness of the child, especially when he speculates that the psyche of the individual only emerges at puberty.) A moment or moments come in the life of the individual when one more or less consciously accepts her or his life cycle, her or his particular bodiliness and its unique set of circumstances; or the moment may never come. But genuine self-acceptance requires such self-appropriation. (Jung speaks of the importance of an individual's separation from the mother and father as a necessary step toward individuation. I am less aware of his speaking of the conscious acceptance of one's unique bodiliness.[1])

2. While there is obvious overlap between the following statement and the dialectically creative and created, determined and free self, there is sufficient distinction in focus to include as a second dialectic: the self is <u>relational</u> and yet <u>solitary</u> -- or again in Meadian concepts, a "me" and an "I". (This duality describes the species-wide/idiosyncratic or communal/individual nature of the self.) The child's very concep-

tion and birth and survival in infancy depend upon others. So, too, does the child's emergence as a self. An individual can only know herself or himself through others. Such acceptance and love and such self-knowledge involve conscious and unconscious processes which begin with one's history. As has been seen and will be "revisited" in this chapter, neither Maslow nor Mead were sufficiently attentive to the unconscious aspects of the life-long need for acceptance.

While there is undoubtedly unconscious communication between the mother and the fetus even before birth, evidence is more available to demonstrate the dramatic communication between mother and infant as the infant's mind and emotional life begin to develop. In all of her communication with her child, by gesture, by word, by look, the mother sends communications of acceptance and well-being, or rejection and danger -- or some mixture thereof. Such communication will never be entirely forgotten and will reappear, in transmuted form, in the individual's self-concept. One way of getting at the importance of the child's experience of acceptance or fear of non-acceptance is to ask a person to recall her or his earliest memories. Such memories will often involve fear of loss of a parent's love, or remembrances of the birth of a sibling who took center stage from the older child, or some other memory which symbolizes one's worth or worthlessness to another. Another way of looking at the same reality would be to encounter the difference in one's available memories and what one is told by relatives or acquaintances about one's earliest experi-

ences, or to encounter the memories which only surface in a therapeutic situation. The question becomes: does memory function in terms of the past or the present? In the former instance, where one does recall the experience of threat of non-acceptance, is that early memory available here and now because of one's present, or would the same experience be recalled no matter how one were operating in the present? In the latter case, where the memories are not available, might not some of one's present fears be unconscious transmutations of the repressed experiences that others report of one's early experiences? In both cases the significant point is that the conscious or unconsciously transmuted experience of acceptance or rejection will often be the content of the memory.

Ruth Benedict provides a good illustration of transmuted unconscious anxiety. In contrast to pictures taken of her father in full health, she was haunted by "a worn face illuminated with the translucence of illness, and very beautiful." When her aunt told her about her mother's having held two-year old Ruth over her father's coffin and pleaded that she "remember," the transmuted memory was clarified. She reports that the power that his face had over her only became clear to her many years later when she took her mother to the Boston Museum, wanting her mother to see El Greco's Felix Hortensio Paravicino.

> Ever since I had first discovered that picture I had found ways and means of getting to Boston to see it; my feeling for it was over and above my appreciation of the superb finality of the painter's art. My visits were acts of friendship and love for the man painted. I always called

> him "mine." One day many years after I was married my mother was in Boston with me. She knows little of painting, and an El Greco I liked meant nothing to her. But when she went into the large gallery where it hangs she went at once to the portrait, not knowing it was "mine." I could not understand. Finally she turned to me and said, "It is your father. It is your father just before he died. There are no pictures of him as he looked then, but now you know what he looked like.[2]

While this is more a situation involving the trauma of death to the child than one of the experience of non-acceptance, it is a powerful illustration of the power of the unconscious.

The parent's communication of acceptance or non-acceptance becomes problematic when there is a discrepancy between the conscious and the unconscious messages being sent. In Rollo May's study of anxiety (The Meaning of Anxiety, 1950), he set out to test the thesis that there is positive correlation between anxiety in the pregnancy of unmarried women and their experience of felt rejection by their own mothers triggered by the pregnancy. His unexpected finding was that the middle class women did fit that hypothesis, while lower class women did not. The difference lay in the fact that the lower class women he worked with had been overtly rejected by their mothers -- the message was clear, and when these rejected women became pregnant they did not worry about loss of mother's love or loss of self-esteem. On the other hand, the middle class women suffered anxiety because their parents covered up the rejection: the unconscious message was one of non-acceptance; the conscious message was "I love you." Pregnancy produced anxiety in these women because they feared the loss of the love that was uncertain in the first place.

The mother/child (or surrogate mother/child) relationship is the beginning of the chain of relationships that can be seen as the co-creative process which is human life. In Mead's terms, mother is the first "other." The circle of others widens to the generalized other or community into which the whole world of humankind can be incorporated. The "other" reveals "me" to myself. The "me" is relational. But "I" must respond to the "me" before I can be said to have or tend toward a self. That "I" is solitary and relatively free. Always caught up in and constituted by a web of relationships, the individual "I," subject of "me," is nonetheless ultimately alone, unique, distinguishable from those relationships. It is not just the child, of course, who is created by this relational process. The parent's self as parent is also created in the same process. The relational/solitary character of self-development is a life-long task ending in death, the most solitary act of life.

The relational/solitary character of the self is an aspect of extraversion/introversion. Without going into Jung's concepts in detail, one could say that the extravert tends to work out, live out, her or his meaning "out there" -- with other people and things. The introvert tends to put her or his meaning together internally. The former is more relational; the latter, more solitary. Individuation requires both.

3. The self is <u>spontaneous</u> and <u>reflective</u> (and reflection itself can become spontaneous): the initiator of both expressive and coping behavior. (Maslow tends to view coping behav-

ior in a negative light, an unfortunate judgment when so much of life is necessarily a matter of coping. He stresses that the self is discovered through expressive and not through coping behavior. But the self is expressed through both forms of behavior. The pattern of coping devices -- for example, sublimation rather than repression -- enhances or diminishes the character of one's self.) For a balanced life, one needs to be both spontaneous, unstructured, free; and on the other hand, structured, reflective, disciplined. Both patterns of behavior can mean bringing more of the unconscious to consciousness. Expressive behavior in the form of play, fantasy, free association, allows repressed or forgotten or unlived impulses to surface, to come to conscious life. But such expression can escape consciousness unless one reflects upon what has occurred. So, too, coping behavior can reveal unconscious fears, desires, impulses -- but only if one reflects on patterns or responding to people and situations. Both Maslow and Jung offer rich insights into the significance of spontaneity, free association, fantasy to the development of the self. Although both are introvert, Jung, more than Maslow, stresses the importance of on-going depth reflection on all aspects of one's life, of on-going attempts at integration of opposites within oneself.

4. The self is <u>conscious</u> and <u>unconscious</u>; actual and potential; claimed and unclaimed; a symbol of the lived and the unlived life. This is Jung's self, center and circumference of the circle that symbolizes all of one's life.

The unconscious includes both that which has never reached consciousness -- the unlived life, potential -- and that which has been repressed or forgotten. Enough has been said throughout this dissertation and touched upon in this chapter about the importance of including in any understanding of the self the unconscious aspects of all elements of human life: needs, values, choices, memories, symbols, relationships, experiences. There will always be a message from the unconscious, a message which will prove to be either a contamination or an enrichment of the conscious moment.

5. The self experiences itself both positively and negatively, with love and with hate; the self experiences and is experienced by the love objects in its world with both love and hate. Any number of polarities describe the human situation in terms of either a moral judgment or evaluative feelings about oneself and/or one's world: good/evil; pleasurable/painful; weak/strong; accepted/rejected; perfect/imperfect; creative/destructive; light side/shadow side. The more pervasive dialectic, the dialectic of dialectics of human life, will be treated separately: that is, birth/death, living/dying. The given is that the individual human being, and therefore the self which is experienced as both central to and the circumference of that human being, is incomplete: imperfect, needy, insufficient unto itself, in process. And yet the self, according to Jung, has an archetypal experience of completion, wholeness which Jung calls the Self. The Self and the self are in a dialectical relationship, a polarity between the

ideal or possible (an impossible possibility, always on-going) and the real. Love and hate are responses to this polarity.

From the moment of birth the child wants what it wants when it wants it, and experiences positive and negative reactions to the people and things around it largely in terms of whether these objects meet the child's needs. This drive for satisfaction is of a piece with the drive for wholeness, completion, perfection, self-sufficiency. At one point or another, everyone wants to "play God," to be in complete control, to write the end of the novel to one's own satisfaction (or the satisfaction of significant others). Because of the incomplete nature of human life, coupled with the desire for completion, there is always a struggle. And because of the interacting needs and struggles of the human community, often a struggle for control of the same need satisfactions, there is greed, selfishness, destructiveness -- in short, there is evil. At the same time, the desire for completion is also a desire for goodness, for perfection. The struggle of the human community is a call to interdependence and altruism. The same tension between the perfect and the imperfect, between the ideal and the real, that is present in the individual, is present in the group.

Coming to terms with the dual nature of human life (described by Freud as the dual drive, eros and thanatos) means accepting limitation -- limitation in oneself and in everyone and everything and every situation in one's world. It means claiming rather than repressing and subsequently projecting

what Jung so well describes as one's shadow or dark, evil side. It means recognizing one's insufficiency as an invitation to interdependence. At the same time, coming to terms with this reality means owning one's strengths; it means developing what Mead calls one's "functional superiority." It can also mean appreciating the gifts of others, the gifts of the non-self as co-extensive with or gifts of one's self. There is a positive correlation between the possibility of considering the gifts of others as one's own gifts and the degree of synergy in a society. If the next person's gain is in fact my loss, I can little rejoice in her or his gain. But if one's gain is gain for the next, genuine achievement by any member of the community is a gift to every member of the community.

The implication is not that in this or in any other dialectic the positive pole can be chosen or arrived at to the exclusion of the negative (or there would be no electricity!). Both members of the pair are part and parcel of both individual and community life. An individual has to integrate both love and hate toward oneself and toward others in order to reach full selfhood. A community has to deal with its weak and strong members, with its creative and its destructive individuals. The easy way out is for the strong to project their weakness onto the weak, their destructiveness onto the criminal, in short, to try to live without their shadows.

6. The self becomes aware of human existence as a matter

of passing from birth through life, toward and unto death. Living also means dying; growing includes letting go; it includes a diminishment of possibilities; living means successfully making the transition from what Jung calls the morning of life to the afternoon of life.[3] One is a baby once; knows infancy once; has one childhood, youth, adulthood, old age. Death is inevitable. Accepting this reality means above all accepting one's mortality, one's life cycle as "one's one and only life cycle."[4] It means recognizing the transitional nature of all of life, living with the reality that every choice means a letting go of the unchosen, that every passage signifies the death of an earlier stage of life (which, of course, lives on within the being/becoming which one is today). Jung has given us a deep appreciation of the second half of life, an appreciation which could indeed help us to accept the living/dying reality of our existence. That appreciation, however, does not mean resignation. It means choosing life over death, the more adequate over the less adequate, living over dying. The key is found in the favorable ratio of life over death. Paradoxically, one can accept one's life cycle -- one's living and one's dying -- and still find death to be, both intellectually and emotionally, something of an intolerable mystery. One can love life and hate death and still know that living means dying, that death is a part of life. Embracing one's life cycle does not mean going "gentle into that good night" (Dylan Thomas). The point here is that a concept of the self must include the recognition of the self as living

and dying, at least physiologically, psychologically and socially speaking.

Whether the spiritual self or the self as spirit can die is another question, and one which Maslow did not sufficiently confront in his writings. It is impossible to imagine the death of one's spirit. The faith or belief in the reality of and the specific form of an afterlife depends, in large part, upon one's personal history -- cultural myths, religious beliefs, experience or acceptance or non-acceptance, of love and hate. But if there is no future, what grounds one's self-esteem? Can one really live for the sake of Being-values if those values are not grounded in a living God who transcends death and saves all being from annihilation?

7. The self is both feminine and masculine. Countersexual hormones are the physiological foundation of the countersexual personality. Jung speaks more about psychic sexuality, about the psychic differences between the sexes, than about physiological differences. Obviously the two are related: in this as in every area, the physiological points to the psychological; the psychological involves the social; the social, having cosmic extension, points to the transcendent or spiritual or symbolic/mystical. The dual aspect of one's sexuality, however, does not mean the muting of sexual differences. Rather, it requires a development first of one's dominant sexuality; then attention to the subordinate sexuality. Without initiating a nature/nurture debate about sexual differences (see Eleanor Maccoby and Carol Jacklin, The Psychology

of Sex Differences, Stanford, 1974, for conclusions regarding established sex differences), one can easily enough recognize that the physiological differences between the sexes have wide and deep implications. For example, for the woman who bears a child and nurses that child, her physiological experience does not stop there. In her response to the infant she is bound to bring a different experience of its life than does the father of the child. She knows the child in a different way; she handles the child in a different way; she feels responsibility for the life of the child in a different way. And these feelings and ways of relating could hardly stop with her maternal functions. Maternity spills over into other concrete ways of relating to one's world. To try to spell this out in detail would indeed to be to plunge into a nature/nurture debate.

The fact that a man's body is more muscular and stronger (F. J. J. Buytendijk reports that higher muscular development in the man and more fatty tissue in the woman is found to be a sexual difference everywhere in the world) means that he experiences himself, his tasks, the expectations of others which he internalizes, in a different way than a woman experiences her bodiliness.

A lot might be said about the muting of sexual differences in our time: from hair styles to clothing to body build, to occupations and hobbies, to sexual practices, homosexuality, transvestism. The point here is that there is in every individual a dominant sex and a subordinate sex, and

every individual has to appropriate her or his dominant sexuality as well as develop the countersexual personality. While some of the details in Jung's description of the anima and animus may well belong to another era and need discounting or rethinking, the concept of the archetypal experience of the opposite sex within the psyche of every individual remains a strong tenet of Jungian psychology. It might be safe to speculate that every man and every woman could easily point to men and women in their experience who incarnate or illustrate the essence of man and/or woman, and men and women in their experience who enact the characteristics of the opposite sex rather than their dominant sexuality. Our culture is in the midst of re-interpreting what is meant by "the feminine" and "the masculine" as far as characteristics, natural dispositions, strengths and weaknesses of the two sexes are concerned. (There are writers like Judith Bardwick, Juliet Mitchell, Elizabeth Gould Davis, Eleanor Maccoby, to mention only a sampling on the side of the study of woman; Warren Farrell and Myron Brenton, among their counterparts in literature on man.) The point here is that a concept of the self must be attentive to the bi-sexual character of human life.

These then are seven dialectical descriptions of human life which must be included in an adequate concept of the self, the self which emerges as a part of that dialectical process.

A concept of the self must also addrrss itself to self-discovery, self-development, self-emergence. Maslow's hierarchy of needs provides a model which can be of (limited) usefulness

in understanding the development of the self, a structure which incorporates the four aspects of the self often referred to in this dissertation. The basic physiological needs are parallel to the physical self. Safety and security needs, in an expanded interpretation, define or describe the psychological self. Both love and belongingness needs, and self-esteem and esteem by others, are required by and acquired by the social self. And, finally, the growth or metaneeds describe the spiritual self. Both the hierarchy of needs and the hierarchy of selves are more fluid and overlapping than this structure might suggest. The hierarchy does describe, however, a sense of the progression from a more material, elementary, what might be described as "animal" existence, to a more spiritual, sophisticated, distinctively human level of existence. Still, it can best be used only as a limited cross-sectional way of looking at the organic, dynamic reality of human life.

What must be added to the Maslovian hierarchy is the crucially important need for acceptance and adequacy at the level of psychological needs. One needs to be and to feel accepted, but accepted because one is an adequate person. Unconditional acceptance would help, but not suffice, if the person being accepted did not feel worthwhile. In the Stanley Coopersmith study of self-esteem already referred to (Antecedents of Self-Esteem), the author lists four sources of self-esteem (which are simultaneously listed as four criteria for defining success). These are:

1. Power, interpreted as the ability to influence others;

2. Significance, described as the acceptance, attention and affection of others;

3. Virtue, or adherence to moral and ethical standards; and

4. Competence, by which Coopersmith means the successful performance in meeting demands.[6]

These four can be seen as elaborations of acceptance and adequacy, without which one would not be able to develop self-esteem. Significance requires acceptance. Power, virtue and competence all nourish an individual's feeling of adequacy: adequacy in face of her or his own moral expectations; adequacy in face of a task; adequacy within a group (Mead's concept of "functional superiority" is an apt description of adequacy). Of course, these needs are both psychological and social in nature: they enhance safety and security; they speak of love and belongingness; they are essential to self-esteem.

The mulit-level nature of any need can be read as a challenge to the hierarchy. Is there with any consistency a sequential dependency, i.e., can a higher need only emerge when a lower need has been met? Mutual implication seems to be a more accurate description of what happens when any but the most basic needs are met (and mutual implication is involved even at that level). For example, a significant achievement may simultaneously meet one's need for self-esteem and esteem by others and provide a surrogate experience of safety and security. Or a profound love relationship (Being-love) may

make up for a multitude of deficiencies. Or consistent attention to physiological needs can give an infant primitive feelings of safety-security, love and belongingness. Or, take for another example the person who consciously deprives herself or himself of more basic needs for the sake of higher needs. The transmutation, in other words, works from either end of the hierarchy. What needs to be added to Maslow's need hierarchy is the fact that no need is ever permanently satisfied and that needs at any level of the hierarchy can undergo transmutation. The corollary challenge, is, is there really a hierarchy?

The answer is "yes" if the hierarchy is seen as a heuristic instrument; "no" if it is seen as a normative expectation of human growth and development. The hierarchy outlines five distinctive areas of human needs in an order ranging from essential needs for survival to growth needs which make possible a more deeply human life. This arrangement can provide a helpful focus for one's own self-exploration and self-understanding. In a similar way the hierarchy can be used as a model by the therapist in helping get at where a person's needs are not being met. If a client or patient is suffering from unmet deficiency needs, the counselor's job would include exploring the less conscious and the unconscious needs -- obviously the exploration involves a bringing the unconscious to consciousness. It is possible, however, that deficiency needs would be met in a search for higher values. For example, a person who has had minimal experience of love and be-

longingness might have this need satisfied through commitment to a cause for greater justice for a specific segment of society. But if a person's more fundamental or deficiency needs have been sufficiently met, therapy might be a matter of helping the individual locate her or his authentic values. Maslow equated this with a search for identity, "because ultimately the search for identity, is, in essence, the search for one's own intrinsic, authentic values (Toward, p. 177)." In Meadian terms, therapy could be described as the "I" in search for the authentic "me," as distinguishable from the "me" of one's social world. The counselor's job, according to Maslow is one of making people aware of Being needs as well as helping clients experience more fully and thereby re-sacralize their lives (Farther, pp. 44-45). He does not underestimate the value of the good human relationship which therapy provides, good to the extent that it supports and/or improves belongingness, security and self-esteem (Motivation, pp. 248-49).

To return to the question of whether the hierarchy stands -- the answer is "no" with regard to its being presented as a clear, chronological, developmental explanation of human growth and development. As has been discussed at several places in this dissertation, there are unconscious aspects of the needs which throw into question the possibility of accurately measuring or validly evaluating one's conscious need satisfaction at various levels -- much less the possibility of measuring the level of one's self-actualization. Also, needs can be transmuted at the unconscious level -- for

example, the need for safety might be lived out through a search for justice -- and result in one making a faulty reading of the hierarchy. It is even more difficult to determine where an individual is to be located on the hierarchy at any one moment of her or his life. The question being raised here is whether need satisfaction or need deprivation in one area of experience necessarily affects one's whole gestalt. The answer would be a more obvious "yes" in the case of serious, crippling need deprivation. But what about Maslow's chronic fears -- of intense emotional experience, of rejection by the psychological community. Were they more descriptive of his life than was his search for the Being-value of truth? Or would one describe Ruth Benedict more in terms of her low self-esteem than in terms of her passion for understanding human life through her study of anthropology?

A model like Erik Erikson's eight ages, read epigenetically, provides a more accurate developmental typology. The presence of all eight stages at every age is built into the model.

Perhaps it is a question of additional work that is needed in the area of developmental psychology and the need hierarchy. What do needs look like, feel like, how are they experienced at various developmental stages? In what guises do the different levels of needs re-emerge in the case of need deprivation? or need fulfillment? Along the same lines, what does expressive behavior look like at various stages of development? If it is true that the myths (or idealizations)

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devised in early childhood are the roots of the psychological problems of the adult, who still lives out of these unconscious and often neurotic myths, how could parents and teachers be helped to recognize and interpret the myths? How early can the unlived and/or repressed life be understood and brought to light?

As previously stated, the aim of this chapter was to assemble the elements necessary to a concept of the self. The goal was more structural and formal than detailed and specific. The chapter has helped clarify and emphasize the processive and dialectical nature of the self and of self-actualization. It has provided some criteria for testing out my own and anyone else's thinking on the self. In addition, the chapter can be seen as a map for future explorations of the self -- not a specific roadmap indicating major and minor highways and providing accurate mileage charts for precise planning, but the chapter does provide some sense of the shape of the pilgrimage. For a person engaged in teaching and counseling, the search for and facilitation of the development of the self is an on-going task and challenge. It is the hope of the writer that this chapter has aided that search and facilitated that facilitation.

However, the value of the dissertation goes beyond the tentative conclusions incorporated in this chapter. The attempt to engage in a serious conversation with a major psychological thinker has been a valuable experience in itself. Among the significant topics which necessarily became a part

of that conversation are these: the part that personal needs and values play in the building of any theory concerning human life; the importance of examining the degree to which one's unconscious life may influence the very selection of ideas and people which one chooses to study; the necessity of grounding one's thinking within a philosophical, conceptual framework consistent with that thinking, particularly when one has moved into the area of ontology.

I end on a note of gratitude to Abraham Maslow who has consistently been present to me in my search: for revealing so much of himself to us that we may better understand a self in a context; for his optimism; for his willingnes to break new ground; for his creativity that made that ground-breaking eventful and exciting; for his contribution toward a way of understanding the self.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER IX

[1]Jung, Two Essays, Vol. VII, pp. 197, 235.

[2]Margaret Mead, Anthropologist, pp. 97-98.

[3]Jung, Two Essays, Vol. VII, pp. 74-75.

[4]Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (2d ed. rev.; New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1963), p. 268.

[5]F. J. J. Buytendijk, Woman: A Contemporary View (New York: Newman, 1968), p. 108.

[6]Coopersmith, p. 38.

APPENDIX A

LISTINGS IN FIVE OF MASLOW'S BOOKS

Toward a Psychology of Being

9 basic assumptions about human needs (p. 3)

15 conclusions regarding existentialism and psych. (p. 10)

7 deficiency characteristics (p. 22)

5 reasons for postulating tendency to growth (p. 23)

13 characteristics of S-A people (p. 26)

12 differences between D-and B- motivation (p. 27)

10 differences between D- and B- love (p. 42)

13 elements of formula for growth (p. 57)

18 characteristics of cognition in peak-experience (p. 74)

14 Being-values (p. 83)

7 propositions about peak-experiences (p. 101)

16 aspects of identity and peak-experience (p. 104)

8 dangers of B -cognition (p. 116)

10 characteristics of healthy human beings (p. 157)

Religions, Values and Peak-Experiences

25 religious aspects of peak-experience (p. 59)

14 attributes of reality perceived in peak-experience (p. 92)

7 reasons for preferring growth values over regression values (p. 97)

Eupsychian Management

36 assumptions that underlie Eupsychian Management policy (p. 17)

11 propositions about managers (p. 75)

12 aspects of good society (p. 103)

13 articles for society of faith (p. 247)

Motivation and Personality

9 functions of science (p. 4)

8 things that improve science (p. 5)

16 propositions regarding motivation (p. 19)

8 reasons for postulating cognitive impulses (p. 48)

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Toward a Psychology of Being

4 conclusions about nature, society (p. 158)

3 reasons why so many have no real identity (p. 164)

5 conclusions for value theory (p. 165)

6 considerations about healthy people (p. 181)

43 propositions of his system (p. 189)

Farther Reaches of Human Nature

8 ways in which one self-actualizes (p. 45)

16 ways the world looks during peak-experience (p. 106)

15 statements about B-psych. (p. 126)

5 ways the word "being" is used (p. 131)

14 Being-values (p. 133)

16 operations which define Being-values (p. 135)

14 Being-values (p. 138)

5 types who choose B-values (p. 138)

3 conclusions regarding healthy people (p. 166)

29 questions for social psychologists (p. 214)

19 characteristics of B- and D-cognition (p. 260)

35 meanings of transcendence (p. 269)

Motivation and Personality

7 exceptions to the hierarchy (p. 51)

6 gratification theory and its validity (p. 60)

5 consequences of satiation of need (p. 60)

5 components of character learning (p. 63)

19 conative-affective results of gratification (p. 72)

11 cognitive results of gratification (p. 73)

15 character traits of gratified people (p. 74)

8 interpersonal results of gratification (p. 74)

8 miscellaneous results of gratification (p. 75)

7 considerations regarding reevaluation of instinct theory (p. 78)

12 mistakes of instinct theory (p. 79)

10 theoretical considerations in support of instinctoid hypothesis (p. 88)

16 ways in which need hierarchy orders itself (p. 98)

10 repercussions of higher need theory (p. 101)

6 conclusions about use of animal studies (p. 120)

8 differences between expression and coping (p. 132)

3 corollaries regarding behavior (p. 125)

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Farther Reaches of Human Nature

6 progressions or hierarchies (p. 282)

24 characteristics of transcending self-actualizers (p. 283)

15 B-values and metapathologies (p. 318)

28 parts of the theory of metamotivation (p. 299)

3 considerations about Mexican families (p. 371)

11 postulations about two cultures (p. 377)

4 points regarding instinctoid (p. 380)

9 conclusions regarding instincts (p. 380)

18 points regarding instinctoid (p. 382)

Motivation and Personality

18 characteristics of self-actualizing people (p. 153)

4 things healthy people feel guilty about (p. 157)

4 relationship of healthy people with less healthy culture (p. 172)

4 determiners of values for S-A people (p. 176)

7 examples of rubricizing (p. 209)

3 things that constitute rubricizing (p. 218)

8 aspects of means/ends differentiation (p. 231)

5 neglected areas of psychology (p. 234)

7 ways psychotherapy takes place (p. 242)

10 facts that support need-gratification theory (p. 244)

4 formulas for healthy society (p. 258)

6 definitions of normality (p. 266)

3 essentials of health (p. 269)

4 inherent design of needs (p. 273)

4 techniques for differentiating inherent from accidental (p. 275)

5 reasons for considering a person religious (p. 298)

4 single cause mistakes (p. 303)

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